After a political action committee and two political candidates successfully campaigned for a ballot measure in a Redondo Beach municipal election, two citizens filed suit against the committee and the candidates, claiming the candidates had controlled the committee, which had used an improper title for itself. The trial court ruled in favor of the committee and candidates, awarding them attorney fees.In consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeal concluded that the nonparties have standing to appeal the judgment; substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Rescue was a general purpose committee and that neither candidate controlled it; and the trial court acted beyond its authority by issuing a judgment against nonparties to the action. The court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants, who were unquestionably the prevailing party. Finally, the court denied the request for sanctions because the appeal of the attorney fees was not frivolous. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition filed by Mark W. Miller seeking to bar the Hamilton County Board of Elections and its members from placing the name of Aftab Pureval on the ballot as a candidate for mayor of Cincinnati in the May 4, 2021 nonpartisan primary election, holding that the board did not abuse its discretion.On appeal, Miller argued that the Board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by denying his protest of Pureval's candidacy. Specifically, Miller argued that Pureval's part-petitions did not include sworn affidavits of the petition circulators in alleged violation of the Cincinnati City Charter. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Pureval's part-petitions included in circulator statements substantially complied with the charter's prescribed form. View "State ex rel. Miller v. Hamilton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Petitioners' request for a preliminary injunction and finding that the entirety of Ark. Code Ann. 7-9-601(b) is unconstitutional, holding that the circuit court did not abuse abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.Petitioners filed a complaint arguing that section 7-9-601(b)'s requirements requiring sponsors of initiatives to obtain federal background checks from the Arkansas State Police are unconstitutional and should be enjoined. The circuit court granted Petitioners' request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the entirety of section 7-9-601(b) is unconstitutional and enjoining Respondents from applying its provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioners demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and that irreparable harm would result in the absence of an injunction. View "Thurston v. Safe Surgery Arkansas" on Justia Law

Calumet City held a referendum proposing that candidates could not seek the office of mayor while simultaneously holding an elected, paid state office. Before the outcome of the referendum was certified, Representative Jones of the 29th District of the General Assembly filed nomination papers seeking the office of mayor. The referendum was later certified as adopted. The day after certification, objectors brought suit to bar Jones from appearing on the February 2021 ballot in light of the newly passed referendum. The Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City sustained the objection and removed Jones from the ballot. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed, directing that Jones’s name appear on the ballot but that all his votes be impounded or suppressed. The appellate court summarily reversed and ordered that Jones appear on the ballot.The Illinois Supreme Court stayed the appellate court order and subsequently reversed in favor of Jones. The referendum became effective on November 24, 2020, the date the election was certified. Because Jones filed his nomination papers on November 16, 2020, he was legally qualified to run for mayor at that time. His nomination papers were not defective at that time. View "Jones v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City" on Justia Law

