Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Relators, Ohioans for Fair Districts and its members, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, Secretary of State Jon Husted, to treat Sections 1 and 2 of H.B. 319, which established new congressional districts for the state based on the 2010 decennial census, as subject to referendum, to accept the submission of Relators' referendum-petition summary, and to discharge the duties of Husted's office as provided by Ohio Const. art. II and Ohio Rev. Code 3519.01. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the writ was consistent with precedent and the plain language of Ohio Const. art. II, and (2) unless a valid referendum petition was timely filed with the secretary of state, H.B. 319 would become effective ninety days from the date the bill was filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state. View "State ex rel. Ohioans for Fair Dists. v. Husted" on Justia Law

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 15 (2012). If enacted, Initiative Petition 15 would add a provision to the Oregon Revised Statutes that would phase out all estate and inheritance taxes, and related taxes on intra-family property transfers that the state currently has statutory authority to collect. The proposed measure would supersede any Oregon law that purports to impose such a tax. Petitioners were electors who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content of the Attorney General's draft ballot title and who therefore were entitled to seek review of the resulting certified ballot title to the Supreme Court. Petitioners challenged the caption and "yes" and "no" vote result statements. The Supreme Court reviewed the certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with ORS 250.035(2) (stating requirements for ballot titles). The Court determined that the initiative warranted revision by the Attorney General, and referred the ballot back for modification. View "Rasmussen v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff's procedural due process claim was properly rejected where plaintiff had no property right to be a candidate. The court also held that plaintiff's substantive due process claim failed because there were no disputed facts regarding plaintiff's application containing an incorrect residential address where plaintiff made an oral admission that he did not live at the listed address. The court further held that plaintiff's Equal Protection claim was properly denied where the actions of the official at issue did not constitute intentional or purposeful discrimination. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to establish that Section 141.032(e) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. Accordingly, because plaintiff filed his application for candidacy in the last hour of the last possible day, which limited his opportunity to refile a correct application, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Birnberg, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of prospective political candidates, petition circulators, and voters, appealed from the district court's order awarding summary judgment to the Board of Elections in the City of New York and upholding the State's "Party Witness Rule." The Rule, contained in New York Election Law 6-132, limited who a candidate for a political party's nomination could use to circulate so-called "designating petitions," which allowed the candidate to appear on the party primary ballot. Unless the circulator was a notary public or commissioner of deeds, the Party Witness Rule restricted designating petition circulators to "enrolled voter[s] of the same political party as the voters qualified to sign the petition," the party in whose primary the candidate sought to run. The court held that because plaintiffs were without a right to have non-party members participate in a political party's nomination process, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Maslow v. Board of Elections, NYC" on Justia Law

Appellant sought to intervene in a suit under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973, that was originally filed in 1996 by the League of United Latin American Citizens, District 19 (LULAC), against the city of Boerne, Texas. LULAC and the city reached a settlement agreement in 1996 and the district court entered a consent decree which provided that city council members would thereafter be elected through at-large elections with cumulative voting. In 2009, LULAC and the city filed a joint motion to reopen the case and modify the consent decree in order to switch to a single-member-district system. The district court granted that motion and appellant, a resident and registered voter of Boerne who opposed the change, filed a motion to intervene. Appellant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion on the grounds that appellant lacked standing. The court held that appellant had standing; that the case was not moot; and appellant had a right to intervene in the case under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of appellant's motion to intervene. The court also held that the district court had the power to modify the consent decree; but the district court abused its discretion in granting LULAC and the city's motion to modify because the record did not show that modifications were warranted. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the district court's order granting the modified consent decree. View "League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Boerne" on Justia Law

A year into his term as a circuit court judge, Appellant Charles Bernstein filed a complaint challenging his mandatory retirement pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, naming as defendants the State, Governor, and General Assembly. Appellant argued that Md. Const. art. IV, 3 had application only to judges who attain the age of seventy while they are in office, and thus, a person seventy years or older who was not currently serving as a circuit court judge may be appointed to fill a judicial vacancy or run for judicial office. The Court of Appeals answered questions certified to it as follows: (1) the Maryland Constitution (i) requires a sitting judge to retire upon reaching age seventy, (ii) prohibits the Governor from appointing a person seventy years of age or older to the bench, and (iii) prohibits a person seventy years of age or older from running from judicial office; and (2) the Maryland Constitution does not permit a person seventy years of age or older to run for a judicial office and, if elected, to serve out the entire term. View "Bernstein v. State" on Justia Law

