Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A group of landowners in Summit County, Utah, challenged a proposed ballot measure to incorporate a new municipality called West Hills. The sponsor of the incorporation, Derek Anderson, had modified the proposed boundaries after the statutory deadline for landowners to request exclusion from the new municipality had passed. As a result, certain landowners whose properties were added late were unable to seek exclusion, even though similarly situated landowners had previously been allowed to do so.The landowners filed suit in the Third District Court, Silver Summit, arguing that the Municipal Incorporation Code, as applied, violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the landowners, finding the code unconstitutional as applied and invalidating the certification of the West Hills ballot measure. The court determined that the plaintiffs were “specified landowners” who would have been entitled to exclusion if their properties had been added earlier, and that the legislature’s interest in certainty did not justify the disparate treatment.The sponsor then filed an emergency petition for extraordinary relief with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, seeking to overturn the district court’s order before the upcoming election. The Utah Supreme Court, after expedited briefing and oral argument, denied the petition for extraordinary relief. The court held that, under the unique circumstances, it would not exercise its discretion to issue a writ due to the potential disruption and confusion in the election process, including the risk of voter suppression and interference with electioneering efforts. The denial was without prejudice to the sponsor’s ability to pursue an appeal or interlocutory review of the district court’s order. View "Anderson v. Bates" on Justia Law

Huntington Beach, a charter city in Orange County, amended its city charter through Measure A, which authorized the city to require voter identification for municipal elections beginning in 2026. This measure was passed by local voters. In response, the California Legislature enacted Elections Code section 10005, effective January 1, 2025, which prohibits any local government from requiring voter identification for voting unless mandated by state or federal law. The statute was specifically intended to address Huntington Beach’s Measure A.Following the passage of Measure A, the State of California, through the Attorney General and Secretary of State, filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Orange County, seeking to invalidate the voter identification provision in the city charter. The City of Huntington Beach demurred, arguing the issue was not ripe since the provision had not yet been implemented. The trial court sustained the demurrer, but after procedural developments and further hearings, ultimately denied the state’s petition, finding that the charter provision did not violate the right to vote or implicate the integrity of the electoral process. The state timely appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the four-part “home rule” test, the court held that Elections Code section 10005 addresses a matter of statewide concern—integrity of the electoral process—and is narrowly tailored to prevent discriminatory barriers to voting. The court concluded that section 10005 preempts the Huntington Beach charter provision. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate invalidating the charter provision, enter a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and declare it preempted by state law. View "P. ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

A citizen of Cleburne County submitted a petition for a local ballot initiative, titled the “Hand Marked, Hand Counted Paper Ballot Ordinance of 2024,” to the county clerk for inclusion in the 2024 general election. The county clerk rejected the petition, determining that there were insufficient valid signatures because some paid canvassers were not Arkansas residents as required by law. The canvassers later submitted supplemental affidavits listing Arkansas addresses, but the clerk still refused to count those signatures.The petitioner then filed suit in the Cleburne County Circuit Court, seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction to compel the clerk to count the disputed signatures and certify the petition if it met the signature requirements. After an expedited hearing, the circuit court granted both the writ and the injunction, ordering the clerk to count all signatures, including those “cured” by the supplemental affidavits, and to certify the petition if it was sufficient.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court could require the county clerk to certify a local ballot initiative that was not timely filed under the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution sets the exclusive timeline for filing local initiative petitions—no sooner than ninety days and no later than sixty days before the election. The petition in question was filed too early for the 2024 election and, by operation of statute, would have been certified for the 2026 election, but it was also untimely for that election under the constitutional timeline. The Supreme Court held that the relevant statutory provisions were unconstitutional to the extent they conflicted with the constitutional timeline. The court reversed the circuit court’s order and dismissed the case, holding that a circuit court cannot require certification of an untimely initiative. View "EVANS v. HARRISON" on Justia Law

