Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, impose base limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee, and aggregate limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees, 2 U.S.C. 441a. In the 2011–2012 election cycle, McCutcheon contributed to 16 federal candidates, complying with all base limits. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to additional candidates and political committees and that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future. McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee challenged the aggregate limits under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, with five justices concluding that those limits are invalid. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the “closely drawn” test applies, the analysis depends on the fit between stated governmental objectives and the means selected to achieve the objectives. The aggregate limits fail even under the “closely drawn” test. Contributing to a candidate is an exercise of the right to participate in the electoral process through political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is not a “modest restraint.” To require a person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes penalizes that individual for “robustly exercis[ing]” his First Amendment rights. The proper focus is on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The justices noted the line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence and that the Court must “err on the side of protecting political speech.” Given regulations already in effect, fear that an individual might make massive unearmarked contributions to entities likely to support particular candidate is speculative. Experience suggests that most contributions are retained and spent by their recipients; the government provided no reason to believe that candidates or committees would dramatically shift their priorities if aggregate limits were lifted. Multiple alternatives could serve the interest in preventing circumvention without “unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights, such as targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and committees, tighter earmarking rules, and disclosure. View "McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Snyder was involved in a fistfight with another town council member. He was convicted of battery. The court imposed a sentence of six months suspended and six months of home detention, but later determined that Snyder had violated probation. Snyder served the remainder of his sentence at the county jail. While Snyder was incarcerated, the County Voter Registration Board informed him that his voter registration had been cancelled under Ind. Code 3-7-46. Snyder knew that Indiana law permits him to reregister to vote at any time following release from jail. Snyder refused to re-register. He was turned away from voting in a special election. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg; the Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971; and the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. On certification, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Indiana Constitution authorized temporary disenfranchisement of any incarcerated convict. The district court dismissed the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds; held that a county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts done under state or federal law; and held that claims to enjoin de-registration or require reinstatement were not justiciable. Despite all parties arguing to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit found the case moot. Snyder waived any challenge to dismissal of the state defendants and failed to state a Monell claim against the county defendants. View "Snyder v. King" on Justia Law

In 2010, three individuals ran for the Colorado House of Representatives, House District 61: Kathleen Curry was a write-in candidate; Roger Wilson was the Democratic nominee, and Luke Korkowski was the Republican nominee. Under Colorado law, individual contributions to Ms. Curry were capped at $200, and individual contributions to each of her opponents were capped at $400. Contributors to Ms. Curry’s campaign sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the state officials. The Tenth Circuit reversed on the equal-protection claim; and in light of this, declined to address the summary-judgment ruling on the First Amendment claims. View "Riddle v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned plaintiff's filing of an administrative complaint with the FEC alleging that various organizations violated election laws during their efforts to keep him off the ballot. The FEC dismissed the complaint and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment against plaintiff, later denying his motion to alter or amend its judgment. Plaintiff appealed. The court rejected plaintiff's claim of competitor standing where he sought to compel FEC enforcement against his opponents years after the campaign had run its course, and claim of informational standing where he asserted an injury that was not sufficiently concrete to confer standing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit because plaintiff lacked standing. View "Nadar v. FEC" on Justia Law

