In this action involving two initiative petitions proposing constitutional amendments that Petitioners sought to have placed on the November 2020 election ballot the Supreme Court denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioners' petition challenging the Secretary of State's determination that the certification language submitted under Ark. Code Ann. 7-9-601(b)(3) was insufficient, holding that Petitioners did not comply with section 7-9-601(b)(3).The petition here contained three counts. The Supreme Court bifurcated the proceedings, and this opinion addressed counts one and two. The Supreme Court denied count one of the petition regarding the determination that the certification language was insufficient, which rendered moot the remainder of the petition. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Petitioners did not comply with section 7-9-601(b)(3) when they failed to certify that their paid canvassers had passed criminal background checks; and (2) neither initiative petition can qualify for the November 2020 election ballot. View "Miller v. Thurston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the existing September 1, 2020 deadline for the receipt of mail-in primary election ballots is constitutional.In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Legislature passed an emergency law to increase voting options in the September 1 primary election and the November 3 general election. The act included the additional voting option of voting by mail. For the primary election, voters may apply for a mail-in ballot, so long as their application to vote by mail is received by August 26, and the mail-in primary election ballot is completed and received by local election officials before 8 p.m. on September 1. Plaintiffs argued that the September 1 deadline significantly interferes with the constitutional right to vote. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the September 1 deadline for the receipt of mail-in primary election ballots is not unconstitutional. View "Grossman v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writs of mandamus sought by Relators, Marie Nauth and the group Concerned Citizens of Medina City (CCMC), seeking an order directing members of the Medina County Board of Elections (collectively, the Board) to certify as valid forty-seven signatures that Relators say the Board invalidated as not genuine, holding that Relators did not meet their burden to show an abuse of discretion by the Board.Relators filed a referendum petition that fell forty-four signatures short of qualifying for the November 3, 2020 general election ballot. Relators then commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus that would direct the Board to reexamine the signatures on the referendum petition and certify as valid the signatures of qualified electors that they signed the referendum petition. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding that Relators failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the forty-seven signatures at issue were invalidated in the first place and for what reasons. View "State ex rel. Nauth v. Dirham" on Justia Law

Rick Berg, as a resident and elector of North Dakota, and as chairman of the North Dakota Republican Party, petitioned this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a writ of mandamus directing Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger to remove Travisia Jonette Minor, A/K/A Travisia Martin from the November 3, 2020, general election ballot for the office of insurance commissioner. Martin filed an affidavit of candidacy, statement of interest, and certificate of endorsement with Jaeger requesting she be placed on the primary election ballot as the North Dakota Democratic-NPL party candidate for North Dakota Insurance Commissioner. In the affidavit of candidacy, Martin certified she met the requirements to hold the office of insurance commissioner. The executive director of the North Dakota Republican Party sent a letter to Jaeger stating Martin was ineligible to hold the office of insurance commissioner because she was not a North Dakota resident for five years preceding the November 2020 election. The Republican Party alleged Martin was ineligible to hold elective office because she voted in Nevada in the November 2016 election. Martin asserted she had maintained her physical residence in North Dakota since 2015. Jaeger refused to remove Martin from the ballot, stating he could only remove a candidate from the ballot if the candidate refused to accept the party nomination or if ordered to do so by a court. After review of the evidence, the North Dakota Supreme Court had "no doubt" Martin fully formed the intent to make North Dakota her legal residence at some point after 2016. However, all of the evidence and testimony presented to the Court regarding Martin’s intent and her actions, both prior-to and up until her vote in 2016, suggested she had not fully abandoned her Nevada domicile and residency, and she continued to avail herself of the rights of being a citizen of Nevada. She availed herself of these rights specifically to the exclusion of exercising many of those rights in North Dakota, including the right to vote. Therefore, the Court exercised its original jurisdiction to consider Berg’s petition, and granted an alternative writ of injunction. View "Berg v. Jaeger, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners Michael Haugen, Jacob Stutzman, Trent Barkus, and the Brighter Future Alliance sought a writ to enjoin North Dakota Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger from placing an initiated measure on the November 3, 2020 ballot. The measure sought to amend the North Dakota Constitution concerning elections and legislative districting. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court granted the writ, concluding the petition did not comply with the constitutional requirement that it contain the full text of the measure. The Court set aside the Secretary of State’s decision to place Measure 3 on the November ballot and enjoined him from doing so. View "Haugen, et al. v. Jaeger, et al." on Justia Law

