Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, a group of Colorado voters contended that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits former President Donald J. Trump from holding the Presidential office again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed, ordering the state to exclude Trump from the Republican primary ballot and to disregard any write-in votes cast for him.The case centered around the interpretation of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which disqualifies any person from holding a federal or state office who has previously taken an oath to support the Constitution and subsequently engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States. The voters claimed that Trump's actions following his defeat in the 2020 Presidential election, particularly the incitement of the crowd that breached the Capitol on January 6, 2021, constituted such insurrection.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, ruling that the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates. The Court maintained that while the States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office, they lack the power to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices, including the Presidency. The Court argued that permitting state enforcement of Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates would invert the Fourteenth Amendment’s rebalancing of federal and state power and would raise serious questions about the scope of that power. The Court concluded that such enforcement would lead to chaos and inconsistency in the electoral process. Therefore, the responsibility for enforcing Section 3 rests with Congress, not the States. View "Trump v. Anderson" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the eligibility of Jennie Armstrong, the winning candidate of Alaska’s House District 16 2022 general election. The losing candidate, Liz Vazquez, along with four House District 16 voters, challenged Armstrong's eligibility, arguing that she had not been a resident of Alaska for at least three years before filing for office, as required by the Alaska Constitution. Armstrong maintained that she became a resident on May 20, 2019, while Vazquez argued that her residency did not begin until June 7, 2019. The superior court ruled in favor of Armstrong, declaring her eligible to serve in the legislature.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's determination that Armstrong established her residency on May 20, 2019, but disagreed with the lower court's use of Title 15 to determine state residency. Instead, the Supreme Court held that Title 1, which states a person establishes residency in the state by being physically present with the intent to remain indefinitely and to make a home in the state, governs the state residency requirement for determining the eligibility of a legislative candidate. The Supreme Court found that Armstrong met the requirements of Title 1 and was therefore eligible to serve in the legislature. View "Vazquez v. Dahlstrom" on Justia Law

In this case, two state senators from Oregon, Dennis Linthicum and Brian Boquist, challenged a recent amendment to the Oregon Constitution that disqualifies any state senator or representative from the next election if they have accrued ten or more unexcused absences from legislative floor sessions. In 2023, the senators engaged in a legislative walkout spanning several weeks, each accumulating more than ten unexcused absences. As a result, Oregon's Secretary of State disqualified them from appearing on the ballot for the 2024 election. The senators sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that their walkout was a form of protest protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that the senators' walkout was not protected by the First Amendment, as it was not a form of expression, but an exercise of legislative power. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, which held that the First Amendment does not protect the exercise of official legislative power, even if it could be characterized as expressive. The court also noted that the power of a legislator to be absent from legislative sessions, and thereby frustrate legislative action, is not personal to the legislator but belongs to the people. Therefore, the senators could not claim a personal First Amendment right to walk out. The court concluded that the senators were unlikely to prevail on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed the denial of their request for a preliminary injunction. View "Linthicum v. Wagner" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed a lower court's decision that a redistricting plan for the Missouri Senate, which was prepared by a judicial redistricting commission, met constitutional requirements. The appellants, residents of districts impacted by the redistricting, argued that the plan violated the community preservation requirement of the Missouri Constitution by splitting certain communities into different senatorial districts. The court found the appellants did not meet their burden of proving the plan was clearly and undoubtedly unconstitutional. The court noted that the constitution allows for some flexibility in the redistricting process and that the plan need not achieve absolute perfection. The court concluded that the redistricting plan did not violate the constitutional requirements and was not the result of partisan or racial gerrymandering. View "Faatz v. Ashcroft" on Justia Law

In Minnesota, a group of voters sought to prevent former President Donald Trump from appearing on the 2024 presidential primary and general election ballots, arguing that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which disqualifies anyone from holding office who has engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the U.S., rendered him ineligible. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that it would not be an error to place Trump's name on the 2024 Republican Party presidential nomination primary ballot. The court reasoned that the nomination primary is an internal party election, and the state law does not prohibit a major political party from placing an ineligible candidate on the primary ballot. However, the court did not decide on the issue of Trump's name on the general election ballot, stating that the matter was not yet ripe for adjudication as it was not "about to occur" under the relevant state law. The court did not foreclose the possibility of petitioners bringing such a claim at a later date. View "Growe v. Simon" on Justia Law

