Plaintiffs filed suit against the Texas Secretary of State Ruth Hughs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly imposing a voter-registration requirement that violates federal law. After the district court denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), the Secretary noticed an interlocutory appeal, and plaintiffs moved for summary affirmance or dismissal of the Secretary's appeal as frivolous.The Fifth Circuit held that the Secretary's appeal is not frivolous because it presents an important question that has not been resolved by the court: whether and to what extent the exception in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908), to sovereign immunity permits plaintiffs to sue the Secretary in an as-applied challenge to a law enforced by local officials. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for summary affirmance and the motion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous. View "Texas Democratic Party v. Hughs" on Justia Law

As the foundation for the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 to this case, the Court of Appeal held that an unincorporated association has standing to appear in an election contest as a representative of its members if (1) its members live in the area affected by the outcome of the election, (2) its members would suffer injury from an adverse outcome in the election contest, and (3) the questions involved were of a public nature.In this case, the court held that the unincorporated association met these requirements where it is undisputed that the patients residing at CSH-Coalinga are in an area affected by the referendum vote on Measure C; the members of DACE would have been harmed in at least two ways if the election contest was successful; and the specific challenge of illegal votes raised in this election contest involves questions of a public nature. The court held that the trial court's analysis of DACE's right to intervene in the election contest in the order denying the motion for attorney fees did not accurately reflect California law governing an unincorporated association and (2) DACE qualified for permissive intervention. Furthermore, as a de facto intervenor and based on its unique contribution to the evidence and argument presented in the trial court, DACE qualified as a party for purposes of section 1021.5's "successful party" requirement. The court rejected the remaining contentions, reversing the order denying the motion for attorney fees. View "Vosburg v. County of Fresno" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit alleging that California's winner-take-all (WTA) approach to selecting its presidential electors violates the equal protection and First Amendment rights of California residents who, like appellants, usually do not vote for the State's popular vote winner and thus enjoy no representation among the State's electors.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that appellants' equal protection challenge is foreclosed by Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections, a decades-old opinion that was summarily affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 288 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 320 (1969), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969). The panel joined three sister circuits to have considered the issue in holding that, under Williams, a State's use of WTA to select its presidential electors is consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.The panel also held that appellants have failed to plausibly allege that California's use of WTA to select presidential electors violates the First Amendment. The panel explained that, because appellants can participate fully in California's presidential election, including voting for their preferred candidates, their right to cast an effective vote is not burdened. Furthermore, WTA does not limit appellants' ability to associate with like-minded voters, and appellants do not allege any restrictions on their ability to petition. Even assuming that appellants had plausibly alleged that the State's use of WTA imposed some minimal burden, their claims would still fail. In this case, any burden is—at most—minimal, and California has identified an important interest: maximizing the impact of the State's electors within the Electoral College. View "Rodriguez v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part the decision of the superior court denying Appellant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of Shawnna Bolick's nomination documents, holding that, under the facts of this case, use of a private mailbox address substantially complied with the statutory requirements for petitions and nomination papers but not for circulator verifications on paper petition sheets.Appellant filed a complaint challenging Bolick's nomination petitions and nomination paper, arguing that Bolick did not comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-311(A), -314(C), and -315(B) because she used a private mailbox address as her place of residence. The superior court denied the challenge, finding that Bolick substantially complied with the applicable election laws because voters were unlikely to have been confused or misled by the technical error. The Supreme Court ordered that Bolick's name be included on the ballot, holding (1) Bolick substantially complied with section 16-311(A) and -314(C) under the facts of this case; and (2) Bolick did not substantially comply with section 16-315(B), and therefore, the signatures from the paper petition sheets circulated by Bolick were invalid. View "Lohr v. Bolick" on Justia Law

