In 2018, City of Montpelier voters approved a proposed amendment to the city’s charter that would allow noncitizens to vote in its local elections. The Legislature authorized the amendment in 2021, overriding the Governor’s veto. Plaintiffs included two Montpelier residents who were United States citizens and registered to vote in Montpelier, eight Vermont voters who were United States citizens and resided in other localities in the state, the Vermont Republican Party, and the Republican National Committee. They filed a complaint in the civil division against the City and the City Clerk in his official capacity, seeking a declaratory judgment that Montpelier’s new noncitizen voting charter amendment violated Chapter II, § 42 of the Vermont Constitution, and an injunction to prevent defendants from registering noncitizens to vote in Montpelier. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the complaint alleged facts to establish standing at the pleadings stage for plaintiffs to bring their facial challenge to the statute. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute allowing noncitizens to vote in local Montpelier elections did not violate Chapter II, § 42 because that constitutional provision did not apply to local elections. The Court accordingly affirmed the trial court’s grant of the City’s motion to dismiss. View "Ferry, et al. v. City of Montpelier" on Justia Law

Brandon Ducharme appealed a trial court’s finding that the four charges in his recall petition against Washington Governor Jay Inslee were factually and legally insufficient. Ducharme's allegations against the governor fell into two general groups: (1) charges alleging the misuse of vetoes to legislation that occurred in 2019; (2) allegations relating to the governor’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Washington state. After granting Ducharme’s motion for accelerated review, the Washington Supreme Court issued an order affirming the trial court’s ruling. The Court explained that Ducharme did not show that Governor Inslee intended to violate the law in connection with any of the recall charges. Furthermore, the petition failed to demonstrate that the governor acted in a manner that was manifestly unreasonable or unjustified when the actions were taken. Therefore, charges one, two, three, and four were factually and legally insufficient. View "In re Recall of Inslee" on Justia Law

Caroline Avery (“Avery”) filed nomination petitions to run as a Republican candidate for Representative of the Pennsylvania First Congressional District in the May 2022 primary election, and Brittany Kosin (“Kosin”) filed nomination petitions to run as a candidate in the same primary election as a Republican for the Pennsylvania General Assembly seat representing the 178th District. However, both candidates withdrew their primary election nomination petitions by way of Commonwealth Court orders. Avery and Kosin subsequently submitted nomination papers seeking to run as third-party candidates in the November 2022 general election for the same offices that they initially sought to fill as Republican candidates in the 2022 primary election. Various citizens petitioned to set aside these nomination petitions, primarily on grounds that the candidates were barred from appearing on the general election ballot by the Election Code, Subsection 976(e) of the Code, 25 P.S. § 2936(e). In response, both potential candidates argued that they were entitled to participate in the 2022 general election based upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Packrall v. Quail, 192 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1963), and in In re Cohen for Office of Philadelphia City Council-at-Large, 225 A.3d 1083 (Pa. 2020) (“Cohen”). Although neither Avery nor Kosin withdrew their primary election nomination petitions pursuant to Section 914, they argued that, in Cohen, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended Packrall to allow a candidate to run in a general election in the circumstances presented in their cases. The Commonwealth Court rejected this argument, concluding that, in Cohen, a majority of Justices held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Packrall was limited to the particular circumstances of that case and did not apply to the case on appeal here. The Supreme Court issued orders affirming the Commonwealth Court on September 22, 2022; the Court issued this opinion to explain its reasoning. View "In Re: Nomination Papers of Kosin & Avery" on Justia Law

