The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioners' petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief with respect to Missouri's absentee voting statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.277, for failure to state a claim, holding that counts I, III, and IV of the petition stated claims upon which relief could be granted.In response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the upcoming August primary and November general elections, Petitioners filed a four-count petition seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to secure the ability to exercise their right to vote without leaving their homes to reduce the risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19 during the process. The Supreme Court sustained the State's motion to dismiss as to all counts. Petitioners appealed the dismissal of Counts I, III, and IV but abandoned their claim in Count II. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the circuit court's judgment with respect to Count II but reversed the remaining portions of the judgment, holding that Petitioners' claims plainly meet the pleading requirements for a declaratory judgment cause of action and the largely similar requirements for actions seeking injunctive relief. View "Missouri State Conference of National Association for Advancement of Colored People v. State" on Justia Law

In 2019, Respondents Ryan Kiesel and Michelle Tilley filed State Question No. 807, Initiative Petition No. 423 (SQ 807) with the Secretary of State of Oklahoma. SQ 807 proposes for submission to the voters the creation of a new constitutional article, Article 31, which would legalize, regulate, and tax the use of marijuana by adults under Oklahoma law. Petitioner Paul Tay filed this protest alleging the petition was unconstitutional because it violated the federal supremacy provisions of Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Petitioner alleged the proposed measure was preempted by existing federal statutes including the Controlled Substances Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code. Because the United States Supreme Court did not address this question, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the Supremacy Clause permitted it to perform its own analysis of federal law. Upon review, the Court held Petitioner did not meet his burden to show clear or manifest facial constitutional infirmities because he did not show State Question No. 807 was preempted by federal law. On the grounds alleged, the petition was deemed legally sufficient for submission to the people of Oklahoma. View "In re: State Question No. 807, Initiative Petition No. 423" on Justia Law

During the 2019 Legislative Session, the Oklahoma Legislature passed HB 2597. Prior to the passage of HB 2597, the Oklahoma criminal code provided it was unlawful to carry a concealed or unconcealed handgun without a license. HB 2597 instituted what was known as "permitless carry" or "constitutional carry." This was accomplished by amending the Oklahoma criminal code to create a new exception to the law generally prohibiting the carrying of firearms. In an original proceeding before the Oklahoma Supreme Court an issue arose over the gist of Initiative Petition No. 425, State Question No. 809. The initiative petition sought to amend the Oklahoma Statutes for the purpose of making it unlawful to carry a concealed or unconcealed handgun without a license. The Petitioner filed this protest alleging the gist of the initiative petition was legally insufficient. The Supreme Court held the gist did not accurately explain the proposal's effect on existing law and is misleading. View "In re: Initiative Petition No. 425, State Question No. 809" on Justia Law

Proponents-respondents Monica Vondruska and Jon Caldara submitted proposed Initiative #293 to the Title Board for the setting of a title and submission clause. Initiative #293 proposed to add section 22 to article X of the Colorado Constitution and to amend certain statutory provisions in Titles 24 and 39 of the Colorado Revised Statutes in order to create a new preschool program. The measure implements the new preschool program, in part, by: (1) redirecting certain state cigarette and tobacco tax revenue away from local governments that ban selling tobacco or nicotine products and to the new preschool program and (2) reallocating a portion of the cigarette and tobacco taxes collected under article X, section 21 of the Colorado Constitution that are currently allocated to several health-related programs (Initiative #315 differed from Initiative #293 to the extent that Initiative #315 also added a ten percent sales tax on tobacco-derived nicotine vapor products). Petitioner Anna Jo Haynes then filed a motion for rehearing, asserting that the title did not satisfy either the single subject or clear title requirement. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the title that the Title Board set for Initiative #293 presented a single subject, namely, the creation and administration of a Colorado preschool program funded by reallocating existing taxes on, and other revenues derived from, tobacco and nicotine products. Furthermore, the Court concluded the title satisfied the clear title requirement because it described Initiative #293’s central features succinctly, accurately, and fairly and in a manner that will not mislead voters. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Title Board’s actions in setting the title for Initiative #293. View "In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2019 (Initiative 293)" on Justia Law