In this challenge to the superior court's judgment on a petition for judicial review challenging a decision of the Secretary of State the Supreme Judicial Court held that execution of the judgment was automatically stayed on appeal.The superior court vacated the Secretary of State's determination that insufficient signatures had been collective to place on the November 2020 ballot a people's veto of An Act to Implement Ranked-choice Voting for Presidential Primary and General Elections in Maine. Appellants moved to stay execution of the judgment pending their appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed both motions to stay as moot, holding that execution of the judgment was automatically stayed upon appeal. View "Jones v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Kylie Oversen, individually and as chairwoman of the Democratic-Non-Partisan League Party of North Dakota, and Jason Anderson, as a candidate nominated by the Democratic-Non-Partisan League Party of North Dakota for the statewide elective office of North Dakota Insurance Commissioner, petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a writ of mandamus to direct Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger to accept and certify Anderson for inclusion on the November 3, 2020 general election ballot for the office of insurance commissioner. Oversen and Anderson argued there was a vacancy on the ballot for that position and Jaeger was required to place Anderson’s name on the ballot as the nominated and endorsed Democratic-NPL party candidate for the office under N.D.C.C. 16.1-11-18(4). After review, the Supreme Court concluded Jaeger correctly applied North Dakota law by refusing to include Anderson on the general election ballot. Therefore, the Court denied the petition. View "Oversen, et al. v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated its original opinion in this appeal and substituted in its place the following opinion.At issue is whether several voters and organizations may challenge in federal court a law that governs the order in which candidates appear on the ballot in Florida's general elections. Plaintiffs alleged that the law violates their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because candidates who appear first on the ballot enjoy a "windfall vote" from a small number of voters who select the first candidate on a ballot solely because of that candidate’s position of primacy. The district court permanently enjoined the Secretary—and the 67 county Supervisors of Elections, none of whom were made parties to this lawsuit—from preparing ballots in accordance with the law.The court held that the voters and organizations lack standing to sue the Secretary because none of them proved an injury in fact. In this case, any injury they might suffer is neither fairly traceable to the Secretary nor redressable by a judgment against her because she does not enforce the challenged law. Rather, the Supervisors—county officials independent of the Secretary—are responsible for placing candidates on the ballot in the order the law prescribes. However, the district court lacked authority to enjoin those officials in this suit, so it was powerless to provide redress. The court also held, in the alternative, that the voters and organizations' complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question. The court explained that complaints of unfair partisan advantage based on the order in which candidates appear on the ballot bear all the hallmarks of a political question outside the court's competence to resolve. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jacobsen v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Relators seeking to compel the placement of four referendum petitions on the November 2020 ballot, holding that Relators failed to present evidence establishing their right to relief.King received petitions calling for a referendum on two meter ordinances, an ordinance authorizing the city manager to enter into an extension of the employment contract with the current law director, and an ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds to fund the purchase and renovation of real property for use as a municipal building. King questioned whether the ordinances were subject to referendum. Relators then filed this mandamus complaint. The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus, holding that Relators failed to present evidence establishing their right to relief by clear and convincing evidence. View "State ex rel. Luonuansuu v. King" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition sought by Relator to prevent the Trumbull County Board of Elections from holding a hearing under Ohio Rev. Code 3501.11(J) and (Q), holding that Relator failed to show that the board was about to exercise quasi-judicial power, that the hearing was unauthorized by law, or that she lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.Section 3501.11(J) empowers the board to investigate violations of election law and report its findings to the secretary of state or the prosecuting attorney. Section 3501.11(Q) empowers the board to investigate the residence qualifications of electors. Relator, who won the Republican nomination to the office of Trumbull County Commissioner and was certified to appear on the November 3, 2020 ballot as a candidate, told Relator that it would hold a public hearing to address allegations regarding Relator's residence and eligibility as an elector during the 2019 through 2020 school year and Relator's alleged misstatements regarding the same. Relator filed a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the board from holding the hearing.The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator failed to establish any of the elements showing that she was entitled to a writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Frenchko v. Trumbull County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In this action involving two initiative petitions proposing constitutional amendments that Petitioners sought to have placed on the November 2020 election ballot the Supreme Court dismissed in part Petitioners' petition challenging the Secretary of State's rejection of the amendments, holding that count three of the petition, which this opinion addressed, was moot.The Secretary of State dismissed the initiative petitions because Petitioners failed to verify that their paid canvassers had passed criminal-background checks. Petitioners then filed this original action, alleging three counts. The Supreme Court bifurcated the action, and this opinion addressed count three. Today, the Supreme Court concluded in a companion case addressing counts one and two that the criminal background affidavit was fatally flawed for both proposed amendments. The Supreme Court held that the issues in count three were moot because its judgment would have no practical legal effect on an existing controversy. View "Miller v. Thurston" on Justia Law