Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court issuing a declaratory judgment invalidating Mo. Rev. Stat. 116.180 and 116.334.2, which prohibit the collection of referendum petition signatures before the Secretary of State has certified the referendum's official ballot title and affixed it to the petition, holding that there was no error.In invalidating sections 116.180 and 116.334.2, the circuit court declared that those provisions interfere with and impede the right of referendum, therefore conflicting with Mo. Const. art. III, 49 and 52(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment declaring those statutes constitutionally invalid, holding that the statutes' prohibition on collecting referendum petition signatures before the Secretary certifies the official ballot title unreasonably shores the timeframe for petition circulation, thus interfering with and impeding the constitutional right of referendum reserved to the people. View "No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Petitioners showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the General Assembly-district plan adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on January 22, 2022 violated Ohio Const. Art. XI, 6(A) and (B) and ordered the Commission to adopt a new plan.On January 12, 2022, the Supreme Court held that the General Assembly-district plan adopted by the Commission in September 2021 was invalid and that the Commission had not drawn a district plan that met neither of the standards set forth in sections 6(A) and 6(B) and ordered the Commission to adopt a new plan. On January 22, the Commission adopted a new plan. The Supreme Court again ordered the Commission to be reconstituted and to adopt yet a newer plan, holding that the new plan violated sections 6(A) and 6(B). View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm." on Justia Law

The League of Women Voters, Progress Michigan, the Coalition to Close Lansing Loopholes, and Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections challenged the constitutionality of 2018 PA 608, which changed the procedures by which the people of Michigan could circulate petitions to invoke the referendum, initiative, and constitutional-amendment processes set forth in Michigan’s Constitution and statutory election laws. Specifically, 2018 PA 608 amended MCL 168.471 to state that no more than 15% of the signatures used to determine the validity of a petition could be from any one congressional district; it amended MCL 168.482 by adding Subsection (7), which required petitions to include checkboxes that would indicate whether the circulator of the petition was a paid signature gatherer or a volunteer; and it added MCL 168.482a, which provided that signature gatherers who were being paid had to, before circulating any petition, file a signed affidavit to that effect with the Secretary of State. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the Court of Claims’ decision, striking as unconstitutional the geographic limitation in MCL 168.471 and the requirement in MCL 168.482(4) that petitions include language identifying the signer’s congressional district. The Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Claims as to the checkbox and affidavit requirements, holding that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.482 was constitutional but the affidavit requirement in MCL 168.482a overly burdened the free-speech rights of the petitions’ sponsors. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, arguing that the checkbox requirement, MCL 168.482(7), was unconstitutional. The Michigan Supreme Court held the 15% cap on signatures from any one congressional district and the precirculation affidavit requirement for paid circulators violated the Michigan Constitution. The checkbox requirement, however, passed constitutional muster. "In light of the chaos and injustice that would ensue were the opinion to be applied retroactively, the decision was given prospective effect only." Any signature gathered after January 24, 2022, must be on a petition that conforms to the requirements of MCL 168.482(7). View "League Of Women Voters Of Michigan v. Michigan Secretary Of State" on Justia Law

The Alaska lieutenant governor refused to certify an application for a ballot initiative, and the group backing the initiative filed suit. In a court-approved stipulation, the Division of Elections agreed to print the signature booklets and make them available to the initiative’s sponsors without waiting for the court to decide whether the initiative application should have been certified. A voter sued the State, asserting that it would violate the initiative process laid out in article XI, section 3 of the Alaska Constitution if the signature booklets were printed and made available before the initiative had been certified. In response the State and the initiative group entered into a new stipulation providing that the State would not make the signature booklets available until the court ordered it. The superior court granted the State summary judgment in the voter’s suit, concluding that he lacked standing and his case was moot. The voter appealed, arguing he had standing and that his case should have been heard because of two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: the public interest exception and the voluntary cessation exception. Without reaching the issue of standing, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment on mootness grounds, concluding that the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to apply either exception to the doctrine. View "Young v. Alaska" on Justia Law

