Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Maine election laws (Me.Rev.Stat. title 21A sec. 1052) as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms, particularly with respect to the phrase "for the purpose of influencing," as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees and reporting of independent expenditures. The district court upheld the law. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the organization had standing. The record showed that its fears were objectively reasonable and led to self-censorship. With respect to the overbreadth claim, the court rejected an argument based on the distinction between issue discussion and express advocacy, characterizing the distinction as irrelevant and applying the "exacting scrutiny" standard because the law does not prohibit, limit, or impose any onerous burdens on speech, but merely requires maintenance and disclosure of certain financial information. There is a "substantial relation" between Maine's informational interest and each of the laws at issue. The terms "promoting," "support," "opposition," "influencing," "expressly advocate" and "initiation" are sufficiently clear. View "Nat'l Org. For Marriage v. Adam" on Justia Law

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Rhode Island election laws as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees, contributions to and expenditures on behalf of candidates, and reporting of independent expenditures. The organization claimed that it would refrain from certain political activities if required to register as a PAC, but would comply with independent expenditures under protest. After receiving assurances that the organization could engage in its planned speech without registering as a PAC, the district court denied a preliminary injunction, noting the minimal burden imposed by the law and the valuable governmental interest underlying it. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the organization had not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits. View "Nat'l Org. For Marriag v. Daluz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (Green Party) brought this action against the Arkansas Secretary of State pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the Green Party was a political party and that Arkansas Code 7-1-101(21)(C) violated the Green Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and (2) an injunction preventing Arkansas from enforcing section 7-1-101(21)(C). At issue on appeal was whether section 7-1-101(21)(C) severely interfered with the Green Party's right of association and therefore, impermissibly burdened the Green Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In light of compelling Supreme Court precedent, the many alternative paths Arkansas provided to the ballot, and the Green Party's own success in achieving ballot access, the court held that while the burdens imposed on the Green Party's rights did exist, they were significantly outweighed by Arkansas's important regulatory interests. Therefore, the court concluded that Arkansas's ballot access scheme did not impermissibly burden the Green Party's constitutional rights and the judgment was affirmed. View "Green Party of Arkansas, et al. v. Martin, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners Daniel Lavey and Anna Richter Taylor sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 16 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of state election law. Initiative Petition 16 would amend several statutory provisions regrading the use of studded tires on public roads. Currently state law makes it a class C traffic violation for a person to drive a vehicle equipped with stuffed tires on any Oregon highway. Initiative Petition 16 would delete two exemptions and amend the code so that no road authority would be allowed to issue a variance permit. Petitioners contended that the ballot title was deficient in a number of different respects pertaining to the caption, the "yes" vote result statement, the "no" vote result statement and the summary. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected most of Petitioners' arguments without discussion, but wrote only to address one issue raised by petitioners that affected the caption and the "yes" vote result statement. The Court found that the caption and "yes" statement did not adequately identify the subject of the proposed initiative because it did not accurately state the change in the law that will take place if the initiative became law. The Court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Lavey v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 14 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of state election law. If enacted, Initiative Petition 14 would amend the Oregon Constitution to prohibit the state from imposing any inheritance tax, estate tax or tax on the transfer of property "where the transfer is the result of the death of a person." Petitioners contended that the ballot title was deficient in a number of different respects pertaining to the caption and the "no" vote result statement and summary. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General with regard to the caption: "the Attorney General's identification of the subject matter of the measure as amending the constitution to prohibit estate taxes is accurate and substantially complies" with state law. However, with regard to the "no" statement, the Court found a vague and indefinite reference that did not adequately inform voters which estates currently subject to estate or inheritance taxes would continue to be subject to such taxes if the initiative was rejected. The Court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Rasmussen v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, visually or manually impaired Florida citizens who were registered to vote in Duval County, Florida and were represented by the American Association of People with Disabilities, filed a putative class action against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal statutory and state constitutional provisions by failing to provide handicapped-accessible voting machines to visually or manually impaired Florida voters after the 2000 general election. The court vacated its prior opinion and in its revised