The Supreme Judicial Court granted Plaintiffs' emergency petition and allowed Plaintiff's application for declaratory relief to the extent that this Court declares, in light of emergency circumstances arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, that the minimum signature requirements in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 53, 7 and 44 for candidates in the September 1, 2020 primary election are unconstitutional.Plaintiffs argued that, in the context of the current pandemic, the minimum signature requirements to be listed on the ballot for a party's nomination posed an unconstitutionally undue burden on Massachusetts would-be candidates' constitutional right to seek elective office. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) application of the signature requirements in the context of the current public health crisis imposes a severe burden a candidate's right to gain access to the September 1 primary ballot, triggering heightened scrutiny; and (2) in this time of pandemic, the justification for the current signature requirements cannot survive this scrutiny and are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs. The Court fashioned equitable relief intended to substantially diminish that burden while respecting the legislative purpose for imposing minimum signature requirements. View "Goldstein v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this gerrymandering action, brought exclusively under the North Carolina Constitution against certain state legislators, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not err in remanding because the Legislative Defendants do not have an enforcement role within the meaning of the Refusal Clause of 28 U.S.C. 1443(2). Consequently, the court need not address whether the Legislative Defendants refused to act or whether they asserted a colorable conflict with federal law. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award fees and costs, because the legislators removed within the statutorily mandated time limit and adhered to the district court's expedited briefing schedule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Common Cause v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In November 2013, Washington voters rejected Initiative 522 (I-522), which would have required labels on packaged foods containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) opposed state-level GMO labeling laws, including I-522. Over the course of the 2013 election cycle, GMA solicited over $14 million in optional contributions from its member companies, $11 million of which went to support the “No on 522” political committee. The payments to No on 522 were attributed solely to GMA itself, with no indication of which companies had provided the funds. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, GMA was not registered as a political committee and did not make any reports to the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC). The State filed a complaint alleging that GMA intentionally violated the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA)'s registration and disclosure requirements and the FCPA’s prohibition on concealing the sources of election-related spending. GMA countered that it cannot be subject to the FCPA’s registration and disclosure requirements because those requirements violate the First Amendment as applied. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The trial court agreed with the State, imposed a $6 million base penalty on GMA, and trebled the penalty to $18 million after determining GMA;s violations were intentional. The Court of Appeals largely affirmed, but revered the treble penalty, holding that one had to "subjectively intend to violate the law in order to be subject to treble damages." After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion that the FCPA, and that the FCPA was constitutional as applied. The Court reversed the appellate court on the treble penalty, holding that the trial court applied the proper legal standard to determine GMA intentionally violated the FCPA. The matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of GMA's claim that the penalty imposed violated the excessive fines clauses of the federal and Washington constitutions. View "Washington v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Electors voted to establish a commission of citizens to adopt district boundaries for the Michigan Senate, Michigan House of Representatives and U.S. Congress, every 10 years. Article IV, section 6 of the amended Michigan Constitution establishes the membership criteria for this “independent citizens redistricting commission,” excluding eight classes of individuals with certain current or past political ties. A final decision to adopt a redistricting plan requires a majority vote, including at least two commissioners who affiliate with each major party, and at least two who do not affiliate with either party. Commission members may not discuss redistricting matters outside of an open meeting, except under specific circumstances. The Republican Party and individuals sought a preliminary injunction, alleging that the eligibility criteria violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments; that allowing applicants to self-identify as Republicans violated the Party’s freedom of association; that the Commission’s composition was viewpoint-discriminatory; and that the speech provision violated the First Amendment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Amendment’s eligibility criteria do not burden the plaintiffs based on their status as Republicans. Even if the criteria imposed a moderate burden on First Amendment activities, they would satisfy a “flexible analysis.” There is no constitutional limitation on Michigan making the forbearance from certain activities a condition of sitting on the commission. The eligibility criteria are essential to the definition of this Commission and its independence from partisan meddling. The Party does not have a First Amendment right to control the self-affiliation of commissioner-applicants. Although the speech provision does burden the commissioners’ freedom to speak about redistricting, this burden is outweighed by Michigan’s more-than-adequate justifications. Michigan’s effort to ensure that a sizeable minority of commission members are non-affiliated does not violate the First Amendment. View "Daunt v. Benson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by Katie O'Neill ordering the Athens County Board of Elections to declare that she was an eligible candidate for the Democratic nomination to the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District and to include in its official canvass of the primary election the votes cast for O'Neill, holding that the board abused its discretion by rejecting O'Neill's petition.On December 18, 2019, O'Neill filed her petition seeking to run for the Democratic nomination for the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District. The Board unanimously certified O'Neill's name to the primary ballot. Keith Monk filed a protest against O'Neill's candidacy. After a hearing, the Board voted in favor of the protest, concluding that O'Neill was not an eligible candidate for the nomination because she had not resided in the district for one year next preceding the November 3, 2020 general election and that the petition was invalid because O'Neill was not a registered voter in Athens County when she began circulating her part-petitions. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the Board abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law by upholding the protest to O'Neill's candidacy. View "State ex rel. O'Neill v. Athens County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part a writ of mandamus sought by Ohioans for Secure and Fair Elections (Ohio-SAFE) seeking, among other things, to compel the Ohio Ballot Board to certify to the Attorney General that the Ohio-SAFE petition contained only one proposed constitutional amendment, holding that Ohio-SAFE had a clear legal right to certification of the proposed amendment as written and the Board had a clear legal duty to make that certification.Ohio-SAFE submitted to the Attorney General an initiative petition and summary, which would amend Ohio Const. art. V, section 1 to eliminate the thirty-day registration requirement to be eligible to vote. In addition, the proposed amendment would guarantee certain rights to every United States citizen who was or was eligible to become an elector in Ohio. The Secretary of State made a motion for the Board to find that the Ohio-SAFE amendment contained four separate proposals. The Board approved the amendment. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State to grant a writ of mandamus directing the Board to certify the Ohio-SAFE amendment as a single amendment, holding that mandamus should issue. View "State ex rel. Ohioans for Secure & Fair Elections v. LaRose" on Justia Law

