Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In August 2022, the appellants filed a complaint and petition in Rice County District Court, seeking to prevent the use of electronic voting machines with embedded modems in the upcoming November 2022 general election. They alleged that these machines were not properly certified or secure, in violation of Minnesota law, and requested an order restraining the county from using the modem functions during the election. The complaint named the Director of Rice County Property Tax and Elections as a defendant, and the Minnesota Secretary of State intervened as a party.The Rice County District Court dismissed the section 204B.44 claim in January 2023, citing several jurisdictional defects, including mootness because the 2022 election had already occurred, and insufficient service of process on all candidates as required by statute. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, focusing on the lack of service to all candidates as the basis for its decision and did not address the other grounds identified by the district court.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the appellants’ claim under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 was moot because the relief sought pertained solely to the 2022 general election, which had already taken place. The court rejected the argument that the claim could be redirected to future elections and clarified that section 204B.44 challenges must be specific to a single election. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, but did so on the alternative ground of mootness, without reaching the issue of service of process on all candidates. View "Benda for Common-sense vs. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Arkansas enacted a law limiting the number of voters one person could assist to six, with violations classified as misdemeanors. Arkansas United, a non-profit organization, and its founder, L. Mireya Reith, challenged this law, arguing it conflicted with Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which allows voters needing assistance to choose anyone to help them, except their employer or union representative.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas denied an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order but later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining the enforcement of the six-voter limit. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs. The State sought and obtained a stay of the injunction from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, allowing the six-voter limit to remain in effect for the 2022 General Election.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Section 208 of the VRA does not create a private right of action. The court found that enforcement of Section 208 is intended to be carried out by the Attorney General, not private parties. The court also rejected the argument that the Supremacy Clause provided a basis for a private right of action. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, vacated the permanent injunction and the award of attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Arkansas United v. Thurston" on Justia Law

The case involves the Public Interest Legal Foundation (PILF) filing a two-count complaint against Jocelyn Benson, the Michigan Secretary of State, alleging non-compliance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). PILF claimed that Michigan failed to conduct proper maintenance of voter registration lists by not removing deceased registrants and did not allow inspection of public records related to voter rolls. PILF's requests for records and subsequent correspondence with the Secretary of State's office did not yield the desired information, leading to the lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of Secretary Benson. The court found that Michigan's efforts to maintain voter registration lists, including using state and federal death records and collaborating with the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), constituted a reasonable effort under the NVRA. The court also found that PILF's claim regarding the failure to allow inspection of records was moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment, agreeing that Michigan's program for removing deceased registrants was reasonable under the NVRA. The court noted that the NVRA requires a reasonable effort, not a perfect one, and that Michigan's multi-layered approach met this standard. The court also found that PILF lacked standing to assert its claim regarding the inspection of records, as it failed to demonstrate concrete downstream consequences from the alleged NVRA violation.In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Michigan's efforts to maintain accurate voter registration lists were reasonable and that PILF did not have standing to pursue its claim regarding the inspection of records. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson" on Justia Law

The Public Interest Legal Foundation (PILF) requested records from the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). PILF sought documents related to a "glitch" in the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation's system that allowed ineligible persons to register to vote. The Secretary denied the request, leading PILF to file a lawsuit claiming an informational injury due to the denial of access to the records.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania initially dismissed the suit for lack of statutory notice but found that PILF had standing based on an informational injury. After PILF provided the required notice and refiled the suit, the District Court granted and denied parts of both parties' summary judgment motions, ruling that PILF was entitled to some records but not others. The District Court did not reassess PILF's standing in light of the Supreme Court's decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that PILF lacked standing. The court held that PILF did not demonstrate a concrete harm or adverse effects from the denial of information, as required by TransUnion. The court emphasized that PILF's inability to study and analyze the records or produce educational materials did not constitute a concrete injury related to the NVRA's purpose of increasing voter participation. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court's orders and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it. View "The Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

The incumbent candidate, Vern Gavin, lost the election to challenger Wanda Evers. Gavin filed a petition for judicial review in the Hinds County Circuit Court, claiming Evers was an unqualified elector due to her residency outside the district and citing several voting irregularities. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Gavin's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to his appeal.The Hinds County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case. Gavin challenged Evers's residency, noting her voting address was transferred outside the district and back within it, and she claimed a homestead exemption at a Jackson address. The Hinds County Executive Committee certified Evers as a candidate despite Gavin's challenge. Evers defeated Gavin in the runoff election. Gavin filed a contest of the election and a petition for judicial review, requesting a special election due to alleged irregularities and disputing Evers's residency qualification. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim, finding Evers met the two-year residency requirement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court's rulings, finding no error. The court held that Gavin received proper notice of the summary judgment motion and that the circuit court did not err in considering both the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain affidavits as hearsay and irrelevant. The court found that Gavin failed to present evidence of election irregularities affecting the outcome and that Evers met the residency requirement. The court also affirmed the denial of Gavin's motion for reconsideration, finding the new evidence presented was cumulative and for impeachment purposes only. View "Gavin v. Evers" on Justia Law

