Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees, the public school district, members of the district's board of directors, and others, alleging (1) subsequent to the federal decennial census, the district was required to adopt new district lines and the district had failed to do so in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 6-13-631; and (2) the voters were entitled to a new school board pursuant to section 6-13-631. The circuit court found in favor of Appellants. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for payment of prevailing-party attorneys' fees, which was denied. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court' findings were equivalent to a finding that there had been a violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act and that, because the circuit court could have awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to the Act, Appellants were entitled to attorneys fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not prevail on anything other than the claim made pursuant to section 6-13-631, and because that statute does not provide for an award of attorneys' fees, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the same. View "Fluker v. Helena-West Helena Pub. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she broke an unwritten rule and suffered the consequences when she challenged a sitting superior court judge for his seat in a local election while she was serving as a temporary superior court commissioner. The court concluded that, while the timing and targeted effect of the superior court's policy were suspicious, the court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's federal or state law retaliation claims because the judges of the superior court's Executive Committee enjoyed legislative immunity for their decision to alter the minimum qualifications to serve as a temporary commissioner. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Schmidt v. Contra Costa County, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a candidate for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, including the secretary of state and members of the state election commission, to comply with W. Va. Code 3-12-11(e) and approve the release of matching funds to his campaign. Petitioner, a participant in the Supreme Court Public Campaign Financing Pilot Program, argued that because he complied with the applicable requirements set forth in the Pilot Program, and because one of the privately finances candidates spent a sum sufficient to trigger the matching funds provisions, the election commission was statutorily required to disburse matching funds to his campaign. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Petitioner, holding (1) the matching funds provisions set forth in the Pilot Program violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) therefore, Petitioner failed to establish a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant" on Justia Law

On January 27, 2012, the Yuma County Superior Court disqualified Alejandrina Cabrera under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-201(C) from appearing on the ballot as a candidate for the San Luis City Council. Concluding that section 38-201(C)'s language requirement must be read "in the context of the political office at issue," the court found that Cabrera was not sufficiently proficient in English to perform as a city council member for San Luis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, in relevant part, that (1) the trial court correctly interpreted section 38-201(C); and (2) the trial court's interpretation of the statute did not unconstitutionally violate Cabrera's right to participate in government. View "Escamilla v. Cuello" on Justia Law

After the U.S. Supreme Court declared a campaign finance statute in Arizona to be unconstitutional, the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission sought an opinion from the Nebraska attorney general as to the constitutionality of Nebraska's Campaign Finance Limitation Act (CFLA). Under the CFLA, candidates for certain covered elective offices and other public officials could choose to abide or not to abide by voluntary spending limits. A candidate who abided by the limits and raises and spent qualifying amounts in accordance with the CFLA became eligible for public funds. The attorney general opined that the CFLA would likely be found to be unconstitutional by a court, and the Commission determined it would not enforce the CFLA. The attorney general was then directed to file an action in court to determine the validity of the CFLA. The Supreme Court found that the CFLA substantially burdened the First Amendment rights of Nebraska citizens and that it was, therefore, unconstitutional. View "State ex rel. Bruning v. Gale" on Justia Law

State Attorney-General and county-prosecutor candidates may not accept campaign contributions from Medicaid providers or any person with an ownership interest in a Medicaid provider, Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45. The plaintiff physicians are Medicaid providers who attempted to contribute to Cordray’s 2010 campaign for reelection as Ohio Attorney General. When the campaign learned that the plaintiffs were Medicaid providers, however, it refused to accept their contributions. The plaintiffs challenged the statute. The district court upheld the law as supported by a general interest in “preventing corruption,” stating that the court should not “second guess” the Ohio Legislature’s means of furthering that interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contribution ban is not closely drawn to “avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” A claim that the law prevents corruption, is “dubious at best.” View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law

This case involved the proper interpretation of a Massachusetts election law that governed the filing of a vacancy, where a candidate nominated for state, city or town office withdraws, dies, or otherwise becomes ineligible prior to an election, G.L.c. 53, section 14(14), and its application to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of a minor political party. The court concluded that this matter was properly before the court where plaintiffs have established an actual controversy; section 14 applied to presidential electors and assumed by extension to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates the electors have pledged to support; although section 14, as written, was not a model of clarity and its meaning not without uncertainty, the court interpreted it in a manner largely consistent with the interpretation proffered by the Secretary; and finally, aligning the court's analysis under art. 9 with that of the equal protection clause, the court perceived no constitutional deficiency in the election law scheme. View "Libertarian Assoc. of Massachusetts & another v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This suit arose after Project Vote learned that students at Norfolk State University, a historically African-American college, experienced problems in registering to vote in the November 2008 primary and general elections in Virginia. At issue was whether Section 8(i)(l) of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which required public disclosure of "all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters," 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(i)(l), applied to completed voter registration applications. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted Section 8(i)(l), concluding that it did not apply to such applications and holding that defendants had violated the NVRA by refusing to disclose the completed applications with voters' Social Security numbers redacted. View "Project Vote v. Long" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party, along with its 2008 presidential candidate Bob Barr, contended that the District's failure to report the number of votes cast for Barr violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court concluded that because the party had failed to show that the District's law placed a severe burden on its rights, the District's important regulatory interests were generally sufficient to justify the restrictions pursuant to Burdick v. Takushi. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Libertarian Party, et al. v. DC Board of Elections, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, black and Hispanic registered voters in Albany County, sued the County and the Board of Elections (collectively, defendants) for enacting a redistricting plan for the Albany County Legislature (Local Law C) in response to the 2010 United States census that allegedly diluted black and Hispanic voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, by failing to provide for five majority-minority districts (MMDs). The court concluded that plaintiffs' appeal was not moot, even though the challenged elections have not taken place. While the court identified legal error in the district court's determination that plaintiffs failed to make the majority-minority showing required to satisfy the first step of a vote dilution claim as identified in Thornburg v. Gingles, the court identified no error in the district court's determination that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success as the third majority bloc-voting step of the Gingles inquiry, or in the court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief on that ground. View "Pope v. County of Albany" on Justia Law