Two days after Wisconsin certified the results of its 2020 election, the President invoked the Electors Clause of the U.S. Constitution and sued the Wisconsin Elections Commission, Governor, Secretary of State, and several local officials. The district court concluded that the President’s challenges lacked merit, as he objected only to the administration of the election, yet the Electors Clause only addresses the authority of the State’s Legislature to prescribe the manner of appointing its presidential electors. The court concluded that the President’s claims would fail even under a broader, alternative reading of the Electors Clause that extended to a state’s conduct of the presidential election.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wisconsin lawfully appointed its electors in the manner directed by its Legislature. The President’s claim also fails because of the unreasonable delay that accompanied the challenges the President now wishes to advance against Wisconsin’s election procedures. The Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts should avoid announcing or requiring changes in election law and procedures close in time to voting. The President had a full opportunity before the election to pursue challenges to Wisconsin law underlying his present claims; he cannot now—after the election results have been certified as final— seek to bring those challenges. View "Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The City filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish whether Measure P, the Fresno Clean and Safe Neighborhood Parks Tax Ordinance, has been duly enacted through the voters' initiative power. On the same day the City filed its action, FBHC filed its own complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate, seeking a declaration declaring that Measure P had been duly enacted.The Court of Appeal consolidated the cases and endorsed the holdings and reasoning of All Persons City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in the Matter of Proposition C (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 703, 708. Finding that All Persons was controlling in this case, the court concluded that neither Proposition 13 nor Proposition 218 affects the voters' initiative power, and therefore neither imposes a two-thirds voting requirement on the passage of voter initiatives that impose special taxes. The court rejected the Association's policy argument, noting that the Association's policy concerns are best addressed by the Legislature. The court reversed the judgments; on the City's action, the court ordered the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of FBHC declaring that Measure P has passed; and on FBHC's action, the court directed the trial court to enter a new judgment granting FBHC's request for declaratory relief and declaring that Measure P has passed. View "City of Fresno v. Fresno Building Healthy Communities" on Justia Law

Following a narrow loss to David Archie in the Hinds County Mississippi Board of Supervisors for District 2 Primary Election, Darrell McQuirter filed a Petition to Contest Qualifications of Archie as nominee for supervisor, claiming that Archie was not a resident of District 2 at the time of the primary election. The Hinds County circuit court found in favor of Archie. Specifically, the trial court found Archie established he domicile within Hinds County District 2. The record did not indicate that the trial judge acted alone. But the trial judge’s final order did not expressly mention elections commissioners’ concurrences, and there was no evidence of any dissent. McQuirter argued on appeal: (1) the trial judge erred by failing to allow the election commissioners to either concur or dissent on either the record or in the trial judge’s order; and (2) the trial court erred by finding that Archie qualified as a resident of the district. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded McQuirter bore the burden of supplying the Court with evidence through the record that established his claim of error, but failed to do so. If the requisite number of election commissioners attend and none dissent, per the applicable statute, the “facts shall not be subject to appellate review.” A majority of the Supreme Court found the statute did not require concurrences of commissioner be placed in the record: "Together, Sections 23-15-931 and -933 bar appellate review of the factual findings without evidence of any commissioner’s dissent or lack of attendance, not concurrence. Here, the commissioners were in attendance, and none dissented." If actual dissents existed, the Court held McQuirter had a duty to supply the Court with a record that evidenced a dissent or the inability to provide record of a dissent; the trial judge’s lack of indicating the commissioners’ concurrence does not suggest that one or more had dissented. The Court thus determined review of Archie's residence was precluded. Judgement of the trial court was affirmed. View "McQuirter v. Archie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this election complaint challenging the result of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OAH) at-large trustee election in the November 3, 2020 general election, holding that Plaintiff Keoni Souza did not provide specific facts or actual information of mistakes, errors, or irregularities sufficient to change the result of the election.Souza was a candidate in the OHA at-large trustee election. Keli'i Akina received the highest number of votes, and Souza received 1,623 fewer votes than Akina. In this complaint, Souza asserted five claims for relief, alleging, among other things, that Act 135, as codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. 11-158, is arbitrary and that a recount was warranted. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding (1) Souza failed to demonstrate that Act 135 is arbitrary or flawed such that the results of the OHA at-large trustee election would be different; and (2) Souza was not entitled to relief on any remaining allegations of error. View "Souza v. Ige " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court rejected Donald Trump's effort to invalidate more than 220,000 votes from Dane and Milwaukee Counties in the 2020 presidential election, holding that the challenge to indefinitely confined voter ballots was without merit and that laches barred relief on the remaining three categories of challenged ballots.Petitioners brought this action seeking to invalidated a sufficient number of Wisconsin ballots to change Wisconsin's certified election results, focusing its objections on four different categories of ballots applying only to voters in Dane and Milwaukee County. Among those challenged ballots were ballots cast by voters who claimed indefinitely confined status since March 25, 2020. The Supreme Court concluded that the Petitioners were not entitled to the requested relief, holding (1) the challenge to the indefinitely confined voter ballots was meritless on its face; and (2) the other three categories of challenged ballots failed under the doctrine of laches. View "Trump v. Biden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Governor Evers' Emergency Order #12 did not render all Wisconsin electors "indefinitely confined," thereby obviating the requirement of a valid photo identification to obtain an absentee ballot.Petitioners, Mark Jefferson and the Republican Part of Wisconsin, filed a petition for original action seeking a declaration that Respondents lacked the authority to issue an interpretation of Wisconsin's election law allowing all electors in Dane County to obtain an absentee ballot without photo identification and that the Emergency Order did not authorize all Wisconsin voters to obtain an absentee ballot without a photo identification. The Supreme Court answered (1) Wis. Stat. 6.86(2)(a) requires that each individual elector make his or her own determination as to whether the elector is indefinitely confined, and an elector is indefinitely confined for purposes of section 6.86(2)(a) for only the enumerated reasons therein; and (2) Respondents' interpretation of Wisconsin election laws was erroneous. View "Jefferson v. Dane County" on Justia Law

