Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Zena Collins Stephens appealed both the court of appeals’ denial of a pretrial writ of habeas corpus and its reversal of the district court’s decision to quash Count I of the indictment. Stephens was elected to the position of sheriff of Jefferson County, Texas in 2016. While investigating someone else, the FBI uncovered information regarding potential campaign-finance violations concerning Stephens. The FBI then turned this information over to the Texas Rangers. The Rangers’ investigation concluded Stephens received individual cash campaign contributions in excess of $100. A grand jury indicted Stephens on three counts: Count I: tampering with a government record in violation of Texas Penal Code section 37.10 “by reporting a $5,000.00 individual cash contribution in the political contributions of $50.00 or less section of said Report;” iIn Counts II and III, unlawfully making or accepting a contribution in violation of Texas Election Code section 253.033(a) by accepting cash contributions in excess of $100 from two different individuals. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Stephens asked: could the Texas Legislature delegate to the Attorney General, a member of the executive department, the prosecution of election-law violations in district and inferior courts? To this, the Court answered "no:" because Texas Election Code section 273.021 delegated to the Attorney General a power more properly assigned to the judicial department, the statute was unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to dismiss the indictment. View "Texas v. Stephens" on Justia Law

A political consultant designed two campaign mailers that were distributed to voters in a local city council election. The mailers included statements about a local real estate developer and his litigation history with the city, and linked the developer to certain candidates. The developer sued the political consultant for libel based on allegedly false statements about him in the mailers, and the political consultant in turn filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that although the complaint arose from protected conduct, the developer demonstrated a probability of prevailing. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Edward v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Arizona voters may vote by mail during the last four weeks of an election. The voter must sign an affidavit that is printed on a specially provided, postage-paid envelope. A ballot with a missing signature cannot be counted. On September 10, 2020, weeks before the upcoming presidential election, the district court enjoined the enforcement of Ariz. Stat. 16-548(A), which requires early voters to have signed their ballots by 7:00 PM on Election Day in order to have their votes counted. The Ninth Circuit granted emergency motions and stayed the injunction, pending appeal.In 2021, the Ninth Circuit entered a permanent stay. The state has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Arizona's signature deadline imposes, at most, a "minimal" burden on those who seek to exercise their right to vote. The state made a strong showing that its deadline reasonably advances important regulatory interests in reducing the burden on poll workers, especially during the days immediately following an election. The public interest is served by preserving Arizona's existing election laws. Although Arizona’s law implicated national interests, at least when the election included presidential candidates, that factor alone did not mean that strict scrutiny must apply. The court noted that the Arizona legislature “laudably amended its election code in 2019 to allow voters an extended period to correct mismatched signatures." Arizona’s decision not to grant the same extension to voters who neglect to sign the affidavit passed constitutional muster. View "Arizona Democratic Party v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remedied a malapportionment in existing maps reflecting the legislative districts across the state, while ensuring the maps satisfy all other constitutional and statutory requirements, but held that claims of political unfairness in the maps present political questions, not legal ones.In 2021, the Wisconsin legislature drew maps reflecting the legislative districts across the state, and the governor vetoed them. The parties agreed that the existing maps had become unconstitutional since they were enacted into law in 2011. Petitioners filed a petition for leave to commence an original action in the Supreme Court asking it to declare the existing maps in violation of Wis. Const. art. IV, 3 and requesting a mandatory injunction remedying the unconstitutional plans. The Supreme Court held (1) this Court will remedy the fact that the maps no longer comply with the constitutional requirement of an equal number of citizens in each legislative district, due to shifts in population across the state; but (2) claims of political fairness in the maps present political questions that must be resolved through the political process and not by the judiciary. View "Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of this election contest and its determination that Constitutional Amendment A was submitted to the voters at the November 3, 2020 election in violation of the single subject requirement in S.D. Const. art. XXIII, 1, holding that the circuit court did not err.At the election at issue, South Dakota voters approved Amendment A, "An amendment to the South Dakota Constitution to legalize, regulate, and tax marijuana; and to require the Legislature to pass laws regarding hemp as well as laws ensuring access to marijuana for medical use." Plaintiffs filed a statutory election contest and a separate declaratory judgment action claiming Amendment A was unconstitutional. The circuit court dismissed the election contest, concluding it was not an appropriate proceeding to challenge the amendment, but concluded in the declaratory judgment action that Amendment A violated Articles XXIII, 1 and 2. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs identified no irregularity in the election process; and (2) the submission of Amendment A to the voters plainly and palpably violated Article XXIII, 1. View "Thom v. Barnett" on Justia Law