In consolidated ballot title review cases, petitioner Hurst and petitioners Van Dusen and Steele challenged the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 50 (2020) (IP 50). If adopted, IP 50 would amend ORS 468A.205, which set aspirational greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals, including the goal of achieving greenhouse gas levels that were at least 75% below 1990 levels by the year 2050. ORS 468A.205(1)(c). The current statute also expressly provided that it did not create any additional regulatory authority for any agency of the executive department. IP 50 would amend ORS 468A.205 to mandate staged reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel and industrial sources (including achieving greenhouse gas emissions levels that are “at least 100 percent below 1990 levels” by 2050); to require the Environmental Quality Commission (EQC) to adopt rules to ensure compliance with the new greenhouse gas emissions limits; and to require the Department of Environmental Quality to enforce the rules that the EQC adopts. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that certain of petitioner Hurst’s arguments that the ballot title did not substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2) were well taken, and thus the Court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Hurst/Van Dusen v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

To slow the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, Wisconsin’s Governor ordered Wisconsinites to stay at home until April 24. An unprecedented number of voters requested absentee ballots for the state’s spring election, resulting in a severe backlog of ballots not promptly mailed to voters. Plaintiffs, including the Democratic party, sued the Wisconsin Elections Commission and, on April 2, obtained a preliminary injunction that extended the deadline for voters to request absentee ballots and extended the deadline for election officials to receive completed absentee ballots.On the day before the April 7 election, the Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction to the extent it required Wisconsin to count absentee ballots postmarked after April 7. The Court declined to address “the wisdom of” proceeding with the scheduled election, opting to answer “a narrow, technical question.” While the deadline for the municipal clerks to receive absentee ballots is extended to April 13, those ballots must be mailed and postmarked by election day.The plaintiffs had not asked that the court allow ballots postmarked after election day to be counted; the court unilaterally ordered that such ballots be counted if received by April 13. That extension would fundamentally alter the nature of the election and would afford relief that the plaintiffs did not seek. In its order enjoining the public release of any election results for six days after election day, the district court essentially enjoined nonparties. The Court noted no evidence that voters who requested absentee ballots at the last minute would be in a substantially different position from late-requesting voters in other Wisconsin elections with respect to receiving ballots; the deadline for receiving ballots was extended to ensure that their votes count. The Court declined to express an opinion on whether other election procedure modifications are appropriate in light of COVID–19. View "Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee" on Justia Law

In this case involving a Minnesota voter's request for access to information in Minnesota's statewide voter registration list the Supreme Court held that registered Minnesota voters have access to "public information lists" as defined by law, as well as to information provided by the secretary of state, but the Legislature has restricted access to the other information sought.A statewide voter registration list is contained in the Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS). The Secretary of State is responsible for administering the SVRS, and the Legislature has allowed some of the information in the SVRS to be made available for inspection in the form of a "public information list." Plaintiff sought access to non-private government data"from the SVRS. The Secretary informed Plaintiff that he was entitled to information in the SVRS related to currently registered Minnesota voters but declined to produce SVRS information on voter status and other issues. The district court ordered the Secretary to produce the requested data. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the relevant provisions of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act and the Minnesota Election Law provides that access to the voter registration list contained in the SVRS is limited to "public information lists" and to information provided by the Secretary. View "Cilek v. Office of Minnesota Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Appellants Eric Early and his election committee, Eric Early for Attorney General 2018 (collectively, Early), appealed the denial of their petition for writ of mandate to preclude respondent Xavier Becerra from running for Attorney General in 2018. Early contended that Becerra, appointed Attorney General by former Governor Brown in 2016, was not eligible for the office under Government Code section 12503. Becerra was an “inactive” member of the California State Bar from 1991 to the end of 2016. Government Code section 12503 provided: “No person shall be eligible to the office of Attorney General unless he shall have been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the state for a period of at least five years immediately preceding his election or appointment to such office.” Early argues that an “inactive” attorney may not practice law in California and therefore is not “admitted to practice” under Government Code section 12503. The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding both active and inactive attorneys were members of the State Bar. The phrase “admitted to practice” referred to the event of admission to the bar and the status of being admitted, and did not require engagement in the “actual” or “active” practice of law. Becerra did not cease to be “admitted to practice” in California when he voluntarily changed his status to “inactive.” View "Early v. Becerra" on Justia Law