The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals by holding that Wis. Stat. 803.09(2m) grants the Wisconsin Legislature the authority to represent the State's interest in the validity of state laws.The question here arose in the context of litigation in federal court over election-related laws. The Wisconsin Legislature was denied standing to appeal an adverse ruling below. The Seventh Circuit subsequently requested that the Supreme Court decide whether, under section 803.09(2m), the Wisconsin Legislature has the authority to represent the State's interest in the validity of state laws. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the Legislature does have that authority. View "Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted emergency motions for a stay pending appeal of the district court's injunction enjoining Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-548(A), which requires early voters to have signed their ballots by 7:00 PM on Election Day in order to have their votes counted. On September 10, 2020, less than two months before the upcoming presidential election, the district court enjoined the law and ordered Arizona to create and to institute a new procedure that would grant voters who failed to sign their ballots up to five days after voting has ended to correct the error.The panel held that the Nken factors weigh in favor of a stay. In this case, the State has shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits where Arizona's Election Day signature deadline imposes, at most, a "minimal" burden on those who seek to exercise their right to vote. Under the Anderson-Burdick framework for evaluating ballot-access laws, the panel concluded that the State has made a strong showing that its ballot-signature deadline reasonably advances important regulatory interests. Even though plaintiffs contend that the changes to Arizona's law will likely affect only a small number of voters and create a relatively low administrative burden on the State, the panel explained that the State's probability of success on the merits is high. Furthermore, the public interest is well served by preserving Arizona's existing election laws and plaintiffs stand to face only a minimal burden. View "Arizona Democratic Party v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the Chief Election Officer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's election complaint, holding that the Court could not grant the relief requested.Plaintiff Ashley Famera-Rosenzweig was one of four candidates in the democratic primary election for the office of U.S. Representative, District II in the August 8, 2020 primary election. Kahele received the highest number of votes in the election, and Plaintiff received the least. In her complaint, Plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to strike Kahele's name from the ballot, alleging that Kahele's voluntary assignment with the National Guard prior to the election was a tactical move to prevent all candidates from participating in appearances and debates with media networks. The Supreme Court dismissed the action, holding that Plaintiff presented no set of facts that would entitle her to the requested relief. View "Famera-Rosenzweig v. Kahele " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint contending that the Supreme Court should strike Kaiali'i Kahele as a democratic candidate for the office of U.S. Representative, District II, holding that Plaintiff presented no set of facts that would entitle him to the requested relief.Plaintiff Brian Evens was one of four candidates in the democratic primary election of the the office of U.S. Representative, District II in the August 8, 2020 primary election. The election results had Kahele receiving the most votes. In his complaint, Evans argued that Kahele conspired to deprive the other candidates of their right to a fair race and the public's knowledge of the candidates. The Supreme Court granted the Chief Election Officer's motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that he was entitled to relief and that Kahele's name shall be placed on the ballot as the democratic candidate in the November 2020 general election. View "Evans v. Kahele " on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Anderson-Burdick framework when it enjoined the State defendants' enforcement of a long-standing Georgia absentee ballot deadline, which requires ballots to be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day to be counted. The district court, instead, manufactured its own ballot deadline so that the State is now required to count any ballot that was both postmarked by and received within three days of Election Day. Because the State defendants have met all four prongs of the Nken test, the court granted their motion to stay the injunction.The court concluded that the State defendants have shown that they will likely succeed on the merits of their claim because the district court did not properly apply the appropriate framework. The court explained that Georgia's decades-old absentee ballot deadline is both reasonable and nondiscriminatory, while its interests in maintaining that deadline (especially now that absentee voting has already begun) are at least "important"—as the district court itself recognized—and likely compelling. In this case, the district court erred by finding that Georgia's Election Day deadline severely burdened the right to vote, and by improperly weighing the State's interests against this burden. The court also concluded that Georgia will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay and a stay is in the public interest. Therefore, because Georgia's decades-old Election Day deadline for absentee ballots does not threaten voting rights, and is justified by a host of interests, the court stayed the district court's injunction of that deadline. View "The New Georgia Project v. Raffensperger" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party of Connecticut and two of its affiliated candidates filed suit alleging that the State violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring candidates for office to collect signatures from electors before appearing on the general election ballot. