Proponents-respondents Monica Vondruska and Jon Caldara submitted proposed Initiative #315 to the Title Board for the setting of a title and submission clause. Initiative #315 proposed to add section 22 to article X of the Colorado Constitution and to amend certain statutory provisions in Titles 24 and 39 of the Colorado Revised Statutes in order to create a new preschool program. This program would be created by reallocating revenue generated by existing state taxes on tobacco products and tobacco litigation settlements and by levying a new sales tax on tobacco-derived nicotine vapor products. Petitioner Anna Jo Haynes then filed a motion for rehearing, asserting that the title did not satisfy either the single subject or clear title requirement. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the title that the Title Board set for Initiative #315 presented a single subject, namely, the creation and administration of a Colorado preschool program funded by state taxes on nicotine and tobacco products. Furthermore, the Court concluded the title satisfied the clear title requirement because it described Initiative #315’s central features succinctly, accurately, and fairly and in a manner that will not mislead voters. View "In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2019 (Initiative 315)" on Justia Law

The en banc court unanimously agrees that this court no longer has jurisdiction in this case because it has become moot. The en banc court explained that it is undisputed that the 2019 general election has occurred, and the current district lines will neither be used nor operate as a base for any future election. Therefore, the en banc court vacated the district court's judgment, dismissed the appeal, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Thomas v. Reeves" on Justia Law

In August 2015 Gill launched his fifth congressional campaign. Unlike his past campaigns, Gill ran as an independent. Although Gill needed 10,754 signatures to qualify for the general ballot, he came up 2,000 short, so the Illinois State Officers Electoral Board did not permit him to appear on the general ballot for Illinois’s 13th Congressional District. Gill filed suit, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted the Illinois State Board of Elections summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court failed to conduct a fact-based inquiry as mandated by the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which considers the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate and identifies and evaluates the precise interests put forward by the state as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. The court must consider the extent to which those state interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. View "Gill v. Scholz" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, holding that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that Arkansas's recent amendments to the requirements for new political parties to appear on the next general-elections ballot on a whole-ballot basis were unconstitutional.The court also held that, assuming a compelling interest exists, and taking the general boundaries established by precedent, a regime containing (1) a substantial signature requirement, (2) a limited rolling window for obtaining signatures, and (3) a deadline 425 days removed from the general election is not narrowly tailored to a generalized interest in regulating the integrity of elections. Although plaintiffs did not make an overwhelming showing as to the actual burdensomeness of the current regime on their own particular ability or inability to comply, the court held that their showing was sufficient and found no clearly erroneous determinations by the district court. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning the injunctive relief. View "The Libertarian Party of Arkansas v. Thurston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ordering the removal of Herbert Townes and David Silvestro from the City of Hopewell Electoral Board, holding that the circuit court erred by setting the burden of proof as a preponderance of the evidence and abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) because removal proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature due to the high penalty they impose on a removed official, the correct burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence, a higher standard than that applied by the circuit court in this case; (2) the circuit court did not improperly allow the Commonwealth to expand its grounds for removal beyond the grounds pled in its petition for removal; and (3) the circuit court abused its discretion when it excluded certain defense evidence at trial. View "Townes v. Virginia State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bill Sandlin filed a petition for mandamus relief to challenge the candidate statements submitted by Real Parties in Interest Ed Pope, Jaci Woods, and Frank McGill (Real Parties) in their candidacy for positions on the Irvine City Council. Petitioner alleged Real Parties’ candidate statements would mislead voters about the current city council’s actions and the facts concerning a failed referendum to relocate the site of a planned state veterans cemetery. Real Parties opposed the petition and filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. While Real Parties’ anti-SLAPP motion was pending, the trial court denied the mandamus petition in its entirety, finding Petitioner’s challenge to Pope’s candidate statement was untimely, and finding he failed to establish Woods’s or McGill’s candidate statements were false, misleading, or otherwise barred by the