Madigan was elected to the Illinois House of Representatives in 1970 and re-elected to 25 additional two-year terms. He became Speaker of the House in 1983 and the state’s Democratic Party Chairman in 1998. In 2021 he withdrew from the race to be reelected as Speaker and resigned his seat in the House and his role as Chairman. Four candidates were on the ballot for the 2016 Democratic primary. Madigan won with 65% of the votes; Gonzales received 27%, Rodriguez 6%, and Barboza 2%. Gonzales sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Rodriguez and Barboza were stooges put on the ballot by Madigan’s allies to divide the Hispanic vote, violating the Equal Protection Clause.The district judge noted that Gonzales had made his suspicions public early in the race and that an editorial in the Chicago Sun-Times agreed with Gonzales. Concluding that the voters were not deceived, the court granted summary judgment against Gonzales. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge did not penalize Gonzales’s campaign speech. Speech, including in depositions and interrogatories, often affects litigation's outcome; a judge who takes account of speech that proves or refutes a claim does not violate the First Amendment. Gonzales told the voters that he thought Madigan had played a dirty trick. The electorate sided with Madigan. The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to upset that outcome or to penalize a politician for employing a shady strategy that voters tolerate. View "Gonzales v. Madigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court declaring Bobby Lee Jones ineligible to hold the office of Justice of the Peace, holding that the trial court erred by not providing Jones with a hearing on the propriety of taking judicial notice of an order in a prior case.In 2006, Jones ran for Justice of the Peace for Phillips County, District One. The court entered an order (2006 order) concluding that Jones was a convicted felon and was therefore ineligible to hold public office. In 2020, Jones again ran for Justice of the Peace for Phillips County, District One. In response, the State brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Jones was ineligible to hold office because of his prior felony convictions. During trial, the trial court took judicial notice of the 2006 order, determined that res judicata applied, and concluded that Jones was ineligible to hold public office. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by not providing Jones with a hearing on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the 2006 order. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court vacating the finding of the Arkansas Ethics Commission that Susan Weaver violated Ark. Code Ann. 7-6-228(c)(1) when a magazine published her campaign advertisement without a required disclosure during Weaver's 2018 judicial campaign, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's decision.Faulkner Lifestyle published an ad of Weaver's candidacy without statutorily required financial disclosure language. The Commission found that section 7-6-228(c)(1) did not require a culpable mental state but, if it did, Weaver violated the statute by acting negligently. The circuit court vacated the finding, holding that the Commission erred in concluding that the standard of proof for a violation of section 7-6-228(c)(1) is strict liability and that insufficient evidence supported the Commission's finding that Weaver was negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's conclusion. View "Arkansas Ethics Commission v. Weaver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted a petition for writ of mandamus and directed the Austin City Council to delete the word "anyone" from a proposed ordinance before placing it on the ballot, holding that Relators clearly established their entitlement to mandamus relief in one respect.The council's ballot language said the proposed ordinance created a criminal offense and penalty for anyone sitting or lying down on a public sidewalk or sleeping outdoors in or near downtown and for anyone camping in a public area not designated by the Parks and Recreation Department. The ordinance, however, did not apply "to anyone" who engaged in the enumerated activities but, rather, only a subset of those who engaged in the covered behavior could be penalized under the ordinance. The Supreme Court conditionally granted in part the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the word "anyone" in the ballot language threatened to mislead the voters. View "In re Durnin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, black citizens of Misssissippi who have lost their right to vote in Mississippi because they were convicted of crimes enumerated in section 241 of the Mississippi Constitution, filed suit alleging that section 241 violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it was enacted with a discriminatory purpose.After determining that plaintiffs have Article III standing and that the suit is not barred by sovereign immunity, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that per Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998), the discriminatory taint of the 1890 provision was removed by the amendment processes in 1950 and 1968. Furthermore, under the rule of orderliness, the court was bound by that decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Secretary of State. View "Harness v. Hosemann" on Justia Law

