Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

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The Appellant Rex Moats was a former candidate for the thirty ninth district of Nebraska Legislature. During the course of the 2008 election, the Republican Party paid for and distributed publications in opposition to Moatsâ candidacy. Moats filed a complaint in district court, where he identified in eleven separate publications instances of where he claimed the Republican Party defamed him, portrayed him in a false light and violated several consumer protection laws. The Republican Party filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and the court granted it, dismissing Moatsâ case. The Supreme Court noted that context was critical to analyzing whether a statement was defamatory, particularly if the statement expressed a fact or opinion. The Court examined the circumstances in which each statement was made, finding they were political campaign brochures intended to persuade voters to vote against Moats through the use of rhetoric and hyperbole. The Court characterized all of the cited statements as âopinionâ and held they were protected speech under the Constitution. The Court could not find that the statements violated consumer protection laws. Accordingly, it affirmed the district courtâs decision to dismiss Moatsâ case.

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In 2008, Plaintiff Timothy Price filed a pro se complaint in the Superior Court seeking access to the ballots and tally sheets from the November, 2006 election from the town clerk âbefore they are in any way tampered with or destroyed.â The Town of Fairlee moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the time to contest an election or ask for a recount had long since passed. The trial court reviewed Plaintiffâs complaint and concluded that Plaintiff was really requesting public records under the stateâs Public Records Act (PRA). The trial court noted that state law required the town clerk to retain all election materials for a 90-day period following an election, and authorized the clerk to destroy those materials after the 90 days passed. The court reasoned that destruction of the election materials had rendered the case moot since it could not grant the relief Plaintiff requested. Plaintiff then submitted a request to the Town for the election records pursuant to the PRA. This time the Town denied the request, saying the records were not subject to the PRA because the records had been destroyed. Taking the matter to court again, the Town moved to dismiss Plaintiffâs request as moot. This time, however, the trial court denied the Townâs motion to dismiss, holding that the records fell into an exception to the mootness doctrine, for actions âcapable of repetition, yet evading review.â The Town then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the election materials had to be âsecurely sealedâ if they hadnât already been destroyed, and were not available for public disclosure. The court granted the Townâs motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court was correct to entertain Plaintiffâs petition, but erred in ruling that the election records requested were exempt from disclosure under the PRA and erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Town. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower courtâs decision.

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Plaintiffs, three Minnesota-based grass roots advocacy organizations, challenged a Minnesota law that made it a crime to knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make a false statement about a proposed ballot initiative under the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act ("FCPA"), Minn. Stat. 211.B06, subd.1. At issue was whether the district court erred when it dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction; when it alternatively held that it would dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and when it denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The court held that plaintiffs' claims were justiciable and that subject matter jurisdiction was proper in federal court; that plaintiffs did allege First Amendment claims upon which relief could be granted; and that the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment based on its findings of mootness was vacated. Therefore, the court remanded for additional development of arguments regarding whether section 211.b06 satisfied strict scrutiny.

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The United States Secretary of Labor ("Secretary") appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1005 ("Local 1005) on the claim that Local 1005's November 2008 election procedures violated the "adequate safeguards" provision of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. 481(c). At issue was whether the district court applied the wrong legal standard in its analysis and whether the district erred when it determined that Local 1005 did not violate the "adequate safeguards provision" of the LMRDA. The court held that the district court did not apply the wrong legal standard where the district court found no violation of section 481(c). The court also affirmed summary judgment and held that Local 1005's actions regarding the accurate announcement of the sole requirement to stand for elected office, coupled with the fully accurate notices posted both on Local 1005's job site bulletin and boards, as well as on its website, amounted to "adequate safeguards" under the LMRDA.

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Appellant George Janiec, a Republican Party candidate for Mayor of the City of Hammond and an incumbent member of the Hammond School Board, was removed from the May 3, 2011 primary election ballot by Appellee Lake County Board of Election and Registration. Appellant challenged the Boardâs decision in Lake Superior Court, requesting judicial review and injunctive relief. The trial court found in favor of the Board. Appellant appealed the trial courtâs decision and sought immediate transfer of the appeal to the Supreme Court. The Board and Lake Superior Court held that Appellantâs candidacy was inconsistent with the ethical policies applicable to members of the Hammond School Board. The Supreme Court found no basis in statute or law for disqualifying Appellant on this basis, and enjoined the Board from removing Appellantâs name from the ballot in the May 2011 primary election.