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.Applying the Anderson-Burdick framework, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that Connecticut's laws do not impose a severe burden on plaintiffs' rights and the State's interest in requiring candidates for office to demonstrate some support before appearing on the ballot justified those laws. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Connecticut's laws impose only a reasonable, nondiscriminatory burden. In this case, the petitioning period ran for 218 days and the evidence demonstrates that petitioning was possible even under the challenging conditions in the State of Connecticut. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the State has the undoubted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot, and the signature requirements are an appropriate means of vindicating the State's interest. View "Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Lamont" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion filed by Plaintiffs to stay the effect of the mandate of this Court's decision issued in this matter on September 22, 2020 pending Plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, holding that Plaintiffs did not satisfy the test in order to stay the effect of the mandate.Plaintiffs argued that they will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted because the ranked-choice-voting law will be in effect for the November election despite what they argued were an adequate number of signatures in support of the people's veto petition. The Supreme Judicial Court declined to stay the mandate, holding (1) the balance of harms and the public interest weigh against this Court's grant of Plaintiffs' requested stay; and (2) Plaintiffs did not establish a substantial possibility of success on the merits. View "Jones v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Anastacia Morper sought preprimary designation as a candidate for the office of United States Representative from New Mexico’s Third Congressional District at the 2020 Republican Party Pre-Primary Convention. The Secretary of State invalidated forty-four of Morper’s nominating petitions because those petitions omitted the heading “2020 PRIMARY NOMINATING PETITION,” which the Secretary deemed to be critical information required by law. By extension, the Secretary invalidated the signatures on those forty-four nominating petitions. In doing so, the Secretary invalidated over seven hundred signatures, leaving only forty-three signatures on the five nominating petitions the Secretary did not invalidate. The Secretary informed Morper that she had not received the “minimum number of signatures required” to be “qualified as a candidate” for the preprimary convention. Morper appealed the Secretary’s decision to the district court. The district court upheld the Secretary’s decision concluding that “the Secretary of State has the right to reject . . . nominating petitions that were not on the form prescribed by law.” The Supreme Court reversed. "We appreciate that the reviewing official at the Secretary’s office may have been required to give the nominating petitions that Morper filed more than a cursory glance to ascertain that the petitions were in the form that Section 1-8-30(C) prescribes, contained the information that Section 1-1-26(A) requires, and were identical to the Secretary’s Form except for the omitted heading. However, this additional attention does not justify the Secretary’s argument that allowing her to invalidate any form that omitted the heading that she approved—regardless of whether the remainder of the form is identical to the Secretary’s Form—protects the integrity and fairness of the elective franchise." View "Morper v. Oliver" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the Secretary's motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Texas House Bill 25 (HB 25), which eliminates straight-ticket voting. The court applied the factors for ruling on a stay and observed the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis that courts should not alter election rules on the eve of an election.In staying a preliminary injunction that would change election laws eighteen days before early voting begins, the court recognized the value of preserving the status quo in a voting case on the eve of an election, and found that the traditional factors for granting a stay favor granting one here. In this case, the Secretary has shown that she is likely to succeed on the merits that the district court erred in issuing an injunction that altered the status quo of Texas election law this close in time to an election. Furthermore, the Secretary has met the burden of showing irreparable injury absent a stay; any harms to plaintiffs do not outweigh the other preliminary factors; and public interest weighs heavily in favor of a stay. View "Texas Alliance for Retired Americans v. Hughs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court order temporarily enjoining two Montana election laws, holding that the court erred by enjoining a ballot deadline.At issue was the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction regarding two election laws. One law required absentee ballots to be returned to local election officers no later than 8 p.m. on Election Day and the other law restricted the delivery of such ballots by persons other than the elector. The Supreme Court affirmed the preliminary injunction against the Ballot Interference Prevention Act (BIPA) and vacated the preliminary injunction against the election-day ballot-receipt deadline, holding (1) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting the preliminary injunction against enforcement of BIPA; and (2) the district court erred by enjoining the ballot deadline. View "Driscoll v. Stapleton" on Justia Law