The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in this election dispute, holding that because the election at issue had already occurred, the case was moot.In this action, Appellant, a qualified voter, challenged the ballot title of two proposed constitutional amendments referred by the General Assembly to the voters of the State of Arkansas for the November 3, 2020 general election. On October 26, 2020, the circuit court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss with prejudice. The next day, Appellant filed his notice of appeal, asserting that the circuit court erred in declining to overrule Becker v. Riviere, 641 S.W.2d 2 (Ark. 1982), and its progeny. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the case was moot and that none of the exceptions to mootness applied. View "Kimbrell v. Thurston" on Justia Law

Challengers filed suit alleging that a 2018 North Carolina law requiring voters to present photographic identification is unconstitutional because it was enacted with the same discriminatory intent as the 2013 Omnibus Law. The district court found that the Challengers were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims and issued a preliminary injunction against the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a legislature's past acts do not condemn the acts of a later legislature, which the court must presume acts in good faith. In this case, the district court considered the General Assembly's discriminatory intent in passing the 2013 Omnibus Law to be effectively dispositive of its intent in passing the 2018 Voter-ID Law. In doing so, it improperly flipped the burden of proof at the first step of its analysis and failed to give effect to the Supreme Court's presumption of legislative good faith in Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). Consequently, these errors fatally infected its finding of discriminatory intent.Furthermore, once the proper burden and the presumption of good faith are applied, the Challengers fail to meet their burden of showing that the General Assembly acted with discriminatory intent in passing the 2018 Voter-ID Law. The court considered the Arlington Heights factors—the sequence of events leading to enactment, legislative history, and disparate impact—and concluded that they cannot support a finding of discriminatory intent. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. View "North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Raymond" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Democratic Party nominee Jimmie Wilson had been convicted of crimes that disqualified him under Ark. Const. art. IV, 9 from serving in the Arkansas House of Representatives and finding that Wilson's presidential pardon did not restore his eligibility to sit as a representative, holding that the circuit court did not err.In 1990, Wilson entered a guilty plea in federal court to five misdemeanor offenses. In 2001, Wilson received a presidential pardon from President William Jefferson Clinton. In 2020, Wilson was selected as the Democratic Party nominee to run in the November 3, 2020 election for the House District 12 seat. On October 15, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that Wilson was disqualified from serving in the Arkansas General Assembly. The circuit court ruled that Wilson was ineligible to serve in the Arkansas House of Representatives due to his convictions and that his presidential pardon did not restore his eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that Wilson's presidential pardon did not restore his eligibility to sit as a representative in the Arkansas General Assembly. View "Gray v. Webb" on Justia Law

North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum petitioned the State Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue declarations and a writ of mandamus concerning who appoints the replacement after the pre-election death of a candidate for an office in the Legislative Assembly. Four candidates appeared on the 2020 general election ballot for two available seats for the office of State Representative for District Eight. The prior officeholder died in October 2020, twenty-nine days before the election, and after ballots were printed and early voting had begun. The North Dakota Secretary of State requested an advisory opinion from the state Attorney General on what to do about votes cast for the deceased candidate. The Attorney General responded stating that the North Dakota legislative assembly would follow the procedure codified in N.D.C.C. 16.1-13-10: "Upon the application of state law and the ‘American’ rule, it is my opinion that this would be the appropriate method to fill a vacancy." Election day totals showed Dave Nehring received the most votes and David Andahl received the second most votes. In accordance with the Attorney General's Opinion, the election results were certified but no certificate of election was issued to Andahl because of his death. Officials for the District Eight Republican Committee announced their intention to appoint an individual to fill the office. Kathrin Volochenko received the third most votes. She intervened in this case and claimed no vacancy in office would exist because she was elected to the office. On December 1, 2020, Nehring was set to fill one of the seats because he received the most votes. Andahl received the second most votes, and he presumably would have filled the other seat but died and will not do so. Therefore, as a matter of law, a vacancy would exist on December 1, 2020. When a vacancy in office occurs, the Governor’s constitutional authority to fill it is contingent upon there being “no other method” provided by law. A governor does not have authority to fill a legislative branch vacancy unless the gap-filling authority of N.D. Const. art. V, section 8 permits it. The Supreme Court declared a vacancy in office would exist on December 1, 2020, and the Governor did not have statutory or constitutional authority to make an appointment to fill the vacancy in this case. "He has not established a clear legal right to performance of the acts he seeks. Therefore, a writ of mandamus is not warranted. We deny the requested relief." View "Burgum v. Jaeger, et al." on Justia Law

