The State of Alabama, on the relation of Shirley Williams-Scott, appealed a circuit court order denying Williams-Scott's petition for a writ of quo warranto seeking to declare that Eddie Penny did not hold office as the mayor of the City of Fairfield. The 2010 federal census indicated that the population of Fairfield had dropped below 12,000. A statutory provision stated that, "[i]n all towns or cities, a majority of the whole number of members to which such corporation is entitled, including the mayor in towns and cities of less than 12,000 population, shall be necessary to constitute a quorum." In the 2016 election cycle, Ed May II was elected to the position of mayor of Fairfield, and Penny was elected to the position of council president. It is undisputed that May did not attend any council meetings for 90 consecutive days, beginning October 1, 2018. During its January 22, 2019 meeting, the city council approved a resolution providing that May was removed from office of mayor as a matter of law. Penny was subsequently proclaimed mayor by a vote of the council. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court did not err in denying Williams-Scott's petition for a writ of quo warranto seeking to declare Penny was not mayor of Fairfield. View "State ex rel. Williams-Scott v. Penny" on Justia Law

Maine Secretary of State Matthew Dunlap filed suit seeking access to documents from the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. The DC Circuit held that, because the emails at issue were neither "similar" to the "examples" of covered documents listed in the December 2017 injunction opinion, nor "substantive disclosures" within the plain meaning of that opinion, they were not among the disclosure obligations imposed by that injunction. Therefore, the court held that the January 2019 order that required their release changed the legal relationship between the parties and hence was immediately appealable.On the merits, the court held that Secretary Dunlap could not clearly and indisputably show that the emails he sought fell within the work of the Commission, and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his request for their disclosure. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's January 28, 2019 order insofar as it required the release of such emails. View "Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved a proposed amendment titled "Raising Florida's Minimum Wage" for placement on the ballot but refused to review a financial impact statement prepared by the Financial Impact Estimating Conference (FIEC), holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to do so.The Attorney General of Florida petitioned the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion on the validity of a proposed citizen initiative amendment to the Florida Constitution requesting review of the compliance of the proposed amendment with constitutional and statutory requirements. The Attorney General further requested an opinion addressing the compliance of the corresponding financial impact statement with Fla. Stat. 100.371. The Supreme Court held (1) the initiative petition and proposed ballot title and summary for the proposed amendment met the legal requirements of Fla. Const. art. XI, 3 and Fla. Stat. 101.161(1); and (2) this Court does not have original jurisdiction to review financial impact statements. View "Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re Raising Florida's Minimum Wage" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Saint Paul and dismissing Appellant's petition asserting that the City erred by refusing to put his proposed amendment to the City Charter before the voters in the next election, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden to prove that his petition met statutory requirements.In rejecting the petition, the City relied on the statewide voter registration system (SVRS) in concluding that Appellant's petition did not have the requisite number of signatures. In his petition, Appellant argued that the City erred by relying on the SVRS to invalidate signatures and in refusing to put his proposed charter amendment before voters. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City did not err by relying on the SVRS to determine eligibility and rejecting signatures of those who were registered to vote at an address outside the City; and (2) Appellant did not meet his burden to show that the City erred in rejecting the petition signatures. View "Butler v. City of Saint Paul" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion for attorney fees under either the private attorney general doctrine or Mont. Code Ann. 13-36-205, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying fees under the private attorney general doctrine.Appellant won the primary election for the Republican nomination for Sheriff of Musselshell County. Appellant's opponent, Ronnie Burns, filed a petition for a court-ordered recount. The court ordered a recount with parameters set forth by Burns. Appellant intervened in the case and sought an emergency hearing to challenge the parameters as violations of Mont. Code Ann. 13-15-206. The district court found that the parameters were inconsistent with the requirements of the statute and vacated its prior orders. The court subsequently concluded that Appellant had not met the criteria for an award of attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying attorney fees to Appellant because the County's actions required Appellant to defend the electoral process for the benefit of all County voters, not merely to exercise his rights to be heard in the proceedings and to be present and represented at any recount. View "Burns v. County of Musselshell" on Justia Law

