Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff's procedural due process claim was properly rejected where plaintiff had no property right to be a candidate. The court also held that plaintiff's substantive due process claim failed because there were no disputed facts regarding plaintiff's application containing an incorrect residential address where plaintiff made an oral admission that he did not live at the listed address. The court further held that plaintiff's Equal Protection claim was properly denied where the actions of the official at issue did not constitute intentional or purposeful discrimination. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to establish that Section 141.032(e) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. Accordingly, because plaintiff filed his application for candidacy in the last hour of the last possible day, which limited his opportunity to refile a correct application, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Birnberg, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced this hybrid declaratory judgment action/article 78 proceeding, seeking a declaration that the implementation of Local Law No. 3-2011 in relation to the November 8, 2011 general election was null and void for lack of compliance with the Nassau County Charter. At issue was whether the metes and bounds descriptions in Local Law No. 3-2011 applied to the 2011 general election or whether they were the first part of a three-step process to take effect in 2013. The court held that Supreme Court properly declared that Local Law No. 3-2011 was in accord with Nassau County Charter 112, but that its implementation was null and void in connection with the November 8, 2011 general election for lack of compliance with Nassau County Charter 113 and 114. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, without costs, and the order and judgment of Supreme Court reinstated. View "Yatauro, et al. v. Mangano, et al." on Justia Law

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Maine election laws (Me.Rev.Stat. title 21A sec. 1052) as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms, particularly with respect to the phrase "for the purpose of influencing," as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees and reporting of independent expenditures. The district court upheld the law. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the organization had standing. The record showed that its fears were objectively reasonable and led to self-censorship. With respect to the overbreadth claim, the court rejected an argument based on the distinction between issue discussion and express advocacy, characterizing the distinction as irrelevant and applying the "exacting scrutiny" standard because the law does not prohibit, limit, or impose any onerous burdens on speech, but merely requires maintenance and disclosure of certain financial information. There is a "substantial relation" between Maine's informational interest and each of the laws at issue. The terms "promoting," "support," "opposition," "influencing," "expressly advocate" and "initiation" are sufficiently clear. View "Nat'l Org. For Marriage v. Adam" on Justia Law

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Rhode Island election laws as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees, contributions to and expenditures on behalf of candidates, and reporting of independent expenditures. The organization claimed that it would refrain from certain political activities if required to register as a PAC, but would comply with independent expenditures under protest. After receiving assurances that the organization could engage in its planned speech without registering as a PAC, the district court denied a preliminary injunction, noting the minimal burden imposed by the law and the valuable governmental interest underlying it. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the organization had not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits. View "Nat'l Org. For Marriag v. Daluz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, visually or manually impaired Florida citizens who were registered to vote in Duval County, Florida and were represented by the American Association of People with Disabilities, filed a putative class action against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal statutory and state constitutional provisions by failing to provide handicapped-accessible voting machines to visually or manually impaired Florida voters after the 2000 general election. The court vacated its prior opinion and in its revised opinion, held that the district court erroneously granted plaintiffs' requested declaratory judgment and injunction against purported violations of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The opinion, however, based that outcome exclusively on the ground that voting machines were not "facilities" under 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b). View "Amer. Assoc.of People with Disabilities, et al. v. Harris, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from defendant's convictions for making two statements regarding Barack Obama on an online message board two weeks before the presidential election. At issue was whether the district court properly convicted defendant under 18 U.S.C. 879(a)(3), which made it a felony to threaten to kill or do bodily harm to a major presidential candidate. The court held that, taking the two statements at issue in the context of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, the court held that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the subjective intent to threaten a presidential candidate. For the same reasons, given any reasonable construction of the words in defendant's postings, these statements did not constitute a "true threat," and were therefore protected speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, defendant's convictions were reversed. View "United States v. Bagdasarian" on Justia Law

The citizens of Kinston, North Carolina, approved a referendum switching city elections from partisan to nonpartisan. Because Kinston was located in a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act), 42 U.S.C. 1973(c)(a), the city council had no authority to implement the referendum until precleared by federal authorities, and preclearance had not occurred. A candidate for public office claiming a state-law entitlement to run under the suspended nonpartisan system, together with other plaintiffs, filed suit seeking to enjoin the Attorney General from enforcing section 5 against Kinston. Count one of plaintiffs' complaint contended that section 5, as reauthorized in 2006, exceeded Congress' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers. Count two contended that amendments made to section 5 in 2006 erected a facially unconstitutional racial-preference scheme. The court held that one of the plaintiffs, the candidate for public office, had both standing and a cause of action to pursue count one and therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of that claim. The court held that, because plaintiffs' standing with respect to count two raised complex questions unaddressed by the district court and the parties' briefs, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of that claim and remanded for further consideration. View "Laroque, et al. v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act (matching funds provision), Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-940 et seq., created a voluntary public financing system to fund the primary and general election campaigns of candidates for state office. Petitioners, candidates and independent expenditure groups, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the matching funds provision. The Court held that the matching funds provision substantially burdened the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups without serving a compelling state interest where the professed purpose of the state law was to cause a sufficient number of candidates to sign up for public financing, which subjected them to the various restrictions on speech that went along with that program. Therefore, the Court held that the matching funds scheme violated the First Amendment and reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. View "Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC, et al. v. Bennett, et al; McComish, et al. v. Bennett, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner administered and enforced Nevada's Ethics in Government Law, Nev. Rev. Stat. 281A.420, and investigated respondent, an elected official who voted to approve a hotel/casino project proposed by a company that used respondent's long-time friend and campaign manager as a paid consultant. Petitioner concluded that respondent had a disqualifying conflict of interest under section 281A.420(8)(e)'s catch-all provision and censured him for failing to abstain from voting on the project. At issue was whether legislators have a personal, First Amendment right to vote on any given matter. The Court held that the Nevada Ethics in Government Law was not unconstitutionally overbroad where the law prohibited a legislator who had a conflict both from voting on a proposal and from advocating its passage or failure; where a universal and long-established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct created a strong presumption that the prohibition was constitutional; and where restrictions on legislators' voting were not restrictions on legislators' protected speech because the legislator's vote was the commitment of his apportioned share of the legislature's power to the passage or defeat of a particular proposal and the legislative power thus committed was not personal to the legislator but belonged to the people. The Court also concluded that additional arguments raised in respondent's brief were not decided or raised in his brief in opposition and were thus considered waived. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan" on Justia Law

Claiming that he was subjected to dirty tricks during his successful campaign to become the police chief of Vinton, La., plaintiff filed a state court suit against the incumbent chief and the town (collectively, "defendant") asserting both state and federal law claims. Defendant removed the case to federal court based on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims and after discovery, defendant sought summary judgment on the federal claims, which plaintiff conceded were not valid. The District Court accordingly dismissed the federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining claims to state court, noting that defendant's attorneys' work could be useful in the state court proceedings. Defendant then asked the federal court for attorney's fees. At issue was whether a court could grant reasonable fees to defendant when plaintiff's suit involved both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. The Court held that, when a plaintiff's suit involved both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a court could grant reasonable fees to defendant, but only for costs that defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims. The Court concluded that, although the District Court noted the usefulness of the attorneys' work in defending against the state law claims, it failed to take proper account of the overlap between the frivolous and non-frivolous claims; the District Court's reasoning that the close relationship between the federal and state law claims supported the award could not be squared with the congressional policy of sparing defendant from the costs only of frivolous litigation; and the Fifth Circuit did not uphold the award on proper ground where it seemed to think that defendant could receive fees for any work useful to defendant against a frivolous claim, even if his lawyers would have done that work regardless. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fox v. Vice" on Justia Law