In consolidated appeals, the issue presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether a Kansas law requiring documentary proof of citizenship ("DPOC") for voter registration was preempted by the federal National Voter Registration Act, or violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In a previous decision in this case, the Tenth Circuit determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction against the documentary proof law because the National Voter Registration Act preempted Kansas's law as enforced against those applying to vote while obtaining or renewing a driver's license. The matter was remanded for trial on the merits in which Kansas' Secretary of State had an opportunity to demonstrate the Kansas law's requirement was not more than the minimum amount of information necessary to perform an eligibility assessment and registration duty. On remand, the district court consolidated that statutory challenge with a related case that raised the question of whether the DPOC unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote because the the Secretary of State's interests were insufficient to justify the burden it imposed. After a bench trial, the district court entered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the DPOC requirement under both the National Voter Registration law and the Equal Protection Clause. The Tenth Circuit concurred with the district court's judgment and affirmed. View "Fish v. Schwab" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal is whether several voters and organizations have standing to challenge a law that governs the order in which candidates appear on the ballot in Florida's general elections. The voters and organizations alleged that the law violates their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because candidates who appear first on the ballot—in recent years, Republicans—enjoy a "windfall vote" from a small number of voters who select the first candidate on a ballot solely because of that candidate's position of primacy. The district court permanently enjoined the Secretary from preparing ballots in accordance with the law.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of justiciability, holding that the voters and organizations lack standing to sue the Secretary, because none of them proved an injury in fact. Furthermore, any injury they might suffer is neither fairly traceable to the Secretary nor redressable by a judgment against her because she does not enforce the challenged law. Rather, the county officials independent of the Secretary (the Supervisors) are responsible for placing candidates on the ballot in the order the law prescribes. Therefore, the court held that the district court lacked authority to enjoin those officials in this action and it was powerless to provide redress. View "Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

In the November 2016 election, Multnomah County voters approved Measure 26-184, an amendment to the Multnomah County Home Rule Charter containing campaign finance provisions. Multnomah County then adopted new ordinances, Multnomah County Code (MCC) sections 5.200-203, mirroring and implementing those charter provisions. At issue before the Oregon Supreme Court was the validity of those ordinances under the free speech provisions of both the Oregon and United States Constitutions - Article I, section 8, and the First Amendment. The Court reached four conclusions: (1) the county’s contribution limits did not, on their face, violate Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution; (2) the case had to be remanded for factual findings and to consider, in the first instance, whether the contribution limits violated the First Amendment; (3) the county’s expenditure limits were invalid under both constitutional provisions; and (4) the parties’ dispute with respect to the disclosure provisions was moot. View "Multnomah County v. Mehrwein" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court ruling that Defendants did not obtain sufficient signatures to generate a recall election of Payson Mayor Thomas P. Morrissey, holding that the Arizona Constitution establishes the requisite number of signatures based upon the number of voters in the most recent election at which the candidate for the office at issue was voted into office.In August 12 2019, Defendants took out a petition to recall Morrissey. Because all Payson elections since 2002 were decided by primary election the town clerk determined that the number of signatures required for the recall petition was twenty-five percent of the number of votes cast in the 2002 general election. The town clerk called a recall election for March 10, 2020. Morrissey filed this lawsuit seeking to enjoin the recall election, arguing that the required number of signatures should be based on twenty-five percent of the votes cast in the 2018 primary election at which he was elected. The trial court agreed and enjoined the recall election based on insufficient signatures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the town clerk should have based the number of signatures required for a recall election on twenty-five percent of the votes cast in the 2018 election. View "Morrissey v. Garner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court granted Plaintiffs' emergency petition and allowed Plaintiff's application for declaratory relief to the extent that this Court declares, in light of emergency circumstances arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, that the minimum signature requirements in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 53, 7 and 44 for candidates in the September 1, 2020 primary election are unconstitutional.Plaintiffs argued that, in the context of the current pandemic, the minimum signature requirements to be listed on the ballot for a party's nomination posed an unconstitutionally undue burden on Massachusetts would-be candidates' constitutional right to seek elective office. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) application of the signature requirements in the context of the current public health crisis imposes a severe burden a candidate's right to gain access to the September 1 primary ballot, triggering heightened scrutiny; and (2) in this time of pandemic, the justification for the current signature requirements cannot survive this scrutiny and are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs. The Court fashioned equitable relief intended to substantially diminish that burden while respecting the legislative purpose for imposing minimum signature requirements. View "Goldstein v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this gerrymandering action, brought exclusively under the North Carolina Constitution against certain state legislators, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not err in remanding because the Legislative Defendants do not have an enforcement role within the meaning of the Refusal Clause of 28 U.S.C. 1443(2). Consequently, the court need not address whether the Legislative Defendants refused to act or whether they asserted a colorable conflict with federal law. