In this case, the plaintiffs, BABE VOTE and the League of Women Voters of Idaho, challenged two amendments to Idaho's election laws, House Bills 124 and 340, which modified the forms of identification voters can use to prove their identity when registering to vote and voting at the polls. The plaintiffs argued that the bills violated the Idaho Constitution's guarantee of equal protection and unduly burdened the right of suffrage. The Idaho Secretary of State, Phil McGrane, counterclaimed, seeking a judgment declaring that the bills did not violate these rights under either the Idaho or the United States Constitutions. The district court granted the Secretary’s motions and entered judgment in favor of the Secretary.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the decisions of the district court. The court held that the bills were a valid exercise of the legislature’s power to enact conditions on the right of suffrage under Article VI, section 4 of the Idaho Constitution. The court applied the rational basis test and found that the new laws were rationally related to their stated purpose to clarify and create uniformity by requiring only generally accepted, authentic, and reliable forms of identification as a reasonable condition to exercise the right of suffrage. The court also found that the bills did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Idaho Constitution. View "BABE VOTE v. McGrane" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Reverend Kenneth Simon, Reverend Lewis W. Macklin, II, and Helen Youngblood, collectively known as the "Simon Parties," filed a lawsuit against the Ohio Redistricting Commission and several of its members. They alleged that Ohio's congressional districts violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment. The Simon Parties requested a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284, which the Ohio Redistricting Commission opposed, and moved to dismiss the complaint.The district court denied the motion to convene a three-judge court and granted the motions to dismiss. The court also denied all other pending motions. The Simon Parties appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court incorrectly determined that the Simon Parties' Fourteenth Amendment claim did not raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes. The court stated that the Simon Parties' allegations on this claim were sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction as a single judge to adjudicate any other pending motion because it was required to convene a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284.The court reversed the district court's order denying the motion for a three-judge court, vacated the district court's orders granting the motions to dismiss and denying the motion for temporary restraining order and motion for class certification, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions for it immediately to initiate the procedures to convene a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284. View "Simon v. DeWine" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a contested municipal general election for the Ward 4 Alderman seat in Coldwater, Mississippi. Levon Hayes was declared the winner, but his opponent, Alice Thomas, filed an election contest, suspecting irregularities in the vote count. Hayes was served with the contest and a Rule 4 summons but did not respond or appear in court. Almost a year later, Thomas applied for a default judgment, which the Tate County Circuit Court granted, declaring Thomas the winner and ordering her immediate swearing in.The case was initially heard in the Tate County Circuit Court, where Thomas applied for a default judgment due to Hayes' failure to respond to the election contest. The court granted the default judgment, declared Thomas the winner, and ordered her immediate swearing in.The case was then brought to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The court was tasked with determining whether a default judgment was permissible in this general election contest under Mississippi Code Section 23-15-951 and the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that a default judgment was not permissible and that Thomas's failure to diligently prosecute her contest required its dismissal with prejudice. The court reversed the default judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court to dismiss Thomas's contest with prejudice and to reinstate Hayes as the elected candidate. The court also noted that the Rule 4 summons served to Hayes was improper and that Thomas's delays in prosecuting her contest violated the public's interest in having elections promptly decided. View "In Re: Contest of the Municipal General Election for the Ward 4 Alderman Seat" on Justia Law

The case involves the Arkansas Voter Integrity Initiative, Inc., and Conrad Reynolds (appellants) who filed a complaint against John Thurston, the Arkansas Secretary of State, the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, and Election Systems and Software, LLC (appellees). The appellants claimed that the voting machines approved by the state did not comply with the Arkansas Code and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) because voters could not independently verify their selections on the ballot before casting their votes. They argued that the machines printed ballots with both bar codes and the voter's selections in English, but the vote tabulator only scanned the bar codes. Since most voters cannot read bar codes, the appellants claimed that voters were unable to verify their votes as required by state and federal law. They also alleged that the appellees committed an illegal exaction by using public funds for the purchase and maintenance of these machines and that Election Systems and Software, LLC violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and committed fraud by claiming that its machines complied with state and federal law.The Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the appellants' complaint. The court found that the voting machines complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also denied the appellants' motion for recusal and their motion for a new trial. The appellants appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the voting process complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also found that the appellants failed to demonstrate evidence of bias or prejudice sufficient to warrant the recusal of the circuit court judge. Finally, the court found that the appellants were not deprived of their right to a jury trial and that the circuit court did not err by denying their motion for a new trial. View "ARKANSAS VOTER INTEGRITY INITIATIVE, INC., AND CONRAD REYNOLDS v. JOHN THURSTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE; THE ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, IN ITS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND ELECTION SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, James R. Fouts, the former mayor of Warren, Michigan, brought a lawsuit against defendants including the Warren City Council and the City Election Commission. He claimed that they violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by applying a new term-limit provision retroactively, which prevented him from running for a fifth term as the city's mayor. The term-limit provision was part of an amendment to the city’s charter, passed by voters, that limited the eligibility of certain city offices to three complete terms or twelve years. Despite having already served four terms as mayor, Fouts attempted to run for a fifth term in 2023, but was disqualified.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Fouts’ claims. The court held that Fouts did not have a fundamental right to run for public office, and thus his First Amendment rights were not violated. The court also ruled that the term-limit provision did not apply retroactively, as it only prohibited Fouts from running for a fifth term, and did not impose new obligations or deprive him of any existing rights based on his past conduct. Therefore, his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were not violated. Lastly, the court found that Fouts failed to demonstrate that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated without any rational basis, and thus his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights were not violated. View "Fouts v. Warren City Council" on Justia Law