Elections Code. The court then denied Real Parties’ anti-SLAPP motion as moot, and further found it was barred by the public interest litigation exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute. After reviewing their anti-SLAPP motion de novo, the Court of Appeal concluded the motion was not moot, the public interest litigation exemption was inapplicable, and the motion should have been granted. View "Sandlin v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court that reversed in part an order declaring the results for a town council election entered by the Harpers Ferry Election Contest Tribunal following an election contest trial, holding that the circuit court properly concluded that four provisional ballots cast in the 2019 Harpers Ferry municipal election should be counted but erred in affirming the Tribunal's decision that Nancy Singleton Case lacked standing to participate in the election contest.The circuit court concluded that the Tribunal erred by concluding that four provision ballots cast during the 2019 municipal election should not be counted. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in substituting its view of the evidence to find that the four provisional ballots should have been counted. Respondents cross-assigned error to the circuit court's decision that the Tribunal did not err in concluding that Case lacked standing to participate in the election contest. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred by affirming the Tribunal's finding that Case lacked standing to participate in the election contest. View "Johnson v. Case" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the State’s action limiting the people's constitutional right to legislate directly by initiative. A proposed initiative instituting three substantive changes to Alaska's election laws was submitted to the lieutenant governor for review, certification and printing signature booklets. Determining the initiative violated a constitutional requirement that proposed initiative bills be confined to one subject, the lieutenant governor denied certification. The initiative's sponsors filed an action in superior court to challenge that decision. The superior court concluded, contrary to the lieutenant governor, that the initiative's various provisions were confined to the single subject of "election reform" and it accordingly should have been certified. The Court directed the State distribute petition booklets for the sponsors to collect signatures for placing the initiative on a future election ballot. The lieutenant governor and State elections officials appealed the superior court decision. The Alaska Supreme Court determined the superior court correctly adhered to the Supreme Court's prior interpretation of the relevant provisions of the constitution. Furthermore, the Court rejected the request to reverse precedent that the people's power to initiate laws generally was equivalent to that of the legislature. View "Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the CPD routinely endorses and supports Republican and Democratic nominees at the expense of third-party candidates, and that the CPD uses subjective and biased criteria for selecting debate participants. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the 15% polling criterion, which the CPD used to determine eligibility for participation in the debates preceding the 2012 Presidential election. Plaintiffs also challenged the Commission's denial of its request to initiate a rulemaking to change its rules to prohibit debate sponsors from using public opinion polls as a criterion for eligibility.Applying de novo review, the DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Commission. The court held that plaintiffs failed to show that the Commission's decisionmaking was arbitrary and capricious where the Commission offered detailed explanations in support of its view that plaintiffs failed to show impermissible bias against independent candidates or in favor of candidates from the two major political parties. The court also held that the Commission acted reasonably in determining that a 15% polling threshold is an objective requirement. Finally, because the court has found that the Commission acted reasonably in reaching its decisions, the court held that the Commission did not err by electing not to initiate a rulemaking. View "Level the Playing Field v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the school board to certify a petition proposing the transfer of territory from one school district to another and certify the transfer proposal to the board of elections for placement on the ballot at the August 4 special election, holding that a writ of mandamus was warranted.Petitioner, a qualified elector in the territory proposed to be transferred, filed a mandamus complaint alleging that the school board failed to comply with its statutory obligations to promptly certify the petition and the proposal to the board of elections and that the school board's unwarranted delay caused the transfer proposal to miss the deadline for certification to the August 4 ballot. Petitioner also sought a writ ordering the board of elections to place the proposal on the August 4 ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ as to the school board and denied it as to the elections board, holding (1) the school board had the opportunity to certify the proposal for placement on the August 4 special election ballot but declined to do so for reasons outside its authority; and (2) Petitioner's mandamus claim against the elections board was not ripe. View "State ex rel. Cook v. Bowling Green City Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law