opinion, held that the district court erroneously granted plaintiffs' requested declaratory judgment and injunction against purported violations of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The opinion, however, based that outcome exclusively on the ground that voting machines were not "facilities" under 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b). View "Amer. Assoc.of People with Disabilities, et al. v. Harris, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from defendant's convictions for making two statements regarding Barack Obama on an online message board two weeks before the presidential election. At issue was whether the district court properly convicted defendant under 18 U.S.C. 879(a)(3), which made it a felony to threaten to kill or do bodily harm to a major presidential candidate. The court held that, taking the two statements at issue in the context of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, the court held that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the subjective intent to threaten a presidential candidate. For the same reasons, given any reasonable construction of the words in defendant's postings, these statements did not constitute a "true threat," and were therefore protected speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, defendant's convictions were reversed. View "United States v. Bagdasarian" on Justia Law

The citizens of Kinston, North Carolina, approved a referendum switching city elections from partisan to nonpartisan. Because Kinston was located in a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act), 42 U.S.C. 1973(c)(a), the city council had no authority to implement the referendum until precleared by federal authorities, and preclearance had not occurred. A candidate for public office claiming a state-law entitlement to run under the suspended nonpartisan system, together with other plaintiffs, filed suit seeking to enjoin the Attorney General from enforcing section 5 against Kinston. Count one of plaintiffs' complaint contended that section 5, as reauthorized in 2006, exceeded Congress' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers. Count two contended that amendments made to section 5 in 2006 erected a facially unconstitutional racial-preference scheme. The court held that one of the plaintiffs, the candidate for public office, had both standing and a cause of action to pursue count one and therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of that claim. The court held that, because plaintiffs' standing with respect to count two raised complex questions unaddressed by the district court and the parties' briefs, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of that claim and remanded for further consideration. View "Laroque, et al. v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the results of a town council election in Atlantic Beach, South Carolina, held on November 3, 2009. Carolyn Cole and Windy Price (Appellants) appealed the circuit court order that affirmed the Town of Atlantic Beach Municipal Election Commission's (MEC) decision to de-certify and order a new election for two Atlantic Beach Town Councilmember positions. On November 3, 2009, the Town of Atlantic Beach held an election for the two positions on town council. After the polls closed, there were 39 contested ballots. The MEC held a challenged ballot hearing, after which, 28 of the challenged ballots were accepted. These accepted ballots included those of Price and Cole. The MEC conducted two protest hearings. In pertinent part, the MEC heard testimony concerning the allegations raised in several letters of protest that contested the election of Appellants on the grounds that Appellants failed to meet the residency requirements to run as candidates. At the close of the second hearing, a majority of the Commissioners voted to grant petitions for a new election. On that same day, Appellants appealed the MEC's decision to the circuit court. The MEC did not issue a written order until January 29, 2010. That order summarily found Appellants did not meet the residency requirements of running for public office. The MEC de-certified the election results and ordered a new election. The circuit court judge heard the appeal in May 2010, and issued an order that same day affirming the decision of the MEC. Upon review, the issues before the Supreme Court pertained to whether there was sufficient evidence in the MECs record to support its decision to decertify and order new elections. Appellants argued that the Supreme Court should vacate the MEC's decision to de-certify and order a new election because the MEC failed to comply with the requirements of the South Carolina Code that delineates the procedure for contesting results of a municipal election. The Court believed that the Town's "complete disregard of the provisions of section the statute was perpetuated by a conscious decision to ignore the will of the voters, and this delay ultimately undermined the legislative purpose behind requiring the expeditious handling of election disputes." Therefore, the Court agreed with Appellants and vacated the decision of the MEC. Accordingly, the MEC's initial certification of the town council election declaring Appellants Cole and Price as winners was restored. View "Cole v. Town of Atlantic Beach Election Commission" on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff's application for ballot placement as an independent candidate for Congress was denied due to his failure to comply with the state’s requirement that each petition signature be witnessed by a district resident. The district court dismissed a challenge to the requirement, relying in part on a 1985 Fourth Circuit case. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that its rationale in the earlier case has been superseded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The district court should determine whether the in-district witness requirement is justified by a state's desire to gauge the depth of a candidate's support. Plaintiff's supporters lack standing, but the plaintiff's challenge is not moot. There is a reasonable expectation that the challenged provisions will be applied against the plaintiff again during future election cycles. View "Lux v. Judd" on Justia Law