Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Siddhanth Sharma, a convicted felon, challenged North Carolina's felony-disclosure requirement for candidates running for federal office. This state law mandates that candidates disclose any felony convictions and provide additional information about the convictions and the restoration of citizenship rights. Sharma, who announced his candidacy for North Carolina’s Thirteenth Congressional District seat, argued that this requirement violated the Qualifications Clause and the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed Sharma's claims. The court found that Sharma had standing to challenge the felony-disclosure requirement but concluded that it did not constitute an additional qualification for office. The court also held that the requirement did not violate the First Amendment, as it served a substantial interest in promoting an informed electorate and posed only a modest burden. Sharma's challenge to the address-disclosure requirement was dismissed for lack of standing, as the court found his injury insufficiently particularized.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the felony-disclosure requirement is constitutional. The court reasoned that the requirement does not exclude candidates from the ballot or disadvantage political viewpoints, and it falls within the state's authority to regulate elections. The court also found that the requirement imposes only a light burden on First Amendment rights and serves the state's interest in fostering an informed electorate. However, the court vacated the judgment on the address-disclosure challenge and remanded it to the district court with instructions to dismiss it as moot, as Sharma's address was already publicly available in the voter-search database. View "Siddhanth Sharma v. Alan Hirsch" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Kansas's restrictions on private parties partially filling out mail-ballot applications before sending them to registered voters. Plaintiffs, VoteAmerica and Voter Participation Center (VPC), argue that these restrictions violate their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. They seek an injunction to prevent Kansas officials from enforcing the law.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas ruled in favor of the plaintiffs after a bench trial based on stipulated facts. The court applied strict scrutiny to the law, finding that it violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court held that the mailing of prefilled applications was protected speech and that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The court also found that the law infringed on the plaintiffs' associational rights and declared the law unconstitutionally overbroad.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that the prefilled applications should be considered separately from the cover letter included in the mailings. It then concluded that mailing the prefilled applications constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment. However, the court rejected the application of strict scrutiny under the Meyer-Buckley framework, finding that the law did not restrict access to a fundamental avenue of political discourse. The court also rejected the argument that the law was subject to strict scrutiny due to speaker discrimination, as the law's speaker-based exception did not reflect a content preference.The Tenth Circuit held that the proper level of scrutiny for the law is intermediate scrutiny, as the law is a content-based but viewpoint-neutral regulation. The court reversed the district court's rulings on the overbreadth and freedom-of-association claims, remanding for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants on these claims. The court also remanded the free-speech claim for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, applying intermediate scrutiny. View "VoteAmerica v. Schwab" on Justia Law

Progress for Cane Hill, a local-option ballot committee, collected enough signatures to propose a local ordinance to make two precincts in Cane Hill "wet." However, Washington County Clerk Becky Lewallen rejected the initiative because 332 of the signatures were collected by paid canvassers who were not Arkansas residents.Progress for Cane Hill challenged the rejection in the Washington County Circuit Court. The circuit court found that the residency requirement in Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-9-103(a)(6) did not apply to local-option ballot initiatives and ordered Lewallen to certify the initiative's sufficiency. Lewallen appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and focused on statutory interpretation. The court held that the residency requirement for paid canvassers in section 7-9-103(a)(6) does apply to local-option ballot initiatives. The court reasoned that the Local Option Code incorporates the general Election Code, which includes the residency requirement. The court found that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and reversed and remanded the case, ordering that votes on the ballot measure not be counted. View "LEWALLEN v. PROGRESS FOR CANE HILL" on Justia Law