Kishore and Santa Cruz seek to have their names placed on the Michigan ballot as candidates for president and vice president, without complying with the state’s ballot-access laws. They contend that the ballot-access requirements, as applied, are unconstitutionally burdensome under the First and Fourteenth Amendments when enforced alongside Michigan’s orders restricting in-person gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in denying injunctive relief. On balance, the state’s well-established and legitimate interests in administering its own elections through candidate-eligibility and ballot-access requirements outweigh the intermediate burden imposed on the Plaintiffs. The court noted that previous litigation reduced the number of signatures required for independent candidates. The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to collect signatures with no restriction from the beginning of their campaign (January 18) to the date of Governor Whitmer’s first Stay-at-Home Order (March 23) and again from the date of the reopening orders (June 1) to the filing deadline (July 16). In all this time, the Plaintiffs have not obtained a single signature on their qualifying petition. View "Kishore v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a Federal Election Commission Rule requiring some donations known as independent expenditures (IEs) to be publicly disclosed. In the underlying case, plaintiff brought an enforcement complaint before the Commission alleging that a well-known IE-making entity, Crossroads GPS, had violated the Rule by failing to disclose certain contributors.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's determination agreeing with plaintiffs that the Rule conflicts with the plain terms of the Federal Election Campaign Act's broader disclosure requirements. After addressing various jurisdictional and procedural arguments, the court held that the Rule's requirement that IE makers disclose only those contributions aimed at supporting a specific IE conflicts with FECA's unambiguous terms in two ways: first, the Rule disregards 52 U.S.C. 30104(c)(1)'s requirement that IE makers disclose each donation from contributors who give more than $200, regardless of any connection to IEs eventually made; and second, by requiring disclosure only of donations linked to a particular IE, the Rule impermissibly narrows subsection (c)(2)(C)'s requirement that contributors be identified if their donations are "made for the purpose of furthering an independent expenditure." View "Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Washington legislature enacted Substitute House Bill 2887 (SHB 2887), requiring noncharter counties with populations of 400,000 or more to elect five county commissioners by 2022, when originally such counties were required to elect three. SHB 2887 would also require affected counties to fund a redistricting committee to create five districts, one for each commissioner. These counties had to hold individual district elections for these commissioners instead of countywide general elections. Spokane County, former and current Spokane County commissioners, and the Washington State Association of Counties argued this law violated article XI, section 4 of the Washington Constitution, mandating the legislature to establish a uniform system of county government, and article XI, section 5, requiring the legislature to provide for the election of county commissioners through general and uniform laws. The Washington Supreme Court held SHB 2887 was constitutional under article XI, sections 4 and 5: "the legislature may classify counties by population for any purpose that does not violate other constitutional provisions, and SHB 2887 is a general law that properly implements district-only elections for noncharter counties of a certain size." View "Spokane County v. Washington" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, the Supreme Court entered judgment dismissing this complaint asking the Court to nullify the results of the August 8, 2020 primary election for the City and County of Honolulu mayoral seat and allow all candidates who choose to continue to the November general election to have their names appear on the ballot, holding that the complaint failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted.Plaintiff was one of fifteen candidates for the City and County of Honolulu mayoral seat in the primary election. Rick Blangiardi and Keith Amemiya received the highest number of votes. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that their were multiple irregularities with the primary election. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) the city clerk for the City and County of Honolulu was a necessary and indispensable party who should have been named as a defendant; and (2) in any case, the complaint failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted. View "Dicks v. State of Hawai'i Office of Elections" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying Proposed Intervenors' renewed motion to intervene in an action brought by the NAACP challenging the validity of Senate Bill 824. S.B. 824 established, inter alia, photographic voter identification requirements for elections in North Carolina.After determining that it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, the court held that the Proposed Intervenors have Article III standing to intervene for the purposes of intervention before the district court based on N.C. Gen Stat. 1-72.2 and Supreme Court precedent. The court rejected the arguments of the NAACP and the State Defendants that section 1-72.2 infringes on the powers of the Executive Branch in violation of the North Carolina Constitution's separation of powers provisions.In regard to intervention as a matter of right, the court held that the district court erred in determining that the Proposed Intervenors lacked a sufficient interest in the S.B. 824 litigation without careful consideration of section 1-72.2(a). Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to more fully consider the North Carolina statute in the analysis of the Proposed Intervenors' interest in the litigation. Because the Proposed Intervenors may have interests which may be practically impaired if not permitted to intervene in the action before the district court, the court remanded as to this issue as well. The court further stated that, although it was appropriate for the district court to apply the Westinghouse presumption since the Proposed Intervenors and the State Defendants appear to seek the same ultimate objective, the district court erred in demanding that the Proposed Intervenors overcome that presumption by the heightened standard of a "strong showing." In regard to permissive intervention, the court held that the district court failed to address sections 1-72.2(a) and (b) and 120-32.6. Given the import of those statutes, the court remanded for consideration of the permissive intervention request. View "North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Berger" on Justia Law