Appellants Rio Grande Foundation (“RGF”) and Illinois Opportunity Project (“IOP”) were nonprofit advocacy groups challenging an amendment to New Mexico’s Campaign Reporting Act (“CRA”), which required groups spending over designated amounts on electioneering communications to state their identities on the materials and to disclose the identities of their donors to New Mexico’s Secretary of State (the “Secretary”). Appellants claimed these requirements burdened their First Amendment rights and chilled their planned speech in the 2020 election cycle. The district court dismissed the case at summary judgment for lack of standing, reasoning Appellants showed no injury-in-fact under the framework the Tenth Circuit laid out in Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006). After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal here in part, holding that RGF had standing to pursue its First Amendment challenge to the amended CRA’s disclosure requirement. The Court affirmed the dismissal of IOP’s claims, but on grounds different than those relied on by the district court. View "Rio Grande Foundation, et al. v. Oliver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the final statements in the "Predatory Debt Collection Protection Act" initiative description, when read in its entirety, did not communicate objectively false or misleading information.Plaintiff filed a complaint claiming that the initiative description at issue was legally insufficient because the final statement "Does not change existing law regarding secured debt" was misleading or objectively false. The trial court denied the objection and ordered that the Act qualified to appear on the general election ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the description, when read in its entirety, alerted a reasonable person to the principal provisions' general objectives and was not objectively false or misleading. View "Protect Our Ariz. v. Fontes" on Justia Law

A special election was scheduled to fill Alaska’s vacant seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Due to time constraints the election was conducted entirely by mail. The Division of Elections created an online ballot delivery system to accommodate visually impaired Alaskans, but the system required voters to print out their ballots and return them by mail or fax or at a drop-off location. An organization advocating for the rights of visually impaired Alaskans sued the Division, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that would prevent the Division from certifying the election results until visually impaired voters were able to participate independently. The superior court granted the preliminary injunction. Because the Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court erred in its analysis of the tests for granting a preliminary injunction, it vacated the order on June 11, 2022. This opinion explained the Supreme Court's reasoning. View "Alaska Division of Elections v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, ex rel. B.L." on Justia Law

Petitioner Reed Scott-Schwalbach sought review of the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 5 (2024) (IP 5), contending that various aspects did not comply with the requirements for ballot titles set out in ORS 250.035(2). The proposal would create a constitutional right for parents to select any kindergarten-through-twelfth-grade (“K-12”) Oregon public school statewide, including any public charter school, for their children to attend throughout each school year, defined in the measure as a parent’s “chosen school.” Unless an exception set out in the measure applies, the chosen school district would be required to admit the child for enrollment in the chosen school. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with those requirements. The Court concluded that the caption, the “yes” result statement, and the summary had to be modified. View "Scott-Schwalbach v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision denying a request for mandamus or injunctive relief related to the political composition of the persons verifying signatures used for mail ballots in Clark County, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief.The Republican National Committee (RNC) brought a petition asserting that the composition of the temporary workers hired from employment agencies to verify signatures on returned mail ballots disproportionately excluded Republicans, and therefore, the Clark County Registrar violated his duty under Nev. Rev. Stat. 293B.360(2) to ensure that the members of each special election board represent all political parties "as equally as possible." The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that RNC failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief. View "Republican Nat'l Committee v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this election complaint asserting that the November 8, 2022 primary election ballot violated Haw. Const. art. II, 4 and Haw. Rev. Stat. 12-31 and that James Malish should have been included in the 2022 general election ballot because he was unopposed as a nonpartisan candidate, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.Plaintiffs Karl Dicks, an unsuccessful Republican candidate for the office of State Senator, District 17, and Malish, the only nonpartisan candidate in the primary election for the office of State Senator, District 9, brought this pro se complaint asserting that the primary election ballot unconstitutionally required selection of a political preference and that the manner in which it displayed a nonpartisan candidate could be construed to require declaration of a political preference when selecting a nonpartisan ballot. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the election complaint failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted. View "Malish v. Nago " on Justia Law

At issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the office of Mayor in the City of Thornton, Colorado constituted a separate office from that of Councilmember for purposes of article XVIII, section 11(1) of the Colorado Constitution (“section11”), which restricted individuals from serving “more than two consecutive terms in office.” This issue was of consequence to the people of Thornton because the Supreme Court's resolution of this question determined the applicable term limit for the then-current Thornton Mayor, petitioner Jan Kulmann. Based on the plain language of the Thornton City Charter and Thornton Municipal Code, the Supreme Court concluded that the Mayor and Councilmembers in Thornton serve in distinct offices. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling declaring, as a matter of law, that the Mayor’s seat and Councilmembers’ seats were part of one elected body and constituted the same office for purposes of section 11’s term limit restrictions. View "Kulmann v. Salazar" on Justia Law