Petitioner administered and enforced Nevada's Ethics in Government Law, Nev. Rev. Stat. 281A.420, and investigated respondent, an elected official who voted to approve a hotel/casino project proposed by a company that used respondent's long-time friend and campaign manager as a paid consultant. Petitioner concluded that respondent had a disqualifying conflict of interest under section 281A.420(8)(e)'s catch-all provision and censured him for failing to abstain from voting on the project. At issue was whether legislators have a personal, First Amendment right to vote on any given matter. The Court held that the Nevada Ethics in Government Law was not unconstitutionally overbroad where the law prohibited a legislator who had a conflict both from voting on a proposal and from advocating its passage or failure; where a universal and long-established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct created a strong presumption that the prohibition was constitutional; and where restrictions on legislators' voting were not restrictions on legislators' protected speech because the legislator's vote was the commitment of his apportioned share of the legislature's power to the passage or defeat of a particular proposal and the legislative power thus committed was not personal to the legislator but belonged to the people. The Court also concluded that additional arguments raised in respondent's brief were not decided or raised in his brief in opposition and were thus considered waived. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from the City of San Diego's Municipal Election Campaign Control Ordinance, San Diego, Cal., Municipal Code ch. 2, art. 7, div. 29, which imposed limitations on campaign finance. Plaintiffs raised a First Amendment challenge to the campaign finance laws. The district court considered the provisions and generally upheld the city's pure contribution limits but enjoined a provision that restricted both the fundraising and spending of independent political committees. Both parties cross-appealed the district court's grant in part of preliminary injunctions for certain provisions at issue. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because the district court properly applied the applicable preliminary injunction standard in the context of the presently discernible rules governing campaign finance restrictions. View "Thalheimer, et al. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In Fall 2010, former employees and representatives of the Town of Coulee filed a petition to recall Mayor Rick Heiberg. Of eleven charges, only two were found by the courts to be factually and legally sufficient to support a recall election. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was determined that the two surviving claims against the mayor were not legally sufficient to support a recall. The Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the recall petition. View "In re Recall of Heiberg" on Justia Law

Claiming that he was subjected to dirty tricks during his successful campaign to become the police chief of Vinton, La., plaintiff filed a state court suit against the incumbent chief and the town (collectively, "defendant") asserting both state and federal law claims. Defendant removed the case to federal court based on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims and after discovery, defendant sought summary judgment on the federal claims, which plaintiff conceded were not valid. The District Court accordingly dismissed the federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining claims to state court, noting that defendant's attorneys' work could be useful in the state court proceedings. Defendant then asked the federal court for attorney's fees. At issue was whether a court could grant reasonable fees to defendant when plaintiff's suit involved both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. The Court held that, when a plaintiff's suit involved both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a court could grant reasonable fees to defendant, but only for costs that defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims. The Court concluded that, although the District Court noted the usefulness of the attorneys' work in defending against the state law claims, it failed to take proper account of the overlap between the frivolous and non-frivolous claims; the District Court's reasoning that the close relationship between the federal and state law claims supported the award could not be squared with the congressional policy of sparing defendant from the costs only of frivolous litigation; and the Fifth Circuit did not uphold the award on proper ground where it seemed to think that defendant could receive fees for any work useful to defendant against a frivolous claim, even if his lawyers would have done that work regardless. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fox v. Vice" on Justia Law

Respondent, a resident of Southold, but not a resident of Fishers Island, filed with the Suffolk County Board of Elections a petition designating himself a candidate in the September 2009 primary election. Petitioners filed objections to the designated petition, alleging that it was invalid because respondent did not meet a residency requirement. At issue was the constitutionality of the residency requirement for the elected position of town justice/town board member, Fishers Island, Town of Southold, Suffolk County. The court held that the residency requirement did not violate the equal protection clause and that the residency requirement passed the rational basis test where the residency requirement imposed only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the right to vote; where any Southold resident who would otherwise be eligible to run for political office could run for the Fishers Island seat; where the residency requirement affected the right to vote, but only in an incidental way; and where the legislative history of the residency requirement articulated several rational bases for the residency requirement and retaining the dual town justice/town board member seat.

The Clerk of the McDowell County Commission appealed an order of the Circuit Court of McDowell County pertaining to mandamus proceedings. The Commission was directed to reimburse the attorney fees of A. Ray Bailey who was the prevailing party in an election contest. The Commission argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Commission to pay Mr. Bailey's fees when the Commission was not a party to the election contest. Furthermore, The Commission argued that there was no statutory authority to support the award. Upon review of the arguments and law governing this matter, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order directing payment of attorney fees by the Commission.

Plaintiffs filed a suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief against the City and County of San Francisco and its election officials (collectively, "city") alleging that when more than four candidates run for a particular office, the restricted instant runoff voting ("IRV") system precluded some groups of voters from participating to the same extent as others. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city where plaintiffs alleged that the restricted IRV system was unconstitutional by violating the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court held that, if the aspects of the city's restricted IRV system scheme imposed any burdens on voters' constitutional rights to vote, they were minimal at best. The court also held that the city had advanced valid, sufficiently-important interests to justify using its system. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs had not established that the city's chosen IRV system was unconstitutional and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city.

Appellant Larry Wilson and seventeen other citizens of Philips County challenged the November 2, 2010 election results for several positions on the Helena-West City Council. The Supreme Court found that the complaint contesting the election results was not filed within twenty days of the election as required by statute. Therefore, the Court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The criminal prosecution of the Appellees in this case arose from conduct that allegedly occurred during the election recount of the November, 2004 presidential election. Appellee Jacqueline Maiden was the coordinator for the elections board, and Appellees Kathleen Dreamer and Rosie Grier were the manager and assistant manager, respectively, of the board's Ballot Department. Maiden was in charge of preparing the board's staff for the recount, and Dreamer and Grier were involved in organizing and conducting the recount. In December, 2004, the board met and certified the recount results. During that meeting, information was disclosed that suggested that personnel might not have conducted the recount in accordance with Ohio law. The board did not launch an investigation and did not refer the matter to the prosecutor. In August, 2005, a grand jury was convened, and indicted Dreamer and Grier on election-law violations regarding the recount. The elections board agreed that it would pay the legal fees and expenses of Dreamer, Maiden and Grier in all matters related to their criminal cases if they were not convicted of criminal conduct. In January, 2007, a jury tried Dreamer, Maiden and Grier. Grier was found not guilty on all charges, and the charges against Dreamer and Maiden were eventually dismissed. In 2009, Appellees filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel the prosecutor and commissioners to appoint an independent counsel and to order the commissioners to pay for their legal expenses. The appellate court granted Appellees' the writ, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the writ was available to "county officers" under the applicable state law under which Appellees sought relief. Appellees were "employees" and not "officers." Accordingly, the Court held that the appellate court erred by granting Appellees the writ of mandamus.

Former Governor Jennifer Granholm appointed Defendant Judge Hugh Clarke to the district court. The Attorney General claimed that Defendant was not entitled to hold office beyond January 1, 2011, and brought a quo warranto action to oust him. The Supreme Court found that Defendant is entitled under state law to hold the office of district judge until January 1, 2013. The Court dismissed the Attorney Generalâs quo warranto action.