Appellant appealed the trail court's dismissal of her action contesting the outcome of the August 10, 2010 Stewart County primary election in which she was an unsuccessful candidate. Appellant filed the election contest on August 18, the general election took place on November 2, and the candidate who defeated appellant in the primary was certified as the winner of the election. The court held that appellant's appeal was moot where an election contest challenging the results of a primary election became moot after the general election had taken place and where appellant did not quickly seek statutorily-sanctioned supersedeas and/or an expedited appeal.

Appellants, three Minnesota corporations seeking to advance their respective social and commercial interests, filed suit to enjoin Minnesota election laws on independent expenditures and corporate contributions to candidates and political parties and moved for a preliminary injunction. At issue was whether the district court erred in failing to grant a preliminary injunction because appellants failed to show a likelihood of success. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for an injunction where appellants were unlikely to prevail on the issue of whether Minnesota functionally retained a ban on corporate independent expenditures; appellants were unlikely to prevail on their claim of improper tailoring; and appellants were unlikely to prevail on the direct-contribution issue or the independent-expenditure issue.

Robin Farris filed six charges against the Pierce County Assessor-Treasurer Dale Washam. Ms. Farris charged that Mr. Washam violated whistleblower protections, retaliated against his employees, grossly wasted public funds, failed to cooperate with discrimination and retaliation investigations, and violated his oath of office. Ms. Farris appeared pro se, and there were technical flaws with the filing of her six charges against Mr. Washam. Through the course of the proceedings, Ms. Farris amended her charges to comply with the courtâs rules of pleading. Mr. Washam contended that there was no statutory authority to allow the recall charges to be amended, and because the original filing was fatally flawed, the Supreme Court should dismiss the entire recall effort. On March 3, 2011, the Supreme Court entered a brief order that affirmed the lower courtâs decision to allow the recall effort to proceed. The Courtâs May 12, 2011 order set forth the reasons for its March decision. The Court affirmed the trial court in all aspects.

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of a certified ballot title for âInitiative Petition 10 (2012).â The proposed measure, if approved by the voters, would amend the state constitution to set the procedure for how the state sets its legislative districts following the federal census. Petitioners contended that the caption understates the scope of the changes that adoption of the measure would require under state law, and is thus misleading. The Supreme Court agreed with Petitioners that the caption understates the major effects of adopting the Initiative. The Court remanded the ballot title back to the attorney General for modification.

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of a certified ballot title for âInitiative Petition 12 (2012).â The proposed measure, if approved by the voters, would amend the state constitution to require elections officials to count every qualified voterâs signature on an initiative or referendum petition. Additionally, it would prevent the application of laws intended to prevent forgery or fraud in circulating petitions from being used to count âgoodâ signatures. Petitioners contended that the phrase âcreates enforceable rightâ in the caption printed on the ballot is misleading. The Attorney General responded that it was limited in the number of words it could put in the title, and that the phrase was simply an efficient choice of words. The Supreme Court was ânot persuaded that the applicable word limit compels the use of the phrase,â and remanded the ballot title back to the Attorney Generalâs office for modification.

Appellants brought an action against appellee, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of South Dakota, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments related to appellants' efforts to place a candidate for governor on the 2010 ballot in South Dakota and challenged the constitutionality of two statutory provisions related to that process. At issue was whether appellants had standing to challenge S.D. Codified Laws 12-5-3(9), which permitted only in-state residents to circulate the petitions at issue ("Count II"), and whether the court erred in failing to strike it down as unconstitutional. The court held that all appellants lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the relevant statute and vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Count II without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

The city requires that potential mayoral candidates obtain 12,500 signatures from registered voters within 90 days in order to be placed on the ballot. The district court denied an injunction to prevent enforcement of the rule. The Seventh Circuit, noting that the election has passed, held that the issue is moot and does not fall within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception.

Appellee Michael Grulkey sought to have Appellant Thomas Fite disqualified to run as an electoral candidate to the General Assembly. In July, 2010, the Arkansas Republican Party certified Fite as its candidate for the eighty-third district for the November 2, 2010 election. Grulkey, a registered voter in that district, petitioned the circuit court for a writ of mandamus or declaratory judgment, alleging that Fite was ineligible to hold office because of a prior conviction in 1984 for Medicaid bribery. The court ruled that Fiteâs conviction rendered him ineligible to run for office, and entered the order on October 27, 2010. Appellant appealed the order on November 4, 2010 - two days after the election - and filed a motion to the Supreme Court to expedite review on November 23, 2010. Seeing no need to proceed, the Court dismissed the case citing that any review of a candidateâs eligibility becomes moot once an election has taken place.

The Appellant Rex Moats was a former candidate for the thirty ninth district of Nebraska Legislature. During the course of the 2008 election, the Republican Party paid for and distributed publications in opposition to Moatsâ candidacy. Moats filed a complaint in district court, where he identified in eleven separate publications instances of where he claimed the Republican Party defamed him, portrayed him in a false light and violated several consumer protection laws. The Republican Party filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and the court granted it, dismissing Moatsâ case. The Supreme Court noted that context was critical to analyzing whether a statement was defamatory, particularly if the statement expressed a fact or opinion. The Court examined the circumstances in which each statement was made, finding they were political campaign brochures intended to persuade voters to vote against Moats through the use of rhetoric and hyperbole. The Court characterized all of the cited statements as âopinionâ and held they were protected speech under the Constitution. The Court could not find that the statements violated consumer protection laws. Accordingly, it affirmed the district courtâs decision to dismiss Moatsâ case.

In 2008, Plaintiff Timothy Price filed a pro se complaint in the Superior Court seeking access to the ballots and tally sheets from the November, 2006 election from the town clerk âbefore they are in any way tampered with or destroyed.â The Town of Fairlee moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the time to contest an election or ask for a recount had long since passed. The trial court reviewed Plaintiffâs complaint and concluded that Plaintiff was really requesting public records under the stateâs Public Records Act (PRA). The trial court noted that state law required the town clerk to retain all election materials for a 90-day period following an election, and authorized the clerk to destroy those materials after the 90 days passed. The court reasoned that destruction of the election materials had rendered the case moot since it could not grant the relief Plaintiff requested. Plaintiff then submitted a request to the Town for the election records pursuant to the PRA. This time the Town denied the request, saying the records were not subject to the PRA because the records had been destroyed. Taking the matter to court again, the Town moved to dismiss Plaintiffâs request as moot. This time, however, the trial court denied the Townâs motion to dismiss, holding that the records fell into an exception to the mootness doctrine, for actions âcapable of repetition, yet evading review.â The Town then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the election materials had to be âsecurely sealedâ if they hadnât already been destroyed, and were not available for public disclosure. The court granted the Townâs motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court was correct to entertain Plaintiffâs petition, but erred in ruling that the election records requested were exempt from disclosure under the PRA and erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Town. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower courtâs decision.