Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Galveston County Commissioners Court is composed of four county commissioners, elected from single-member precincts, and one county judge, elected by the entire county. From 1991 to 2021, one of the four commissioner precincts had a majority-minority population, with blacks and Hispanics together accounting for 58 percent of the precinct’s total population as of 2020. In 2021, the Galveston County Commissioners Court enacted a new districting plan for county commissioner elections. The enacted plan does not contain a majority-minority precinct. Following a bench trial, the district court found that the enacted plan dilutes the voting power of the county’s black and Hispanic voters in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.Galveston County appealed. The panel held that, under existing precedent, distinct minority groups like blacks and Hispanics may be aggregated for purposes of vote dilution claims under Section 2. However, disagreeing with the underlying legal analysis, the panel believed that such precedent should be overturned. Thus, the panel requested a poll for en banc hearing. View "Petteway v. Galveston County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Frank sued Wyoming state and local officials in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending Wyoming's electioneering statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as applied. Frank, a Wyoming citizen, and alleging the statute unconstitutionally prevented him from handing out campaign literature and displaying bumper stickers on his car within the 300-foot buffer zone. Frank also claimed the statute was overbroad because it violated the First Amendment rights of third parties who could not display campaign signs on private property falling within the statutory buffer zones. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted each in part, striking down some parts of the electioneering statute and upholding the rest. Specifically, the district court held the ban on electioneering within 300 feet of polling places on election day was unconstitutional, as was the ban on bumper stickers within the election day and absentee period buffer zones. But the district court upheld the statute’s prohibition on electioneering within 100 feet of absentee polling places. It also concluded there was an insufficient factual basis to consider Plaintiff’s overbreadth claim. After its review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court upheld the electioneering statute against Frank’s First Amendment challenge to the size of, and conduct proscribed within, the 300-foot election-day buffer zone. The Court reversed and remanded on Frank’s constitutional challenge to the absentee buffer zone, including the electioneering conduct proscribed within that zone. Finally, the Court remanded for the district court to adjudicate in the first instance Frank’s facial overbreadth challenge. View "Frank, et al. v. Wyoming Secretary of State, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court finding that the emergency clause contained within Act 237 of 2023 (the LEARNS Act) did not receive a separate roll-call vote as required under the Arkansas Constitution, rendering the clause procedurally invalid, holding that Arkansas General Assembly complied with Ark. Const. V, 1 when it enacted the LEARNS Act emergency clause.After the General Assembly passed the LEARNS Act the legislation was sent the Governor, who signed it into law. Appellees brought the underlying complaint seeking a declaration that the Act's emergency clause, under which certain provisions became effective on the date of the Governor's approval, was invalid. Upon remand, the circuit court declared the LEARNS Act emergency clause invalid because it did not receive a separate roll-call vote. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the emergency clause was passed in compliance with article 5, section 1. View "Ark. Dep't of Education v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Since 1979, Tennessee has made it a crime for anyone other than election officials to distribute the state’s official form for applying to vote absentee. During much of this time, Tennessee kept close guard of this form to deter fraud. Election officials now make the form widely available online so that eligible voters may easily apply. According to the Plaintiffs, this change has rendered the ban on distributing the application form “outdated.” They want to distribute the form while encouraging absentee voting at their get-out-the-vote drives. They allege that the First Amendment gives them the right to do so and that, because they seek to distribute the form while expressing a political message, the ban is subject to strict scrutiny.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Tennessee’s ban prohibits an act--distributing a government form--that qualifies as conduct, not speech. While the First Amendment provides some protection to “expressive conduct,” strict scrutiny does not apply to Tennessee’s ban because it neutrally applies no matter the message that a person seeks to convey and because it burdens nobody’s ability to engage in actual speech. At most, the Supreme Court’s lenient First Amendment test for neutral laws that regulate conduct applies and the ban survives that nondemanding test, View "Lichtenstein v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Louisiana’s Attorney General filed a request for mandamus relief seeking to vacate the district court’s hearing scheduled to begin on October 3 and require the district court to promptly convene trial on the merits of this congressional redistricting case.   