Voters filed suit against Officials challenging the process by which Officials confirmed the eligibility of voters who register on election day (election day registrants or EDRs). Voters also challenged a provision of the Minnesota Constitution denying the right of persons under guardianship to vote, as well as the sufficiency of notice afforded to such persons under certain Minnesota statutes. The court concluded that Voters could not prevail on their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims based on Officials' failure to verify EDR's voting eligibility before allowing EDRs to cast their votes where Voters raised no allegations of the "aggravating factors" identified in Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 School District; alleged no discriminatory or other intentional, unlawful misconduct by Officials sufficient to implicate section 1983; and alleged no defects causing Minnesota's voting system to be so "fundamentally unfair" that relief under section 1983 would be appropriate. Further, Voters lacked standing to raise their remaining claims where the amended complaint failed to allege that any plaintiff has been denied the right to vote by a constitutional provision barring persons under guardianship from voting. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Voters claims and denial of their motion for summary judgment as moot. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al. v. Ritchie, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of California Senate Bill 6 (SB 6). SB 6, implementing California's Proposition 14 (Prop. 14), fundamentally changes the California election system by eliminating party primaries and general elections with party-nominated candidates, and substituting a nonpartisan primary and a two-candidate runoff. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; Plaintiff Chamness' case was not moot where his claim was capable of repetition because future election administrators would deny him the ability to use the designation "Independent" on the primary ballot; Plaintiffs Frederick's and Wilson's appeal were moot because they only sought declaratory relief affecting future elections; and Intervenor Galacki's claims regarding his write-in candidacy and the vote he cast for himself in the general election were moot. In Case No. 11-56449, the court held that Chamness failed to establish that SB 6 severely burdened his rights, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute as reasonably related to furthering the state's important interest in efficiently regulating elections. In Case No. 56303, the court held that the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding that allowing Galacki to intervene would entail substantial delays and inefficiencies resolving the case, and in therefore denying Galacki's motion as untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting defendants summary judgment and denying Galacki's motion to intervene. View "Chamness v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

The California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the California Constitution; state voters then passed a ballot initiative, Proposition 8, amending the state constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Same-sex couples who wished to marry filed suit in federal court, challenging Proposition 8. State officials refused to defend the law, so the district court allowed the initiative’s official proponents to intervene, declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement. State officials declined to appeal. The intervenors appealed. The Ninth Circuit certified a question, which the California Supreme Court answered: official proponents of a ballot initiative have authority to assert the state’s interest to defend the constitutionality of the initiative when public officials refuse to do so. The Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the intervenors did not have standing to appeal. Article III of the Constitution confines the power of federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” A litigant must demonstrate a personal and tangible harm throughout all stages of litigation. The intervenors had standing to initiate this case against the California officials responsible for enforcing Proposition 8, but once the district court issued its order, they no longer had any injury to redress and state officials chose not to appeal. The intervenors had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything. Their “generalized grievance” is insufficient to confer standing. The fact that a state thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override settled law to the contrary. View "Hollingsworth v. Perry" on Justia Law

IRTL challenged the constitutionality of several Iowa campaign-finance laws, an administrative rule, and two forms. The court concluded, inter alia, that IRTL lacked standing to challenge the definitions of "political committee" and "permanent organization" because it faced no credible threat or present or future prosecution; the first two sentences of Iowa Code subsection 68A.404(3), the second sentence of subsection 68A.404(3)(a), the entirety of subsection 68A.404(4)(a), the first and third sentences of Iowa Administrative Code rule 351-4.9(15), and Form Ind-Exp-O were constitutional as applied to IRTL and groups whose major purpose was not nominating or electing candidates; the first and third sentences of subsection 68A.404(3)(a), the second sentence of Iowa Administrative Code rule 351-4.9(15), the entirety of subsections 68A.404(3)(a)(1) and 68A.402B(3), and Form Dr-3 were unconstitutional as applied to IRTL and groups whose major purpose was not nominating or electing candidates; and Iowa Code section 68A.503 was constitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Iowa Right To Life Committee v. Tooker, et al." on Justia Law

Three federal contractors sought a declaration that 2 U.S.C. 441c abridged their freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment and denied them the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fifth Amendment. FECA prohibited any "person" contracting with the federal government from contributing to "any political party, committee, or candidate for public office or to any person for any political purpose or use" in a federal election. The court sua sponte vacated and remanded to the district court to comply with immediate procedures set forth in section 437h, concluding that FECA's judicial review provision ousted both the district court and the court's jurisdiction to consider the merits of the claims. View "Wagner, et al. v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

The Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices subpoenaed documents and testimony from the National Organization for Marriage (NOM) seeking the names of donors to NOM in order to determine whether NOM had complied with Maine's campaign laws during the 2009 election season. The superior court affirmed the Commission's decision not to vacate or modify the subpoenas. Appellants, including NOM and Stand for Marriage Maine PAC, appealed, contending that the Commission's subpoenas infringed on their right to freedom of association because disclosure would expose NOM's donors to threats, harassment, and reprisal. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding that the record did not support Appellants' constitutional argument. View "Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices" on Justia Law