A series of appeals presented a question of whether the Pennsylvania Election Code required a county board of elections to disqualify mail-in or absentee ballots submitted by qualified electors who signed the declaration on their ballot’s outer envelope, but did not handwrite their name, their address, and/or a date on the ballot, where no fraud or irregularity has been alleged. Petitioner Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (the “Campaign”) challenged the decision of multiple County Boards of Elections to count absentee and mail-in ballots. The Campaign did not contest these ballots were all timely received by the respective Boards prior to 8:00 p.m. on November 3, 2020 (election day); that they were cast and signed by qualified electors; and that there was no evidence of fraud associated with their casting. The Campaign instead contended these votes should not have been counted because the voters who submitted them failed to handwrite their name, street address or the date (or some combination of the three) on the ballot-return outer envelope. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was "guided by well-established interpretive principles" including that where the language of a statute was unambiguous, the language would control. "In the case of ambiguity, we look to ascertain the legislative intent, and in election cases, we adhere to the overarching principle that the Election Code should be liberally construed so as to not deprive, inter alia, electors of their right to elect a candidate of their choice. . . . "Election laws will be strictly enforced to prevent fraud, but ordinarily will be construed liberally in favor of the right to vote." View "In Re: Canvass of Absentee and Mail-In Ballots" on Justia Law

This action concerns the validity of Minn. Stat. 204B.13, subd. 2(c), which addresses the administration of an election when the candidate of a major political party dies after the seventy-ninth day before a general election. Tyler Kistner is the candidate of the Republican Party for the United States House of Representatives in the Second Congressional District of Minnesota; Angela Craig is the incumbent Representative and the candidate of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party for that office; and Jenny Winslow Davies is a voter in the district. The dispute arose from the death of a third candidate in the race, Adam Charles Weeks, the Candidate for the Legal Marijuana Now Party, on September 21, 2020. At issue is whether Minnesota has authority to forego the election for Representative on November 3, 2020, and schedule a special election for February 2021. The district court ruled that the Minnesota statute is likely preempted, ordered that section 204B.13 must not be enforced as to the election on November 3 for Representative from the Second District, and enjoined the Minnesota Secretary of State from refusing to give legal effect to the ballots cast for Representative on November 3.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction. The court agreed with the district court that the Minnesota statute is likely preempted by federal law. Even assuming for the sake of analysis that federal law permits a state to cancel an election and thereby to produce a "failure to elect" in certain extraordinary situations, the court concluded that federal law would allow that course only in truly "exigent" circumstances. The court concluded that the death of candidate Weeks is likely not the sort of exigent circumstance that permits the state to refrain from holding the election for United States Representative on the date prescribed by federal law. Nor do the unofficial results announced by the Secretary of State suggest that the balloting on November 3 failed to elect a Representative. Therefore, the court saw no error in the district court's determination that Craig and Davies would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, as they would be left without representation in the House of Representatives between the end of the incumbent's term in January 2021 and the seating of a new Representative after a special election in February 2021. Furthermore, the balance of harms and the public interest do not militate against an injunction, especially when there is a likelihood of success on the merits of the complaint. View "Craig v. Simon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting Appellees' emergency petition fro declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus declaring David Pruitt ineligible to run for public office, holding that the circuit court did not err.On February 27, 2020, Pruitt filed as a candidate for the office of alderman in the November 3, 2020 election. Appellees filed an emergency petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, alleging that Pruitt was ineligible to hold public office because he had been found guilty of voting more than once in an election in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 7-1-103(a)(19)(A), and therefore, his name may not be placed on the ballot. The circuit court granted Appellees' petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, finding that Pruitt had been convicted of certain infamous crimes in violation of Arkansas Election Law, which disqualified him from running for public office, and that Pruitt's expungement did not restore his eligibility to hold public office. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) subsection (a)(19)(A) is a misdemeanor offense related to the election process and constitutes an infamous crime as contemplated by Ark. Const. art. V, 9; and (2) Pruitt's sealing of his record did not restore his eligibility to hold public office. View "Pruitt v. Smith" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the processing of mail-in and absentee ballots received from voters in Philadelphia County in the November 3, 2020 General Election. Specifically, Appellee Donald J. Trump, Inc. (the “Campaign”) orally moved for the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas to give its representative more proximate access to the canvassing activities being carried out by Appellant, the Philadelphia County Board of Elections (the “Board”). The trial court denied relief, the Commonwealth Court reversed, and the Board appealed that order. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Board did not act contrary to law in fashioning its regulations governing the positioning of candidate representatives during the pre-canvassing and canvassing process, as the Election Code did not specify minimum distance parameters for the location of such representatives. Critically, the Court found the Board’s regulations as applied herein were reasonable in that they allowed candidate representatives to observe the Board conducting its activities as prescribed under the Election Code. Accordingly, the Court determined the Commonwealth Court’s order was erroneous, and vacated that order. The trial court's order was reinstated. View "In Re: Canvassing Observ." on Justia Law