Proponents-respondents Monica Vondruska and Jon Caldara submitted proposed Initiative #315 to the Title Board for the setting of a title and submission clause. Initiative #315 proposed to add section 22 to article X of the Colorado Constitution and to amend certain statutory provisions in Titles 24 and 39 of the Colorado Revised Statutes in order to create a new preschool program. This program would be created by reallocating revenue generated by existing state taxes on tobacco products and tobacco litigation settlements and by levying a new sales tax on tobacco-derived nicotine vapor products. Petitioner Anna Jo Haynes then filed a motion for rehearing, asserting that the title did not satisfy either the single subject or clear title requirement. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the title that the Title Board set for Initiative #315 presented a single subject, namely, the creation and administration of a Colorado preschool program funded by state taxes on nicotine and tobacco products. Furthermore, the Court concluded the title satisfied the clear title requirement because it described Initiative #315’s central features succinctly, accurately, and fairly and in a manner that will not mislead voters. View "In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2019 (Initiative 315)" on Justia Law

The en banc court unanimously agrees that this court no longer has jurisdiction in this case because it has become moot. The en banc court explained that it is undisputed that the 2019 general election has occurred, and the current district lines will neither be used nor operate as a base for any future election. Therefore, the en banc court vacated the district court's judgment, dismissed the appeal, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Thomas v. Reeves" on Justia Law

In August 2015 Gill launched his fifth congressional campaign. Unlike his past campaigns, Gill ran as an independent. Although Gill needed 10,754 signatures to qualify for the general ballot, he came up 2,000 short, so the Illinois State Officers Electoral Board did not permit him to appear on the general ballot for Illinois’s 13th Congressional District. Gill filed suit, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted the Illinois State Board of Elections summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court failed to conduct a fact-based inquiry as mandated by the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which considers the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate and identifies and evaluates the precise interests put forward by the state as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. The court must consider the extent to which those state interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. View "Gill v. Scholz" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, holding that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that Arkansas's recent amendments to the requirements for new political parties to appear on the next general-elections ballot on a whole-ballot basis were unconstitutional.The court also held that, assuming a compelling interest exists, and taking the general boundaries established by precedent, a regime containing (1) a substantial signature requirement, (2) a limited rolling window for obtaining signatures, and (3) a deadline 425 days removed from the general election is not narrowly tailored to a generalized interest in regulating the integrity of elections. Although plaintiffs did not make an overwhelming showing as to the actual burdensomeness of the current regime on their own particular ability or inability to comply, the court held that their showing was sufficient and found no clearly erroneous determinations by the district court. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning the injunctive relief. View "The Libertarian Party of Arkansas v. Thurston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ordering the removal of Herbert Townes and David Silvestro from the City of Hopewell Electoral Board, holding that the circuit court erred by setting the burden of proof as a preponderance of the evidence and abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) because removal proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature due to the high penalty they impose on a removed official, the correct burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence, a higher standard than that applied by the circuit court in this case; (2) the circuit court did not improperly allow the Commonwealth to expand its grounds for removal beyond the grounds pled in its petition for removal; and (3) the circuit court abused its discretion when it excluded certain defense evidence at trial. View "Townes v. Virginia State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bill Sandlin filed a petition for mandamus relief to challenge the candidate statements submitted by Real Parties in Interest Ed Pope, Jaci Woods, and Frank McGill (Real Parties) in their candidacy for positions on the Irvine City Council. Petitioner alleged Real Parties’ candidate statements would mislead voters about the current city council’s actions and the facts concerning a failed referendum to relocate the site of a planned state veterans cemetery. Real Parties opposed the petition and filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. While Real Parties’ anti-SLAPP motion was pending, the trial court denied the mandamus petition in its entirety, finding Petitioner’s challenge to Pope’s candidate statement was untimely, and finding he failed to establish Woods’s or McGill’s candidate statements were false, misleading, or otherwise barred by the Elections Code. The court then denied Real Parties’ anti-SLAPP motion as moot, and further found it was barred by the public interest litigation exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute. After reviewing their anti-SLAPP motion de novo, the Court of Appeal concluded the motion was not moot, the public interest litigation exemption was inapplicable, and the motion should have been granted. View "Sandlin v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law