Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants, three Minnesota corporations seeking to advance their respective social and commercial interests, filed suit to enjoin Minnesota election laws on independent expenditures and corporate contributions to candidates and political parties and moved for a preliminary injunction. At issue was whether the district court erred in failing to grant a preliminary injunction because appellants failed to show a likelihood of success. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for an injunction where appellants were unlikely to prevail on the issue of whether Minnesota functionally retained a ban on corporate independent expenditures; appellants were unlikely to prevail on their claim of improper tailoring; and appellants were unlikely to prevail on the direct-contribution issue or the independent-expenditure issue.

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of a certified ballot title for âInitiative Petition 10 (2012).â The proposed measure, if approved by the voters, would amend the state constitution to set the procedure for how the state sets its legislative districts following the federal census. Petitioners contended that the caption understates the scope of the changes that adoption of the measure would require under state law, and is thus misleading. The Supreme Court agreed with Petitioners that the caption understates the major effects of adopting the Initiative. The Court remanded the ballot title back to the attorney General for modification.

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of a certified ballot title for âInitiative Petition 12 (2012).â The proposed measure, if approved by the voters, would amend the state constitution to require elections officials to count every qualified voterâs signature on an initiative or referendum petition. Additionally, it would prevent the application of laws intended to prevent forgery or fraud in circulating petitions from being used to count âgoodâ signatures. Petitioners contended that the phrase âcreates enforceable rightâ in the caption printed on the ballot is misleading. The Attorney General responded that it was limited in the number of words it could put in the title, and that the phrase was simply an efficient choice of words. The Supreme Court was ânot persuaded that the applicable word limit compels the use of the phrase,â and remanded the ballot title back to the Attorney Generalâs office for modification.

Appellants brought an action against appellee, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of South Dakota, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments related to appellants' efforts to place a candidate for governor on the 2010 ballot in South Dakota and challenged the constitutionality of two statutory provisions related to that process. At issue was whether appellants had standing to challenge S.D. Codified Laws 12-5-3(9), which permitted only in-state residents to circulate the petitions at issue ("Count II"), and whether the court erred in failing to strike it down as unconstitutional. The court held that all appellants lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the relevant statute and vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Count II without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

The Appellant Rex Moats was a former candidate for the thirty ninth district of Nebraska Legislature. During the course of the 2008 election, the Republican Party paid for and distributed publications in opposition to Moatsâ candidacy. Moats filed a complaint in district court, where he identified in eleven separate publications instances of where he claimed the Republican Party defamed him, portrayed him in a false light and violated several consumer protection laws. The Republican Party filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and the court granted it, dismissing Moatsâ case. The Supreme Court noted that context was critical to analyzing whether a statement was defamatory, particularly if the statement expressed a fact or opinion. The Court examined the circumstances in which each statement was made, finding they were political campaign brochures intended to persuade voters to vote against Moats through the use of rhetoric and hyperbole. The Court characterized all of the cited statements as âopinionâ and held they were protected speech under the Constitution. The Court could not find that the statements violated consumer protection laws. Accordingly, it affirmed the district courtâs decision to dismiss Moatsâ case.

Plaintiffs, three Minnesota-based grass roots advocacy organizations, challenged a Minnesota law that made it a crime to knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make a false statement about a proposed ballot initiative under the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act ("FCPA"), Minn. Stat. 211.B06, subd.1. At issue was whether the district court erred when it dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction; when it alternatively held that it would dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and when it denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The court held that plaintiffs' claims were justiciable and that subject matter jurisdiction was proper in federal court; that plaintiffs did allege First Amendment claims upon which relief could be granted; and that the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment based on its findings of mootness was vacated. Therefore, the court remanded for additional development of arguments regarding whether section 211.b06 satisfied strict scrutiny.

The United States Secretary of Labor ("Secretary") appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1005 ("Local 1005) on the claim that Local 1005's November 2008 election procedures violated the "adequate safeguards" provision of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. 481(c). At issue was whether the district court applied the wrong legal standard in its analysis and whether the district erred when it determined that Local 1005 did not violate the "adequate safeguards provision" of the LMRDA. The court held that the district court did not apply the wrong legal standard where the district court found no violation of section 481(c). The court also affirmed summary judgment and held that Local 1005's actions regarding the accurate announcement of the sole requirement to stand for elected office, coupled with the fully accurate notices posted both on Local 1005's job site bulletin and boards, as well as on its website, amounted to "adequate safeguards" under the LMRDA.