Kenneth Brown filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) alleging that the in-person absentee voting procedures in Racine during the August 2022 primary election violated the law. Brown observed voting at City Hall and a local mall and believed the procedures were unlawful. WEC found no probable cause of a violation and declined to take action. Brown then appealed WEC’s decision to the Racine County Circuit Court.The circuit court determined that Brown had standing to bring the action, as the alleged invalid voting procedures impacted his right to vote. The court partially ruled in Brown’s favor, concluding that the Racine City Clerk’s choice of alternate voting sites violated statutory requirements and that the use of a mobile election unit was unlawful. WEC sought to appeal this decision, and the case was brought before the Wisconsin Supreme Court via a bypass petition.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed whether Brown had standing to seek judicial review of WEC’s decision. The court interpreted Wisconsin Statute § 5.06(8), which allows for appeals from WEC’s decisions, and determined that to be “aggrieved” by a decision, an individual must suffer an injury to a legally recognized interest. The court found that Brown did not demonstrate any personal injury resulting from WEC’s decision, as he did not allege that the decision made it more difficult for him to vote or affected him personally.The court held that Brown was not “aggrieved” within the meaning of the statute and therefore did not have standing to seek judicial review. Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Brown’s complaint. View "Brown v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles E. Wilson filed a lawsuit against the District of Columbia Board of Elections, Mayor Muriel E. Bowser, and the District of Columbia, challenging the proposed ballot Initiative 83, also known as the “Make All Votes Count Act of 2024.” Wilson objected to the initiative’s summary statement, short title, and legislative form, and raised several challenges to the Board’s determination that the initiative was a “proper subject” for an initiative. The initiative, which proposed ranked-choice voting and changes to primary election rules, was approved by voters on November 5, 2024.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Wilson’s complaint, ruling it was untimely because it was filed the day before the ten-day period described in D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(e)(1)(A) began. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the complaint was not filed within the specified timeframe.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the ten-day period described in Subsection (e)(1)(A) is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule. The court determined that the ten-day period is a deadline by which any suit must be filed, rather than a time window during which a suit must be brought. The court also held that the Superior Court had general equity jurisdiction to hear Wilson’s substantive challenges to the Board’s “proper subject” determination. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the Mayor and the District of Columbia, as they were not proper defendants in this case.The Court of Appeals vacated the Superior Court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings to address Wilson’s claims against the Board of Elections. View "Wilson v. Bowser" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a Maryland LLC and a Missouri nonprofit corporation, alleged that the Maryland State Board of Elections mismanaged state electoral operations in violation of state and federal laws during the 2020 and 2022 general elections. They claimed inaccuracies in voter registration records, excessive error rates in voting systems, improper certification of voting machines, use of uncertified machines, and failure to provide requested audit logs and configuration reports. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including the appointment of a Special Master to supervise changes before the November 2024 election.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs had not alleged injuries sufficiently concrete and particularized to support Article III standing. The court found that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements for organizational standing, as they failed to allege any injury to their organizational activities or to their members that was concrete and particularized. The court also held that the alleged violations of the Maryland Public Information Act did not constitute a redressable injury in fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked representational standing to assert claims on behalf of their individual members. The court found that the alleged vote dilution and the possibility that members' ballots were cast blank were generalized grievances that did not constitute concrete, particularized injuries. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that any of their members made the public records requests, thus failing to establish standing for the alleged violations of the Maryland Public Information Act. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of the motion for injunctive relief as moot. View "Maryland Election Integrity, LLC v. Maryland State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

A group of Baltimore City registered voters, led by Anthony J. Ambridge, filed a petition seeking judicial review of a proposed amendment to the Baltimore City Charter, known as "Question F," which was to appear on the 2024 general election ballot. The petitioners argued that the proposed charter amendment was not proper "charter material" and that the ballot language was not understandable. The Maryland State Board of Elections opposed the petition, arguing that the claims were barred by laches and that the judicial review mechanism used by the petitioners was inappropriate.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ruled in favor of the petitioners, determining that the claims were not barred by laches and could be raised under the judicial review mechanism. The court found that Question F violated Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution as it was not proper charter material and that the ballot language was not easily understandable by voters. The court ordered that the results of Question F should not be certified.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that EL § 9-209(a) is not a proper mechanism to challenge whether a proposed charter amendment is proper charter material or whether the ballot language meets the standards for understandability. The Court also held that the petitioners' claims were barred by laches due to the unreasonable delay in filing the petition, which caused prejudice to the State Board, the City, and the electorate. The Court further concluded that the ballot language conveyed, with minimum reasonable clarity, the actual scope and effect of the measure, allowing voters to make an informed choice. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the appellants. View "State Bd. of Elections v. Ambridge" on Justia Law