The Fifth Circuit granted in part and ordered the district court to vacate the October Hearing. The court explained that redistricting based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. Section 10301, is complex, historically evolving, and sometimes undertaken with looming electoral deadlines. The court explained that the district court did not follow the law of the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit court. Its action in rushing redistricting via a court-ordered map is a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no alternative means of appeal. Issuance of the writ is justified “under the circumstances” in light of multiple precedents contradicting the district court’s procedure here. The court held that the state has no other means of relief and is not seeking to use mandamus as a substitute for appeal. Further, the court noted that if this were ordinary litigation, the court would be most unlikely to intervene in a remedial proceeding for a preliminary injunction. Redistricting litigation, however, is not ordinary litigation. The court held that the district court here forsook its duty and placed the state at an intolerable disadvantage legally and tactically. View "In Re: Jeff Landry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Attorney General rejecting a constitutional initiative proposed for the 2024 ballot (B12), of which Petitioner was a proponent, holding that the Attorney General correctly determined that the new facial content proposed by B12 violated the separate-vote requirement in Mont. Const. art. XIV, 11.The Attorney General concluded that B12, which would amend Mont. Const. art. VIII, 3, was legally insufficient due to a violation of the separate-vote requirement and ambiguity in the text of the initiative. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision and enjoined the Secretary of State from approving petitions for circulation to the electorate for signatures or otherwise submitting the measure for approval by voters, holding that the separate-vote issue was dispositive and that the Attorney General properly concluded that B12 violated the constitutional separate-vote requirement. View "Monforton v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiffs in this declaratory judgment action, holding that Ind. Code 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibits or otherwise limits corporate contributions to political action committees (PACs) or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures.Plaintiffs filed suit against several state officials responsible for enforcing Indiana's election laws, arguing that Ind. Code 3-9-2-4 and 3-9-2-5 were unconstitutional as applied. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiffs had not suffered an injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether sections 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibit corporate contributions to Super PACs like the fund at issue. The Court of Appeals answered by holding that sections 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibit corporate contributions to PACs earmarked for independent campaign-related expenditures. View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal reversing the trial court's judgment concluding that the at-large method of electing city council members in the City of Santa Monica diluted Latino voters' ability to elect their preferred candidates and their ability to influence the outcome of council elections, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the California Voting Rights Act of 2001, Cal. Elec. Code 14025 et seq. (CVRA).The superior court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims that the racially polarized voting in the City violated the CVRA. The superior court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered the City to conduct a special election using a seven-district map drafted by an expert who testified at trial. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that there had been no dilution of Latino voters' ability to elect their preferred candidates or their ability to influence the outcome of the election. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court presented with a dilution claim should undertake a searching evaluation of the totality of the facts and circumstances; and (2) because the court of appeal did not evaluate the dilution element of the CVRA under the proper standard, remand was required. View "Pico Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

Indiana law allows 13 categories of voters, including “elderly” voters—those 65 or older--to vote by mail. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indiana Election Commission extended absentee-voting privileges to all registered Indiana voters for the June 2020 primary but did not renew that order for the November general election. Indiana voters who were allowed to vote absentee in the primary, but who do not otherwise qualify for absentee voting, unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction requiring Indiana to permit unlimited absentee voting, citing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Weeks before the 2020 general election, the Seventh Circuit (Tully I) affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits in light of Supreme Court precedent holding that the right to vote does not include a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.Returning to the district court, the plaintiffs abandoned their Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court concluded that Tully I constituted controlling authority. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. Given the circumstances under which Tully I was issued, that decision does not constitute the law of the case and is not binding. Considering the merits anew, the court held that Indiana’s granting the opportunity to vote by mail to elderly voters does not abridge the right to vote of those under 65 and does not violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. View "Tully v. Okeson" on Justia Law

The City of San Diego (the City) placed a citizen’s initiative, Measure C, on the ballot for the March 2020 general and special election. Ballot materials for the measure stated that it required a two-thirds majority to pass, but by March 2020, at least two trial courts in San Francisco concluded that citizens’ initiatives required only a simple majority. Measure C ultimately received 65.24% of the votes cast. The City thereafter adopted a resolution that stated the number of votes for and against measure C and identified that there was a split of authority about the voter threshold requirement for a citizens’ inintiative, but did not state whether Measure C passed. By April 2021, several appellate courts concluded citizens’ initiatives required a simple majority, and the City adopted a resolution that Measure C had passed. Various groups sued to challenge the adoption of Measure C, calling into question the voter threshold required for its passage. The Court of Appeal determined the application of a simple majority voting requirement did not violate due process or constitute “fraud on the voters,” even though ballot materials and the ordinance placing the measure on the ballot stated a two-thirds majority applied. View "Alliance San Diego, et al. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law