In November 2008, P. Leslie Riley and an organization known as "Personhood Mississippi" filed an initiative, now known as Measure 26, with the Office of the Secretary of State. The initiative was qualified by the Secretary of the State to be placed on the general election ballot. Thereafter, Deborah Hughes and Cristen Hemmins ("Plaintiffs") filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in Hinds County Circuit Court against Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann, challenging Measure 26 as a violation of Article 15, Section 273(5)(a) of the Mississippi Constitution. On August 10, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Secretary of State replied with a response to that motion. Then, on September 30, 2010, the trial court entered and approved an Agreed Order, allowing Riley and Personhood Mississippi to intervene. In that same order, all parties agreed that this case was "based on questions of law" and "should be resolved by way of judgment on the pleadings." Subsequently, after considering the motion and responses, having heard oral argument, and being otherwise fully advised in these matters, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that they had not carried their heavy burden in attempting to restrict the citizenry's right to amend the Constitution. Thereafter, the trial court entered an additional order, titled "Final Judgment." The trial court ruled that the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings disposed of the case. Additionally, the trial court ruled that "final judgment is hereby entered in favor of the" Secretary of State and the Intervenors. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Measure 26 was not ripe for review. Thus, the Court vacated the trial court's final judgment in favor of Intervenors and Secretary Hosemann. The Supreme Court finally dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice. View "Hughes v. Hosemann" on Justia Law

David Waide filed an Initiative with Mississippi Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann, and Hosemann approved it for placement on the November, 2011 general election ballot. Plaintiff Leland Speed filed a complaint against Hosemann in the Hinds County Circuit Court, along with a Motion for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, asking the Supreme Court to declare Initiative 31 unconstitutional and to enjoin Hosemann from placing it on the ballot. Speed argued that Initiative 31 "violates Section 273(5)(a) because that section prohibits use of the initiative process for the proposal, modification or repeal' of any portion' of the Constitution's Bill of Rights." Speed argued that Initiative 31 was a "proposal, modification or repeal' of the Bill of Rights . . . and more specifically of its Section 17, which governs taking of private property for a public use." After Hosemann and Waide responded to Speed's pleadings, Speed filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, in which he argued that the case "involve[d] a pure issue of law with no material facts in dispute" and asked the court to enter judgment in his favor under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The trial judge both denied Speed's motion for judgment on the pleadings and ruled on the merits, finding that Speed's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and ordering that Hosemann be allowed to proceed in placing Initiative 31 on the ballot. On appeal, Speed asked the Supreme Court to reverse the trial judge, declare that Initiative 31 violates Section 273(5) of the Mississippi Constitution, and "keep Initiative 31 off the November ballot." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issue presented in this appeal (the constitutionality of proposed Initiative 31) was not ripe for adjudication by the Court, such that any opinion thereon would be improperly advisory. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's decision and dismissed the case. View "Speed v. Hosemann" on Justia Law

Petitioner State Senator Jim Wilson sought review of the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011, pursuant to Section 11C, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Petitioner alleged the Act does not comply with the apportionment formula in Section 9A, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Specifically, Petitioner alleged the Act does not pass constitutional muster because it "fails to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible provide for compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests." Senator Wilson did not explicitly identify every district in the Redistricting Act that he contended was not in compliance with Section 9A but claimed that he identified such districts by the maps provided in the appendix of his petition. Upon review of the arguments submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner failed to show that the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 does not comply with the provisions of Section 9A of the Oklahoma Constitution. View "Wilson v. Fallin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced this hybrid declaratory judgment action/article 78 proceeding, seeking a declaration that the implementation of Local Law No. 3-2011 in relation to the November 8, 2011 general election was null and void for lack of compliance with the Nassau County Charter. At issue was whether the metes and bounds descriptions in Local Law No. 3-2011 applied to the 2011 general election or whether they were the first part of a three-step process to take effect in 2013. The court held that Supreme Court properly declared that Local Law No. 3-2011 was in accord with Nassau County Charter 112, but that its implementation was null and void in connection with the November 8, 2011 general election for lack of compliance with Nassau County Charter 113 and 114. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, without costs, and the order and judgment of Supreme Court reinstated. View "Yatauro, et al. v. Mangano, et al." on Justia Law