Delaware’s Constitution contains a political balance requirement for appointments to the state’s major courts. No more than a bare majority of judges on any of its five major courts “shall be of the same political party.” Art. IV, section 3. On three of those courts, those members not in the bare majority “shall be of the other major political party.” Adams, a Delaware lawyer and political independent, sued, claiming that those requirements violate his First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him ineligible to become a judge unless he joins a major political party.The Supreme Court held that because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he failed to show a “personal,” “concrete,” and “imminent” injury necessary for Article III standing. A grievance that amounts to nothing more than abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the proper application of the law is not an “injury in fact.” Adams must at least show that he is likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future if not barred because of political affiliation. Adams’ only supporting evidence is his statements that he wanted to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any of Delaware’s courts. The evidence fails to show that, when he filed suit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in the reasonably foreseeable future. Adams’ statements lack supporting evidence, like efforts to determine possible judicial openings or other preparations. Adams did not apply for numerous existing judicial vacancies while he was a registered Democrat. He then read a law review article arguing that Delaware’s judicial eligibility requirements unconstitutionally excluded independents, changed his political affiliation, and filed suit. View "Carney v. Adams" on Justia Law

This case involved cross appeals regarding a petition to recall Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan based on events that occurred at protests following the killing of George Floyd. The recall petition alleged Mayor Durkan failed to adequately control the Seattle Police Department’s (SPD) response to the protests, allowing the police to use unnecessary force and causing significant harm to nonviolent protesters, local residents, media representatives, and medical aid workers. Of the seven recall charges, six were dismissed by the trial court and one was allowed to move forward. Mayor Durkan appealed the charge that was allowed to move forward, and the recall petitioners appealed the dismissal of two other charges. On October 8, 2020, the Washington Supreme Court issued an order affirming the trial court’s dismissal of two recall charges and reversing the finding that one charge was sufficient for recall. View "In re Recall of Durkan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition filed by Petitioners asking the Supreme Court to temporarily restrain the State Canvassing Board from certifying the results of the November 3, 2020 general election held in Minnesota and to require a full recount of the federal and state offices on the ballot, holding that the petition must be dismissed.Petitioners asserted three claims in their petition. Counts I and II rested on challenges to consent decrees entered by the district court that suspended the witness requirement for absentee and mail ballots for the 2020 general election. Count III challenged the processes used in some counties for conducting the post-election review. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding (1) Counts I and II were barred by laches; and (2) because Petitioners did not file proof that the petition was served in compliance with Minn. Stat. 204B.44, Count III must be dismissed. View "Kistner v. Simon" on Justia Law

Ten days after the 2020 presidential election, plaintiff, a Georgia voter, filed suit against state election officials to enjoin certification of the general election results, to secure a new recount under different rules, and to establish new rules for an upcoming runoff election. Plaintiff alleged that the extant absentee-ballot and recount procedures violated Georgia law and, as a result, his federal constitutional rights. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for emergency relief.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiff lacks standing to sue because he fails to allege a particularized injury. The court explained that plaintiff alleged only a generalized grievance because he bases his standing on his interests in ensuring that only lawful ballots are counted, and an injury to the right to require that the government be administered according to the law is a generalized grievance. In this case, plaintiff cannot explain how his interest in compliance with state election laws is different from that of any other person.Even if plaintiff had standing, because Georgia has already certified its election results and its slate of presidential electors, plaintiff's requests for emergency relief are moot to the extent they concern the 2020 election. The court stated that the Constitution makes clear that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the court may not entertain post-election contests about garden-variety issues of vote counting and misconduct that may properly be filed in state courts. View "Wood v. Raffensperger" on Justia Law