In this case, the Attorney General of Florida petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for an advisory opinion regarding the validity of a proposed citizen initiative amendment to the Florida Constitution, titled "Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion". The proposed amendment was sponsored by Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc., and sought to limit the government's ability to prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider.The court approved the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot. In its ruling, the court held that the proposed amendment complied with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and that the ballot title and summary complied with section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes. The court also concluded that there is no basis for finding that the proposed amendment is facially invalid under the United States Constitution.The court noted that the ballot summary, which essentially followed the language of the proposed amendment, was an "accurate, objective, and neutral summary of the proposed amendment." Therefore, it concluded that the summary did not mislead voters about what the proposed amendment would achieve. View "Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re: Limiting Government Interference with Abortion" on Justia Law

The Florida Supreme Court was asked to review a proposed amendment to the state constitution legalizing the recreational use of marijuana. The court evaluated the amendment for adherence to the constitution’s single-subject requirement, the clarity of the ballot summary, and whether the amendment was facially invalid under the federal constitution. The amendment, titled "Adult Personal Use of Marijuana," aimed to modify the Florida Constitution to legalize the personal use of marijuana by adults and allow licensed centers to sell and distribute marijuana for personal use.The court ruled that the amendment adhered to the single-subject requirement as it focused on a single dominant plan or scheme, which is the legalization of marijuana for personal use. The court disagreed with the argument that the amendment violated the single-subject requirement by both decriminalizing and commercializing recreational marijuana, stating that the sale and possession are logically and naturally related as part of a dominant plan or scheme.The court also ruled that the ballot summary met the statutory standard for clarity. The court disagreed with the opposition that the ballot summary was misleading because it implied that there were already other state-licensed entities ready to engage in the sale of recreational marijuana.Lastly, the court ruled that the amendment is not facially invalid under the U.S. Constitution. The court rejected the argument that the proposed amendment is preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act and thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause.In conclusion, the court approved the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot, finding it complies with the requirements imposed by the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes. View "Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Adult Personal Use of Marijuana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana ruled on a case involving a dispute over a proposed ballot initiative related to reproductive rights. In the case, Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights and Samuel Dickman, M.D. (MSRR) sought a declaratory judgment arguing that the Attorney General’s proposed ballot statement for Constitutional Initiative 14 (CI-14) was argumentative, prejudicial, and inaccurate. MSRR also contended that their own proposed ballot statement was clear and impartial and should have been approved by the Attorney General.The court considered whether MSRR could challenge the Attorney General’s ballot statement under relevant statutes and whether the Attorney General had violated certain sections of the Montana Code Annotated by submitting an argumentative, prejudicial, and/or inaccurate ballot statement for CI-14 and by declining to approve MSRR’s proposed ballot statement.The court concluded that the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute led to an absurd result that abrogated due process. Therefore, MSRR could challenge the Attorney General’s ballot statement under the relevant statutes. The court also found the Attorney General’s ballot statement for CI-14 failed to comply with statutory requirements as it did not fairly present the voters with what was proposed within the Initiative.However, the court disagreed with MSRR’s contention that the Attorney General was required to approve its ballot statement. The court concluded that while the Attorney General’s statement was deficient, he had the statutory authority to determine if MSRR's ballot statement complied with the requirements. The court then crafted a new ballot statement that complied with statutory requirements. View "Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

In November 2020, Nicholas Douglas was elected to the office of constable of Sumter County. In February 2021, Gregory S. Griggers, the district attorney for the 17th Judicial Circuit, filed a petition for the writ of quo warranto, on behalf of the State of Alabama, alleging that Douglas was not eligible to hold the office of constable because he was not a resident of Sumter County and had "a long history of engaging in conduct that is detrimental to the public good." The trial court denied Douglas's motion to dismiss the petition and after a bench trial, Douglas was removed from office.Douglas appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the quo warranto action. The Supreme Court of Alabama agreed, finding that the action did not comply with the requirements set forth in § 6-6-591, Ala. Code 1975. This statute provides two alternative methods for commencing a quo warranto action: at the direction of a circuit-court judge or without the direction of a circuit-court judge on the information of any person giving security for the costs of the action. In this case, neither of these methods were followed. The court concluded that Griggers was not statutorily authorized to unilaterally commence this quo warranto action on the State's behalf without the direction of a circuit-court judge or without providing security for the costs of the action. Therefore, the trial court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter an order vacating its judgment. View "Douglas v. Griggers" on Justia Law

This case was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and concerns the electoral boundaries of Senate Districts 1 and 2 in eastern North Carolina. The plaintiffs, two North Carolina voters, filed a lawsuit against the North Carolina State Board of Elections and state officials, alleging that the boundaries of these districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the use of these districts in the 2024 elections and requested the adoption of new districts that they had drawn. The District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the request for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs then appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown a clear likelihood of success on the merits of their VRA claim, nor had they demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court also found that the balance of equities favored the defendants, and that an injunction would not serve the public interest. Moreover, the court noted that granting the injunction would disrupt the ongoing 2024 Senate elections, which would not be in the public interest. As such, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not met the high standard necessary for obtaining a preliminary injunction.The key holding of the case is that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a clear likelihood of success on their claim that the boundaries of Senate Districts 1 and 2 in North Carolina violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and failed to show that they would suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction. Furthermore, granting the injunction would disrupt the ongoing 2024 Senate elections and would not serve the public interest. View "Pierce v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law