A group of voters in Tarrant County, Texas, challenged the county’s decision to redraw the boundaries of its four commissioners precincts in 2025, a process that occurred outside the usual post-census redistricting cycle. The new map, adopted by a narrow 3–2 vote, shifted a significant number of voters—disproportionately Black, Latino, and Democratic—into precincts that would not hold commissioner elections until 2028, effectively postponing their opportunity to vote for a county commissioner by two years. The plaintiffs, who are racially diverse, argued that the redistricting was intended to harm racial minorities and Democratic voters, and that the mid-cycle timing unlawfully disenfranchised certain residents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction to block the use of the new map in the 2026 election. The district court dismissed the First Amendment claims as nonjusticiable under Supreme Court precedent, but allowed the race discrimination and vote postponement claims to proceed, ultimately finding that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit held that claims of partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable in federal court, even when staggered elections result in some voters’ ballots being postponed. The court further held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that race was a motivating factor in the adoption of the new map, applying the Arlington Heights framework and finding no clear error in the district court’s assessment of the evidence. Finally, the court concluded that postponement of voting opportunities due to redistricting in a staggered election system does not violate the Constitution, as there is no right to vote on a particular schedule. View "Jackson v. Tarrant County" on Justia Law

In 2023, the New York Legislature enacted the Even Year Election Law (EYEL), which consolidated certain county and town elections with even-year state and federal elections. The law amended various statutes to move local elections to even-numbered years and adjusted the terms of office for officials elected in odd-numbered years. Several counties and towns with charter provisions setting local elections in odd years, along with individual voters, challenged the EYEL, arguing that it violated the home rule provisions of article IX of the New York State Constitution and other constitutional rights.The Supreme Court, Onondaga County, consolidated the complaints and denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It declared the EYEL unconstitutional, holding that counties have a constitutional right to set their own terms of office and that the EYEL was neither a valid general law nor a valid special law under article IX. The court enjoined enforcement of the EYEL. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the EYEL did not violate the New York or United States Constitutions. The Appellate Division held that the EYEL was a general law, applied rationally to similarly situated counties, and served the legitimate state interest of increasing voter turnout.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that article IX does not expressly or implicitly limit the Legislature’s authority to mandate the timing of local elections. The EYEL was found to be a valid general law, and the constitutional “bill of rights” for local governments did not bar the Legislature from enacting such a statute. The Court also dismissed the individual voter plaintiffs’ claims, finding any alleged injury minor compared to the State’s substantial interest. The order was affirmed without costs. View "County of Onondaga v State of New York" on Justia Law

Several months before an election, complaints were filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission alleging that two political groups, A Stronger Alaska and the Republican Governors Association, had violated Alaska’s campaign finance laws by coordinating with a gubernatorial campaign and failing to comply with disclosure requirements. The Commission initiated expedited proceedings, held hearings where officials from the groups testified, and then chose not to make a final determination on the alleged violations. Instead, the Commission remanded the matters to its staff for further investigation on a regular, non-expedited basis. The Commission’s staff subsequently issued administrative subpoenas seeking documents and communications from the groups, but the groups refused to comply.The Commission sought judicial enforcement of its subpoenas in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The groups opposed enforcement, arguing that the subpoenas were unnecessary because the Commission already had relevant testimony, that further investigation was barred by res judicata, and that the process violated their due process rights. They also challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme authorizing the expedited process. The superior court rejected all of these arguments, granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission, and ordered enforcement of the subpoenas.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the subpoenas were not unreasonable or oppressive simply because prior testimony had been given, as documentary evidence could still be relevant. The court also held that res judicata did not apply because the Commission had not issued a final decision on the merits, and that the process did not violate substantive due process or result in an absurd or unconstitutional statutory scheme. The court affirmed the order granting summary judgment to the Commission. View "Republican Governors Association v. Hebdon" on Justia Law