On September 27, 2021, in accordance with the timeline that the Oregon Supreme Court ordered in Oregon ex rel Kotek v. Fagan, 484 P3d 1058 (2021), the Oregon Legislative Assembly enacted, and the Governor signed, a reapportionment of Oregon’s legislative districts, based on the federal decennial census data that was released by the United States Census Bureau in August 2021. Senate Bill (SB) 882 (Spec Sess 2021), codified as Or Laws 2021, ch 2. Two sets of petitioners, all of whom were Oregon electors, sought review of that reapportionment. Petitioners in Sheehan v. Legislative Assembly (S068991) challenged SB 882 in its entirety on the ground that it was the product of an improper and partisan process, and they presented a different reapportionment plan that they asked the Supreme Court to direct the Secretary of State to adopt in place of SB 882. Petitioners in Calderwood v. Legislative Assembly (S068989) brought a narrower challenge and asked the Supreme Court to void only the sections of SB 882 that apportioned House Districts 8 and 12, arguing that the Legislative Assembly drew those districts for an unlawful partisan purpose and without considering the redistricting criteria set out in ORS 188.010(1). The Supreme Court concluded: (1) the Sheehan petitioners did not demonstrate SB 882 violated applicable law in any of the ways they have asserted; and (2) the Calderwood petitioners failed to demonstrate that the parts of SB 882 that defined House Districts 8 and 12 did not comply with applicable law in any of the ways they have asserted. Both petitions were dismissed. View "Sheehan/Calderwood v. Legislative Assembly" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Section 3-506 of Maryland's Election Law, which provides that a list of Maryland registered voters (the List) may be given to an applicant who is himself a registered Maryland voter (Access Provision), so long as the applicant attests that he will use the List for purposes that are related to the electoral process (the Use Provision). On remand from the Fourth Circuit, the district court awarded summary judgment to Maryland state officials on plaintiff's Use Provision-based free speech and vagueness claims.The Fourth Circuit applied the Anderson-Burdick balancing test and concluded that plaintiff's claim that — as applied to him — the Use Provision contravenes the Free Speech Clause was without merit. The court explained that, when weighed against the State's interests — that is, safeguarding the List, protecting Maryland's election system, and shielding Maryland registered voters from harassment — the burden imposed on plaintiff is modest. The court also found plaintiff's as-applied vagueness claim unavailing where plaintiff understands the Use Provision's reach. Finally, the court found meritless plaintiff's facial challenges to the Use Provision which argued that the Use Provision facially contravenes the Free Speech Clause and that the phrase "related to the electoral process" is facially vague. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Fusaro v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 1992, Michigan voters, wanting to amend Michigan’s Constitution to establish term limits for state legislators, state executives, and members of Congress, got a petition on the ballot; 58.8% of voters approved the measure. Term limits became part of the Michigan Constitution (six years in Michigan’s House of Representatives; eight years in the Michigan Senate). Some voters sued, arguing that the term limits violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit upheld the term limits. About 20 years later, a bipartisan group of veteran legislators challenged the term-limit provision, making many of the same ballot-access and freedom-of-association claims, and citing two procedural provisions of the Michigan Constitution.The district court granted Michigan summary judgment. After determining that it had jurisdiction because the legislators raise claims under the Federal Constitution, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent bars their claims as voters. Voters have no fundamental right to “vote for a specific candidate or even a particular class of candidates.” As candidates, the legislators hold no greater protection than the voters they wish to represent. Candidates do not have a fundamental right to run for office. Michigan has several legitimate government interests in enacting term limits, including its sovereign interest in structuring its government as it sees fit. View "Kowall v. Benson" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding filed to the Colorado Supreme Court, at issue were the final legislative redistricting plans for the Colorado Senate and House of Representatives, adopted and submitted to the Court by the Colorado Independent Legislative Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”). Under article V, section 48.3, the Court's jurisdiction was limited to whether the Plans complied with the criteria listed in section 48.1 of article V, and the Court had to approve those Plans unless the it concluded the Commission abused its discretion in applying or failing to apply those criteria in light of the record before it. Finding no such abuse of discretion here, the Colorado Court approved the Plans and ordered the Commission to file those Plans with the Colorado Secretary of State as required by article V, section 48.3(5). View "In re Colo. Indep. Legis. Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

After a narrow loss in the general election for Alaska House District 27, Lance Pruitt contested the result. The superior court dismissed Pruitt’s multi-count complaint for failure to state a valid claim. But in order to expedite the case’s eventual review, the court heard evidence on a single count: Pruitt’s claim that the Division of Elections committed malconduct that influenced the election by moving a polling place without notifying the public in all the ways required by law. After considering the evidence, the superior court ruled that Pruitt did not show either that the lack of notice amounted to malconduct or that it was sufficient to change the results of the election. Pruitt appealed only the count on which the court heard evidence. In order to resolve this election contest before the start of the legislative session, the Alaska Supreme Court issued a brief order stating that Pruitt had not met his burden to sustain an election contest. This opinion explained the Court’s reasoning. Although the count alleging inadequate notice should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim, the Court held it did not succeed on the merits. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Pruitt v. Alaska" on Justia Law