The case involves the Republican National Committee (RNC) and the North Carolina Republican Party (NCGOP) filing two state law claims against the North Carolina State Board of Elections (State Board) and its members. The claims, one statutory and one constitutional, allege that the State Board failed to comply with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which mandates certain voter registration and maintenance procedures. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) intervened as a defendant. The plaintiffs argue that the State Board's noncompliance with HAVA led to improper voter registrations, potentially affecting 225,000 voters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially reviewed the case. The district court found it had original jurisdiction over the state statutory claim but not the state constitutional claim. It dismissed the statutory claim, ruling that the relevant statutory provision did not provide a private right of action. Consequently, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim and remanded it to state court, also holding that Section 1443 did not provide a valid basis for removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court's remand order was improper. It found that the district court possessed original jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim under Section 1331 because the claim contained an embedded federal question. The court also determined that removal was permissible under Section 1441. Additionally, the court held that the defendants validly removed the constitutional claim pursuant to Section 1443(2), which allows for removal in cases involving the refusal to perform an act on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with laws providing for equal rights. The court reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "RNC v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a proposed constitutional amendment in Utah, referred to as Amendment D. The amendment, proposed by the Utah State Legislature, seeks to change the state constitution in three significant ways: specifying that the right to alter or reform the government can only be exercised through constitutional processes, banning foreign influence in the initiative and referendum processes, and granting the Legislature unlimited power to amend or repeal any law passed by a citizen initiative. The controversy centers on whether the amendment was properly submitted to voters and whether it was published as required by the Utah Constitution.The Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County reviewed the case and found that the Legislature had not complied with the constitutional requirements for submitting and publishing the proposed amendment. The court ruled that the ballot title for Amendment D was misleading and did not accurately reflect the substance of the amendment, thus failing to meet the Submission Clause of the Utah Constitution. Additionally, the court found that the Legislature did not cause the amendment to be published in newspapers across the state for two months preceding the election, as required by the Publication Clause. Consequently, the district court issued a preliminary injunction declaring Amendment D void and ordered that any votes cast on the amendment not be counted.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the district court's decision and affirmed the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court agreed that the ballot title was misleading and did not provide voters with a clear understanding of what they were voting for or against, thus violating the Submission Clause. The Court also held that the Legislature failed to comply with the Publication Clause by not ensuring continuous publication of the amendment's text in newspapers for the required two-month period. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the balance of harms and the public interest favored issuing the preliminary injunction. As a result, Amendment D was declared void, and any votes cast on it will have no effect. View "League of Women Voters v. Utah State Legislature" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2024, the Nebraska Secretary of State announced he would not implement recent statutory amendments allowing individuals convicted of felonies to vote upon completing their sentences, deeming the amendments unconstitutional. In response, individuals who had completed their sentences filed for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary and county election commissioners to implement the amendments and allow them to register to vote.The case was brought directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court. The relators argued that the amendments provided a clear right to vote and imposed a clear duty on the respondents to allow voter registration. The Secretary, supported by an Attorney General's opinion, argued that the amendments were unconstitutional, asserting that the power to restore voting rights lies with the Board of Pardons, not the Legislature.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case, noting that fewer than five judges found the amendments unconstitutional, as required by the Nebraska Constitution to invalidate a legislative act. Consequently, the court determined that the relators had established the prerequisites for mandamus relief. The court issued a peremptory writ directing the Secretary and election commissioners to use voter registration forms required by the amendments and to register the individual relators upon receipt of complete applications. The court also ordered the Secretary to remove any disqualification on registration not contained within the amendments and to comply fully with the new statutory provisions. View "State ex rel. Spung v. Evnen" on Justia Law