Madigan was elected to the Illinois House of Representatives in 1970 and re-elected to 25 additional two-year terms. He became Speaker of the House in 1983 and the state’s Democratic Party Chairman in 1998. In 2021 he withdrew from the race to be reelected as Speaker and resigned his seat in the House and his role as Chairman. Four candidates were on the ballot for the 2016 Democratic primary. Madigan won with 65% of the votes; Gonzales received 27%, Rodriguez 6%, and Barboza 2%. Gonzales sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Rodriguez and Barboza were stooges put on the ballot by Madigan’s allies to divide the Hispanic vote, violating the Equal Protection Clause.The district judge noted that Gonzales had made his suspicions public early in the race and that an editorial in the Chicago Sun-Times agreed with Gonzales. Concluding that the voters were not deceived, the court granted summary judgment against Gonzales. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge did not penalize Gonzales’s campaign speech. Speech, including in depositions and interrogatories, often affects litigation's outcome; a judge who takes account of speech that proves or refutes a claim does not violate the First Amendment. Gonzales told the voters that he thought Madigan had played a dirty trick. The electorate sided with Madigan. The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to upset that outcome or to penalize a politician for employing a shady strategy that voters tolerate. View "Gonzales v. Madigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court declaring Bobby Lee Jones ineligible to hold the office of Justice of the Peace, holding that the trial court erred by not providing Jones with a hearing on the propriety of taking judicial notice of an order in a prior case.In 2006, Jones ran for Justice of the Peace for Phillips County, District One. The court entered an order (2006 order) concluding that Jones was a convicted felon and was therefore ineligible to hold public office. In 2020, Jones again ran for Justice of the Peace for Phillips County, District One. In response, the State brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Jones was ineligible to hold office because of his prior felony convictions. During trial, the trial court took judicial notice of the 2006 order, determined that res judicata applied, and concluded that Jones was ineligible to hold public office. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by not providing Jones with a hearing on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the 2006 order. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court vacating the finding of the Arkansas Ethics Commission that Susan Weaver violated Ark. Code Ann. 7-6-228(c)(1) when a magazine published her campaign advertisement without a required disclosure during Weaver's 2018 judicial campaign, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's decision.Faulkner Lifestyle published an ad of Weaver's candidacy without statutorily required financial disclosure language. The Commission found that section 7-6-228(c)(1) did not require a culpable mental state but, if it did, Weaver violated the statute by acting negligently. The circuit court vacated the finding, holding that the Commission erred in concluding that the standard of proof for a violation of section 7-6-228(c)(1) is strict liability and that insufficient evidence supported the Commission's finding that Weaver was negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's conclusion. View "Arkansas Ethics Commission v. Weaver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted a petition for writ of mandamus and directed the Austin City Council to delete the word "anyone" from a proposed ordinance before placing it on the ballot, holding that Relators clearly established their entitlement to mandamus relief in one respect.The council's ballot language said the proposed ordinance created a criminal offense and penalty for anyone sitting or lying down on a public sidewalk or sleeping outdoors in or near downtown and for anyone camping in a public area not designated by the Parks and Recreation Department. The ordinance, however, did not apply "to anyone" who engaged in the enumerated activities but, rather, only a subset of those who engaged in the covered behavior could be penalized under the ordinance. The Supreme Court conditionally granted in part the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the word "anyone" in the ballot language threatened to mislead the voters. View "In re Durnin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, black citizens of Misssissippi who have lost their right to vote in Mississippi because they were convicted of crimes enumerated in section 241 of the Mississippi Constitution, filed suit alleging that section 241 violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it was enacted with a discriminatory purpose.After determining that plaintiffs have Article III standing and that the suit is not barred by sovereign immunity, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that per Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998), the discriminatory taint of the 1890 provision was removed by the amendment processes in 1950 and 1968. Furthermore, under the rule of orderliness, the court was bound by that decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Secretary of State. View "Harness v. Hosemann" on Justia Law

In 2020 Krislov sought to run in the Democratic primary for a position on the Illinois Supreme Court. To get on the ballot he needed 5,050 valid signatures, 0.4% of the votes cast in the same district for the same party’s candidate in the most recent gubernatorial election. He submitted about 9,500 signatures, but many were ruled invalid and his total fell about 100 short. Instead of protesting that decision in state court, Krislov sued in federal court, arguing that falling 100 signatures short of 5,050 is within the margin of error for document examiners. The district court dismissed the case as a state-law challenge to a state-law requirement, which Krislov had forfeited by not using his state remedies and stating that “close enough for government work” is not an available doctrine in Illinois.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. The U.S. Constitution does not require states to ensure that their laws are accurately administered. Accurate adjudication always is in the public interest—as is accurate administration of state law—but federal courts cannot proceed if the plaintiff lacks standing or the proposed remedy would not redress the plaintiff’s injury. The election is over and Krislov cannot establish that the same problem is likely to recur for him, personally; if it does, Krislov is entitled to prompt review in state court. There is no “public interest” exception to the justiciability rules. View "Krislov v. Yarbrough" on Justia Law