This case arose out of multiple petitions challenging the constitutionality of Plan L03, the legislative redistricting plan adopted by the Idaho Commission for Reapportionment (“the Commission”) following the 2020 federal census. Petitioners generally argued that Plan L03 split more counties than was required to comport with federal constitutional requirements, rendering Plan L03 unconstitutional under the Idaho Constitution. The petitions were filed in the Idaho Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Petitioners requested the Court issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the Secretary of State from transmitting a copy of the Commission’s Final Report and Plan L03 to the President Pro Tempore of the Idaho Senate and the Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives. Finding there was no constitutional violation, the Supreme Court declined to issue the writ. View "Durst et al v. ID Comm. for Reapportionment" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the amount of reimbursement that counties were entitled to from the State for costs associated with purchasing, installing, and operating additional ballot boxes. In order to answer that question, the Court first had to consider the relationship between RCW 29A.40.170 (the ballot box statute), RCW 29A.04.430 (the reimbursement statute, or "Section 430"), and RCW 43.135.060 (the unfunded mandate statute). The Supreme Court held Section 430 controlled over the unfunded mandate statute and provided reimbursement only of the State’s proportional share for the costs of compliance with the ballot box statute. Further, the Court held that the 2020 amendment of Section 430 did not violate article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution and that respondents Snohomish, Kittitas, and Whitman Counties could not claim any vested right that would require the Court to invalidate the retroactive effect of Section 430. The Court therefore reversed the order granting partial summary judgment and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wash. State Ass'n of Counties v. Washington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declared the congressional-district plan passed by the General Assembly invalid, holding that the General Assembly did not comply with Ohio Const. art. XIX, 1(C)(3)(a) and (b) in passing the plan and that a new congressional-district plan must be passed the complies in full with Article XIX and is not dictated by partisan considerations.At issue was 2021 Sub.S.B. No. 258, which was passed by a simple majority and signed into law by Governor Mike DeWine on November 20, 2021. The bill resulted in districts in which undue political bias was at least, if not more, likely to favor Republican candidates than the 2011 reapportionment that impelled Ohio's constitutional reforms. Petitioners argued that the congressional-district plan violated Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a). The Supreme Court held that the congressional-district plan was invalid in its entirety because it unduly favored the Republican Party and disfavored the Democratic Party and because it unduly split three counties, in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(b). View "Adams v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Georgia law places restrictions on which prospective candidates for elective office can appear on the general election ballot. The Libertarian Party of Georgia, prospective Libertarian candidates, and affiliated voters ask the court to hold that Georgia's ballot-access laws unconstitutionally burden their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and deny them equal protection.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court incorrectly held that the laws violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court explained that, under the Anderson framework, the laws need only be justified by the State's important regulatory interests. In this case, the interests the Secretary asserts—in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot, in maintaining the orderly administration of elections, and in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election—are compelling. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Georgia's laws do not cause an equal protection violation. The court concluded that the Secretary's stated interest sufficiently justifies the distinction between candidates. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated the district court's injunction, and remanded. View "Cowen v. Secretary of State of the State of Georgia" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether the Secretary of State was required to count the signatures on an initiative petition of voters whose registration was deemed “inactive.” Plaintiffs were supporters of Initiative Petition 50 (2016) (IP 50) who sought to qualify that initiative for the 2016 ballot. After the secretary subtracted the signatures of voters with inactive registration, the petition did not have enough signatures to be placed on the ballot. Plaintiffs brought this action challenging the secretary’s exclusion of those signatures. Plaintiffs argued that voters with inactive registration could sign initiative petitions because, even if their registration was inactive, they were still registered, and therefore remain “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The secretary responded that those voters could not sign initiative petitions because voters with inactive registration were not “registered * * * in the manner provided by law,” and they therefore were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded, like the secretary, that because voters whose registrations were inactive were not eligible to vote, they were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. Accordingly, the Court held that their signatures on initiative petitions could not be counted, and that the secretary properly excluded them when determining the number of signatures submitted in support of IP 50. View "Whitehead v. Fagan" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the Commonwealth Court’s entry of a permanent injunction blocking the Secretary of the Commonwealth from certifying the results of the November 5, 2019 election in which the voters of the Commonwealth were asked to approve a proposed “victim’s rights amendment” (“Marsy’s Law”) which would be added as a new provision of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution – Section 9.1 (“Victim’s Rights Amendment”). The Commonwealth Court entered its injunction on the basis that the Victim’s Rights Amendment violated the requirement of Article XI, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that, “[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon separately.” After careful consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court, because the Supreme Court determined the Victim’s Rights Amendment was, in actuality, a collection of amendments which added a multiplicity of new rights to the Pennsylvania Constitution, and, because those new rights were not interrelated in purpose and function, "the manner in which it was presented to the voters denied them their right to consider and vote on each change separately, as Article XI, section 1 mandates." View "League of Women Voters of PA v. Degraffenreid" on Justia Law