In 2020 Krislov sought to run in the Democratic primary for a position on the Illinois Supreme Court. To get on the ballot he needed 5,050 valid signatures, 0.4% of the votes cast in the same district for the same party’s candidate in the most recent gubernatorial election. He submitted about 9,500 signatures, but many were ruled invalid and his total fell about 100 short. Instead of protesting that decision in state court, Krislov sued in federal court, arguing that falling 100 signatures short of 5,050 is within the margin of error for document examiners. The district court dismissed the case as a state-law challenge to a state-law requirement, which Krislov had forfeited by not using his state remedies and stating that “close enough for government work” is not an available doctrine in Illinois.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. The U.S. Constitution does not require states to ensure that their laws are accurately administered. Accurate adjudication always is in the public interest—as is accurate administration of state law—but federal courts cannot proceed if the plaintiff lacks standing or the proposed remedy would not redress the plaintiff’s injury. The election is over and Krislov cannot establish that the same problem is likely to recur for him, personally; if it does, Krislov is entitled to prompt review in state court. There is no “public interest” exception to the justiciability rules. View "Krislov v. Yarbrough" on Justia Law

The Freedom Foundation was a nonprofit organization that describes itself as committed to “advanc[ing] individual liberty, free enterprise and limited, accountable government in the Evergreen State.” The Foundation brought citizen’s actions against Teamsters Local 117; Service Employees International Union Political Education and Action Fund (SEIU PEAF); and Governor Inslee, the Department of Social and Health Services, and Service Employees International Union 775 for various alleged violations of Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA). In consolidated appeals, the issue common to all was whether the Freedom Foundation satisfied the FCPA’s prerequisites before filing their citizen’s actions. In each case, the superior courts ruled the Foundation failed to meet a 10-day deadline required by the FCPA and, accordingly, entered judgment for respondents. After review, the Washington Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. With respect to the Foundation's suit against the Teamsters Local 117, the Supreme Court determined that though the superior court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings to the union, the court’s entry of judgment would have been proper as summary judgment, and was thus affirmed. This result precluded the Foundation’s other challenges to the superior court’s rulings, which were therefore not addressed. As to the union's cross-appeal of its counterclaim against the Foundation under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Foundation was not a state actor, was not wielding powers traditionally and exclusively reserved to the State, and therefore was not subject to suit under section 1983. View "Freedom Found. v. Teamsters Local 117" on Justia Law

Schwamberger, a former deputy director of the Marion County Board of Elections sued the Board and its former director, Meyer, asserting, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that the defendants’ actions constituted First Amendment retaliation, violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Each Ohio County Board of Elections must have four members divided equally between the two major parties. The deputy director (Schwamberger) and the director (Meyer) are always members of opposite political parties, R.C. 3501.091, and deputy directors serve at the pleasure of their county boards. Schwamberger was terminated for impermissibly commenting on the election process, and therefore on policy and political issues related to her deputy-director position, after attempting to complain about errors in the 2018 election to the Board.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Schwamberger’s suit. Schwamberger’s speech proximately caused her termination but that speech implicated policy concerns; she was a policymaking employee, so her speech was unprotected. Schwamberger has not demonstrated a property interest in her position. Under Ohio law, she was an at-will employee who served at the pleasure of the Board. Even if the Board did act “arbitrarily” regarding her discharge, its actions do not create a constitutional claim. View "Schwamberger v. Marion County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court finding that Javier Soto, a candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination for the Arizona House of Representatives in Legislative District 3, obtained enough valid signatures to qualify for placement on the primary election ballot, holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) signatures dated with a month and day but no year substantially complied with the requirement of a "[d]ate of signing"; (2) signatures that listed the signer's street address but no municipality, state, or zip code substantially complied with the requirement of an "actual residence address"; and (3) the trial court did not err by finding the signatures valid. View "McKenna v. Soto" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit dismissed defendants' appeal of the district court's decision permanently enjoining as unconstitutional a South Dakota law regulating ballot-petition circulation, as well as plaintiffs' cross-appeal of the district court's failure to decide all of their claims. While defendants' appeal was pending, the South Dakota Legislature enacted SB 180, which substantially changed the ballot-petition process, replacing HB 1094. Therefore, defendants' appeal is moot and the court lacked jurisdiction. The court also concluded, based on considerations of public interest, that defendants failed to show their entitlement to vacatur and the court declined to vacate the district court's judgment. In regard to plaintiffs' cross-appeal, the court concluded that the district court has not yet decided all of plaintiffs' claims and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over the cross-appeal based on the lack of a final order. View "SD VOICE v. Noem" on Justia Law