Under the Illinois Election Code, individuals may contribute up to $5,000 to a political campaign; corporations, unions, and associations may donate up to $10,000; and political action committees may provide up to $50,000. Illinois lifts its contribution limits if a candidate’s self-funding exceeds $250,000 in a race for statewide office or $100,000 in any other race, or if spending by an independent expenditure committee or individual exceeds either of these limits, 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(h). Independent expenditures are any payment, gift, donation, or expenditure of funds, used for the purpose of making electioneering communications or for advocating in support of or against a candidate, and not made in coordination with a campaign. Before making political expenditures exceeding $3,000 in a 12-month period, the Code requires any entity (not an individual) to register; a registered independent expenditure committee may accept unlimited contributions from any source, provided the committee does not make contributions to any candidate, political party committee, or PAC. Independent expenditure committees may never contribute to candidates, even when contribution limits are lifted. An independent expenditure committee challenged the ban only with respect to when unlimited contributions and unlimited coordinated expenditures are allowed for others. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting claims of violations of the First Amendment rights of free speech and free association and the right of equal protection. The ban is closely drawn to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. View "Proft v. Raoul" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this expedited election case in which the village of Hills and Dales sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Plain Local School District Board of Education to forward to the Stark County Board of Elections a petition proposing the transfer of some of the school district's territory to Jackson Local School District, holding that the village lacked standing.Specifically, the Court held that where Ohio Rev. Code 3311.242 authorizes only qualified electors to submit a transfer petition and does not confer rights upon municipal corporations, the village lacked authority to seek a writ of mandamus compelling the enforcement of Ohio Rev. Code 3311.242. View "State ex rel. Hills & Dales v. Plain Local School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part the petition for a writ of mandamus sought by Safe Surgery Arkansas and Laurie Barber (SSA) seeking to compel the Arkansas Secretary of State to count signatures SSA obtained in support of a ballot petition for a referendum on Act 579 of 2019, holding the new requirements of Act 376 of 2019 were not in effect at the time SSA filed its proposed referendum and supporting signatures.Act 376 added additional requirements for getting a referendum on the election ballot. The Secretary of State had refused to count most of the signatures SSA obtained in support of the ballot petition on the grounds that they were obtained in violation of Act 376. In this petition, SSA sought to have the signatures counted pursuant to the pre-Act 376 legal framework, arguing, inter alia, that Act 376's emergency clause was defective, rendering ineffective the changes in Act 376 until after SSA had already filed its ballot petition. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Act 376's emergency clause was ineffective and that a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State to address SSA's filings under the pre-Act 376 framework was the only adequate remedy. View "Safe Surgery Arkansas v. Thurston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court declining to order a new 2019 Democratic primary election for municipal office in the city of Bridgeport pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-329a(b), holding that the trial court did not err in determining that Plaintiffs lacked standing to invoke section 9-329a(a)(1) and that Plaintiffs failed to establish that they were entitled to an order directing a new primary election under section 9-329a(a)(2).Plaintiffs, registered Democrats residing in the city, brought this action alleging that improprieties leading up to the primary election rendered the result so unreliable that it must be set aside. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the action for lack of aggrievement with respect to Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to section 9-329a(a)(1) but denied the motion with respect to the claims brought pursuant to section 9-329a(1)(2). After a trial, the court rendered judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim under section 9-329a(a)(1) because they were not aggrieved; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to establish that they were entitled to an order directing a new special primary election. View "Lazar v. Ganim" on Justia Law

A Maryland law requiring newspapers, among other platforms, to publish on their websites, as well as retain for state inspection, certain information about the political ads they decide to carry, violates the First amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunctive relief awarded by the district court and explained that, while Maryland's law tries to serve important aims, the state has gone about this task in too circuitous and burdensome a manner to satisfy constitutional scrutiny. The court agreed with the district court that the law is a content-based law that targets political speech and compels newspapers, among other platforms, to carry certain messages on their websites. The court declined to decide whether strict or exacting scrutiny should apply to a disclosure law like the one at issue, and held that the law failed under the more forgiving exact scrutiny standard. View "The Washington Post v. McManus" on Justia Law