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award fees and costs, because the legislators removed within the statutorily mandated time limit and adhered to the district court's expedited briefing schedule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Common Cause v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In November 2013, Washington voters rejected Initiative 522 (I-522), which would have required labels on packaged foods containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) opposed state-level GMO labeling laws, including I-522. Over the course of the 2013 election cycle, GMA solicited over $14 million in optional contributions from its member companies, $11 million of which went to support the “No on 522” political committee. The payments to No on 522 were attributed solely to GMA itself, with no indication of which companies had provided the funds. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, GMA was not registered as a political committee and did not make any reports to the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC). The State filed a complaint alleging that GMA intentionally violated the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA)'s registration and disclosure requirements and the FCPA’s prohibition on concealing the sources of election-related spending. GMA countered that it cannot be subject to the FCPA’s registration and disclosure requirements because those requirements violate the First Amendment as applied. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The trial court agreed with the State, imposed a $6 million base penalty on GMA, and trebled the penalty to $18 million after determining GMA;s violations were intentional. The Court of Appeals largely affirmed, but revered the treble penalty, holding that one had to "subjectively intend to violate the law in order to be subject to treble damages." After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion that the FCPA, and that the FCPA was constitutional as applied. The Court reversed the appellate court on the treble penalty, holding that the trial court applied the proper legal standard to determine GMA intentionally violated the FCPA. The matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of GMA's claim that the penalty imposed violated the excessive fines clauses of the federal and Washington constitutions. View "Washington v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Electors voted to establish a commission of citizens to adopt district boundaries for the Michigan Senate, Michigan House of Representatives and U.S. Congress, every 10 years. Article IV, section 6 of the amended Michigan Constitution establishes the membership criteria for this “independent citizens redistricting commission,” excluding eight classes of individuals with certain current or past political ties. A final decision to adopt a redistricting plan requires a majority vote, including at least two commissioners who affiliate with each major party, and at least two who do not affiliate with either party. Commission members may not discuss redistricting matters outside of an open meeting, except under specific circumstances. The Republican Party and individuals sought a preliminary injunction, alleging that the eligibility criteria violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments; that allowing applicants to self-identify as Republicans violated the Party’s freedom of association; that the Commission’s composition was viewpoint-discriminatory; and that the speech provision violated the First Amendment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Amendment’s eligibility criteria do not burden the plaintiffs based on their status as Republicans. Even if the criteria imposed a moderate burden on First Amendment activities, they would satisfy a “flexible analysis.” There is no constitutional limitation on Michigan making the forbearance from certain activities a condition of sitting on the commission. The eligibility criteria are essential to the definition of this Commission and its independence from partisan meddling. The Party does not have a First Amendment right to control the self-affiliation of commissioner-applicants. Although the speech provision does burden the commissioners’ freedom to speak about redistricting, this burden is outweighed by Michigan’s more-than-adequate justifications. Michigan’s effort to ensure that a sizeable minority of commission members are non-affiliated does not violate the First Amendment. View "Daunt v. Benson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by Katie O'Neill ordering the Athens County Board of Elections to declare that she was an eligible candidate for the Democratic nomination to the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District and to include in its official canvass of the primary election the votes cast for O'Neill, holding that the board abused its discretion by rejecting O'Neill's petition.On December 18, 2019, O'Neill filed her petition seeking to run for the Democratic nomination for the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District. The Board unanimously certified O'Neill's name to the primary ballot. Keith Monk filed a protest against O'Neill's candidacy. After a hearing, the Board voted in favor of the protest, concluding that O'Neill was not an eligible candidate for the nomination because she had not resided in the district for one year next preceding the November 3, 2020 general election and that the petition was invalid because O'Neill was not a registered voter in Athens County when she began circulating her part-petitions. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the Board abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law by upholding the protest to O'Neill's candidacy. View "State ex rel. O'Neill v. Athens County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part a writ of mandamus sought by Ohioans for Secure and Fair Elections (Ohio-SAFE) seeking, among other things, to compel the Ohio Ballot Board to certify to the Attorney General that the Ohio-SAFE petition contained only one proposed constitutional amendment, holding that Ohio-SAFE had a clear legal right to certification of the proposed amendment as written and the Board had a clear legal duty to make that certification.Ohio-SAFE submitted to the Attorney General an initiative petition and summary, which would amend Ohio Const. art. V, section 1 to eliminate the thirty-day registration requirement to be eligible to vote. In addition, the proposed amendment would guarantee certain rights to every United States citizen who was or was eligible to become an elector in Ohio. The Secretary of State made a motion for the Board to find that the Ohio-SAFE amendment contained four separate proposals. The Board approved the amendment. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State to grant a writ of mandamus directing the Board to certify the Ohio-SAFE amendment as a single amendment, holding that mandamus should issue. View "State ex rel. Ohioans for Secure & Fair Elections v. LaRose" on Justia Law