Several voters in Washington County, Pennsylvania, submitted mail-in ballots for the 2024 Primary Election that contained obvious errors, such as missing signatures or dates on the declaration envelope, or missing secrecy envelopes. Under a previous policy, the county board of elections notified voters of such defects and allowed them to correct the errors or vote provisionally. However, in April 2024, the board adopted a new policy eliminating notice and cure procedures. Instead, all returned mail-in ballots, including those with disqualifying errors, were coded identically in the state’s SURE system, which triggered an email to voters stating their ballot had been received and that they could not vote at the polls, regardless of whether their ballot was valid. As a result, voters whose ballots were set aside for errors were not informed of the disqualification and did not attempt to vote provisionally.The Washington County Court of Common Pleas found that the board’s policy violated voters’ procedural due process rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to provide notice that their ballots would not be counted, thus depriving them of the opportunity to challenge the decision or vote provisionally. The court issued an injunction requiring the board to notify affected voters, accurately code ballots in the SURE system, and ensure poll books reflected that such voters had not “voted,” allowing them to cast provisional ballots. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the right to vote and the statutory right to cast a provisional ballot are protected liberty interests, and that the board’s policy risked erroneous deprivation of those rights.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed in large part, holding that the right to vote and the statutory right to cast a provisional ballot when a mail-in ballot is void are protected liberty interests under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court held that due process requires county boards to provide accurate notice—via correct SURE system coding—when a mail-in ballot is segregated for a disqualifying error, so affected voters have the opportunity to vote provisionally. The court vacated the requirement for additional notice beyond accurate SURE coding and clarified that the right to challenge under 25 P.S. §3157 does not require pre-canvass challenges. The injunction otherwise remains in effect. View "Center for Coalfield Justice v. Washington County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Following the 2020 census, South Carolina was required to redraw its congressional districts to ensure population equality among the seven districts. The most significant changes involved Districts 1 and 6, with District 1 being overpopulated and District 6 underpopulated. The redistricting process, led by Senator Chip Campsen, resulted in a plan that increased the Republican advantage in District 1 by unifying certain counties and shifting precincts with high Democratic vote shares into District 6. The plan was enacted in 2022 and used in subsequent elections.Previously, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the plan in Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1 (2024), focusing on claims of racial gerrymandering. The Supreme Court found that the legislature’s primary intent was partisan advantage, not racial discrimination, and held that claims of partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable under the U.S. Constitution. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their remaining federal claims, the League of Women Voters of South Carolina filed a petition in the Supreme Court of South Carolina, arguing that the plan constituted an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under several provisions of the South Carolina Constitution.The Supreme Court of South Carolina, exercising its original jurisdiction, held that claims of partisan gerrymandering present a nonjusticiable political question under the state constitution. The court found that South Carolina’s constitution and statutes do not contain provisions that prohibit or limit partisan gerrymandering, nor do they provide judicially manageable standards for adjudicating such claims. The court concluded that the authority to draw congressional districts is textually committed to the legislature and denied the League’s request for relief, dismissing the claims with prejudice. View "League of Women Voters of South Carolina v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations and an individual challenged two provisions of Arizona’s 2023 Election Procedures Manual (EPM). The first provision, known as the Speech Provision, purported to summarize Arizona’s voter intimidation laws and included examples of prohibited conduct, such as using offensive language or engaging in behavior that could be seen as intimidating or harassing voters. The second, the Canvass Provision, described the Secretary of State’s duty to certify statewide election results by a statutory deadline, specifying that if a county failed to submit its official results on time, the Secretary must proceed without including that county’s votes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the Speech Provision violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by chilling protected political speech, and that the Canvass Provision unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote by threatening disenfranchisement if a county missed the certification deadline. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions, denied a request to stay the case under Pullman abstention, and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of both the Speech and Canvass Provisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the Speech Provision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing because they intended to engage in political speech arguably covered by the provision and faced a credible risk of enforcement. The court found a likelihood of success on the merits, as the state did not contest the district court’s conclusion that the Speech Provision likely violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of standing regarding the Canvass Provision, concluding that plaintiffs had not shown a substantial risk that any county would fail to certify its results and thus vacated the injunction as to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "AMERICAN ENCORE V. FONTES" on Justia Law

A group of proponents filed an initiative petition seeking to repeal the existing constitutional provision governing Oklahoma’s primary elections and replace it with a new system. The proposed amendment would establish an “open primary” for certain state and federal offices, where all candidates appear on the same ballot regardless of party, and any qualified voter may vote for any candidate. The two candidates with the most votes would advance to the general election, regardless of party affiliation or endorsement. The ballot would display each candidate’s party registration or independent status, with a disclaimer clarifying that such registration does not imply party nomination or endorsement. The measure would not affect elections for presidential electors, municipal, judicial, or school board offices.After the petition was filed with the Secretary of State, the Oklahoma Republican Party and another petitioner protested its legal sufficiency before the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. They argued that the initiative was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, claiming it infringed on the right of political association and failed strict scrutiny. They also asserted that the gist and ballot title were misleading, particularly in their use of the term “open primary” and in the explanation of changes to general elections.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the petition. Applying its standard of review, the court found no clear or manifest facial constitutional infirmity, holding that the proposed system did not impose a severe burden on associational rights under relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedents. The court determined that the gist was not misleading, as it adequately described the practical effect of the measure. The challenge to the ballot title was deemed premature, as statutory procedure requires such review after the signature-gathering phase. The court held that the initiative petition was legally sufficient for circulation and signature gathering. View "IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 448, STATE QUESTION NO. 836: THE OKLAHOMA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SETTER" on Justia Law