Pennsylvania Act 77 established “no-excuse” absentee voting. All eligible Pennsylvania voters may vote by mail without showing their absence from their voting district on the day of the election; “[a]pplications for mail-in ballots shall be processed if received not later than five o’clock P.M. of the first Tuesday prior to the day of any primary or election” and “a completed absentee [or mail-in] ballot must be received in the office of the county board of elections no later than eight o’clock P.M. on the day of the primary or election” for that vote to count.The Democratic Party argued that a combination of the COVID-19 pandemic and mail-delivery delays made it difficult for absentee voters to timely return their ballots in the 2020 primary election. On September 17, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that USPS’s existing delivery standards could not meet the timeline built into the Election Code and that the Pennsylvania Constitution required a three-day extension of the ballot-receipt deadline for the general election. Pennsylvania voters were notified of the extension. The U.S. Supreme Court denied an emergency stay request while requiring that county boards of elections segregate ballots received during the extension.Another federal suit, brought by voters, alleged the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had elevated mail-in voters to a “preferred class” and that counting ballots received after Election Day would unlawfully dilute their votes. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, noting that the provision did not extend the period for mail-in voters to actually cast their ballots and that federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.”The Third Circuit denied a request for expedited briefing and affirmed without deciding whether the provisions are proper exercises of Pennsylvania’s authority to regulate federal elections. When voters cast their ballots under a facially lawful election rule, private citizens lack standing to enjoin the counting of those ballots on the grounds that the source of the rule was the wrong state organ or that doing so dilutes their votes or constitutes differential treatment. View "Bognet v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

After movants, who were the plaintiffs in a separate but similar case, were denied intervention in the district court, they moved to intervene in the Secretary of State's ongoing appeal concerning signature-verification procedures for ballots.The Fifth Circuit denied the motion to intervene because intervention on appeal is reserved for exceptional cases and movants' reasons for intervening do not come close to that high threshold. The court rejected movants' argument in favor of intervention because their appeal needs to be consolidated with the Secretary's appeal. The court explained that, because both movants and the Secretary are appealing from the same order, both appeals have been docketed under the same case number in this court. Therefore, assuming the motion to intervene in the Secretary's appeal is denied, the same merits panel will hear both the Secretary's appeal of the summary judgment and movants' appeal of the denial of their motion to intervene. The court stated that, to the extent movants want their voices heard, the proper procedure is to move to appear as amici curiae, not to move to intervene. Finally, the court declined to strike the motion. View "Richardson v. Texas Secretary of State" on Justia Law