In response to challenges faced during the 2020 election, the Texas Legislature enacted S.B. 1 in 2021, which restricts paid "vote harvesting services." This law aims to protect the privacy of mail-in voters by prohibiting compensated interactions intended to influence votes. Plaintiffs, a coalition of organizations, challenged this provision on vagueness and First Amendment grounds, seeking injunctions against various Texas officials.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas enjoined the enforcement of the vote harvesting provision of S.B. 1 on September 28, 2024, nearly three years after the law took effect and just three weeks before voting was to begin. The State of Texas then moved to stay the district court's order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and granted the State's request for a stay. The court emphasized the Supreme Court's guidance in Purcell v. Gonzalez, which advises against altering election laws close to an election due to potential voter confusion and administrative burdens. The court found that the district court's injunction, issued after mail-in ballots had already been distributed, could lead to significant confusion and disruption.The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to S.B. 1 was not "entirely clearcut," failing to meet the criteria that might justify an exception to the Purcell principle. The court noted that the law's provisions were designed to protect voter privacy and security, similar to protections upheld by the Supreme Court for in-person voting. Consequently, the motion to stay the district court's injunction pending appeal was granted. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jennifer McGill and Cherokee Nation Entertainment, LLC challenged the sufficiency of a proposed constitutional amendment regarding the Pope County casino license. They alleged that the Arkansas Secretary of State, John Thurston, improperly certified the amendment for the ballot. The petitioners claimed that the number of valid signatures was insufficient and that the popular name and ballot title were inadequate. Local Voters in Charge (LVC), the sponsor of the amendment, and Jim Knight intervened in the case.The Arkansas Supreme Court had previously granted expedited consideration and bifurcated the proceedings into two counts. For Count I, the court appointed a special master to resolve factual disputes about the number of valid signatures. The special master found that LVC had properly certified that no paid canvasser had disqualifying offenses and that LVC did not violate the pay-per-signature ban. The special master disqualified some signatures but concluded that LVC still had enough valid signatures to meet the requirement.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the special master’s findings and determined that LVC complied with the statutory requirements for certifying paid canvassers. The court also found that the petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that LVC violated the pay-per-signature ban. As a result, the court denied the petition on Count I, allowing the proposed amendment to remain on the ballot. The court’s decision was based on the lack of clear error in the special master’s findings and the petitioners' failure to meet their burden of proof. View "McGill v. Thurston" on Justia Law

Ohio enacted a law to prevent foreign nationals from influencing its elections by banning their political contributions and expenditures. The law defines "foreign nationals" to include lawful permanent residents, unlike the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which exempts them. Plaintiffs, including advocacy organizations and lawful permanent residents, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing it violated their rights. The district court agreed, finding the law unconstitutional as applied to lawful permanent residents and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Ohio from enforcing the law against all foreign nationals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the law was overbroad and violated the First Amendment rights of lawful permanent residents. The court allowed Ohio to enforce the law against foreign governments and political parties but severed the definition of "foreign national" to exclude lawful permanent residents. Ohio appealed the decision and requested an emergency stay of the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Ohio's motion for a stay. The court found that Ohio was likely to succeed on the merits, concluding that the law was not overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment rights of lawful permanent residents. The court held that Ohio has a compelling interest in preventing foreign influence in its elections, which includes lawful permanent residents. The court also determined that the law was narrowly tailored to serve this interest and was neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. The stay allows Ohio to enforce the law while the appeal is considered. View "OPAWL - Building AAPI Feminist Leadership v. Yost" on Justia Law

Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and Nicole Shanahan submitted nomination papers to the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) to run as independent candidates for President and Vice President in the November 2024 election. On August 23, 2024, Kennedy requested to withdraw his candidacy, but WEC denied his request based on Wisconsin law, which states that a candidate who has filed nomination papers cannot decline the nomination unless they die. Consequently, WEC included Kennedy's name on the certified list of candidates.Kennedy sought judicial review of WEC's decision in the Dane County Circuit Court and filed a motion for a temporary injunction to remove his name from the ballot. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Kennedy had not demonstrated irreparable harm, that the injunction would alter the status quo, and that he had no reasonable probability of success on the merits. The court also found that Kennedy's constitutional claims lacked legal merit.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the circuit court's decision to deny the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court's task was to determine whether the circuit court had properly exercised its discretion. The Supreme Court concluded that Kennedy failed to demonstrate that the circuit court had erred in its decision. Specifically, Kennedy did not adequately argue that the circuit court misinterpreted the relevant statute or that his constitutional claims had merit. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying the temporary injunction. View "Kennedy v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law