A group of voters and officials in Wisconsin brought a case before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, arguing that the state's current legislative districts were not contiguous and therefore violated the state constitution. The respondents countered that the districts were contiguous, as they included separate, detached territories known as "municipal islands." The court ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding that the current legislative districts did not meet the contiguity requirements of the state constitution. The court explained that "contiguous territory" means territory that is physically touching, and the current districts, which include separate, detached parts, do not meet this requirement. The court also rejected the respondents' defenses of lack of standing, laches, issue preclusion, claim preclusion, and judicial estoppel. As a remedy, the court enjoined the Wisconsin Elections Commission from using the current legislative maps in future elections and urged the legislature to pass legislation creating new maps that satisfy all legal requirements. The court also set forth a process for adopting new state legislative districts if the legislature fails to enact new maps. View "Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

In a case brought by a group of Colorado electors, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado considered whether former President Donald J. Trump could appear on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot. The electors claimed that Trump was disqualified under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits anyone who has engaged in insurrection against the U.S. Constitution from holding office. The district court found that Trump had engaged in insurrection on January 6, 2021, but concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the presidency.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Election Code allows the electors to challenge Trump's status as a qualified candidate based on Section Three. The court found that Congress does not need to pass legislation for Section Three's disqualification provision to apply, and that the provision encompasses the office of the Presidency. The court further held that the district court did not err in finding that Trump had engaged in insurrection, and that his speech inciting the crowd was not protected by the First Amendment. As a result, the court concluded that Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President under Section Three, and it would be a wrongful act under the Election Code for the Secretary of State to list him as a candidate on the presidential primary ballot. The court stayed its ruling until January 4, 2024, to maintain the status quo pending any review by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "Anderson v. Griswold" on Justia Law

In the state of Kansas, a number of non-profit groups, including the League of Women Voters of Kansas and the Kansas Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, challenged a law which made it a felony to engage in conduct that gives the appearance of being an election official or that would cause another person to believe a person is an election official. The non-profits argued that the law was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague, as it could criminalize their voter education and registration activities. They also claimed that the law violated their rights to free speech and association. The district court denied their request for a temporary injunction and the Court of Appeals dismissed the non-profits' claims for lack of standing, arguing that they were not at risk of prosecution under the statute. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed these decisions, finding that the non-profits did have standing to challenge the law. The Court held that when a law criminalizes speech and does not clearly demonstrate that only constitutionally unprotected speech is being criminalized, the law is unclear enough to confer pre-enforcement standing on a plaintiff challenging the law. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab" on Justia Law

In a case concerning the constitutionality of the Kentucky General Assembly's legislative and congressional reapportionment plans, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court's decision that the plans were constitutional. The appellants, which included the Kentucky Democratic Party and several individual voters, challenged the plans, alleging that they were the result of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, violated the Kentucky Constitution's guarantees of free and equal elections, equal protection, and freedom of speech and assembly, and violated Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution, which sets forth requirements for the reapportionment process. The court held that the apportionment plans did not involve an unconstitutional level of partisan gerrymandering and did not violate the state constitution's guarantees of free and equal elections, equal protection, freedom of speech and assembly, or Section 33's requirements for the reapportionment process. The court applied a substantially deferential standard in its review, given the political nature of the apportionment process. It found that the plans did not involve a clear, flagrant, and unwarranted deviation from constitutional limitations, nor did they threaten the state's democratic form of government. The court also found that the appellants had standing to bring their claims and that the claims were justiciable. View "GRAHAM V. ADAMS" on Justia Law

The New York Court of Appeals held that the New York State Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) failed to fulfill its constitutional duties for redistricting maps after the 2020 census. The court affirmed a lower court decision ordering the IRC to reconvene and deliver a second set of lawful redistricting maps.In 2014, New York voters amended the state constitution to mandate that the IRC, not the courts or the legislature, draw legislative districts. However, the IRC failed to deliver the required maps, resulting in a court-ordered redistricting plan for the 2022 elections.The court clarified that such court-directed plans are limited to the "extent" that the court is "required" to do so, and are not meant to last longer than necessary to remedy a violation of law. Therefore, the existing court-drawn districts are limited to the 2022 election.The court dismissed arguments that it was too late to compel the IRC to act, explaining that the court-ordered maps were not required to last a decade and that the IRC's constitutional obligation could be enforced at any time, unless barred by laches. The court also rejected arguments that the lawsuit was a collateral attack on an earlier decision, which dealt with a different issue.The ruling orders the IRC to submit a second set of redistricting maps and implementing legislation to the legislature as soon as possible, but no later than February 28, 2024. View "Matter of Hoffmann v New York State Ind. Redistricting Commn." on Justia Law