Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the form and procedural requirements of an initiative petition for Amendment 3, which aims to protect reproductive freedom. The Attorney General and the Secretary of State had approved the form of the petition in March 2023. Proponents of the amendment collected the necessary signatures, and the Secretary of State certified the petition for the 2024 general election ballot. Opponents challenged the certification, claiming the petition failed to include all constitutional provisions and statutes that might be affected if the amendment were approved.The Circuit Court of Cole County ruled in favor of the opponents, finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of article III, section 50 of the Missouri Constitution and section 116.050.2(2). The court ordered the amendment removed from the ballot. Proponents appealed, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri.The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court's decision. The court held that article III, section 50 requires a petition proposing a constitutional amendment to identify only those existing sections of the constitution that are in direct conflict with the proposed amendment. The court found that Amendment 3 did not purport to repeal any existing constitutional provision and was not in direct conflict with any existing constitutional article or section. The court also rejected the opponents' claim that Amendment 3 violated the "single subject" requirement, finding that all provisions of the amendment related to the single subject of protecting reproductive freedom.The court concluded that the Secretary of State's certification of Amendment 3 was correct and ordered the amendment to be placed on the 2024 general election ballot. View "Coleman v. Ashcroft" on Justia Law

Three nonprofit organizations challenged two Arizona election law amendments: one allowing the cancellation of a voter’s registration if they move to another county (the “Cancellation Provision”) and another making it a felony to provide a voting mechanism to someone registered in another state (the “Felony Provision”). The plaintiffs argued these laws would jeopardize voting rights in Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of both provisions, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the laws could harm voters and were likely unconstitutional. The defendants, including the Arizona Attorney General and the Yuma County Republican Committee, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they only alleged a frustrated mission and diverted resources, failing to show direct harm to their core activities. The court emphasized that organizational standing requires more than just a diversion of resources; it requires a direct impact on the organization’s core activities.Regarding the Felony Provision, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they faced a realistic possibility of prosecution, which could chill their voter outreach activities. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their vagueness challenge. The court interpreted the phrase “mechanism for voting” narrowly, determining it referred only to unlawful acts of voting, not voter outreach or registration.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Two relators challenged a ballot initiative proposing to amend the Nebraska Constitution to include a right to abortion. The initiative sought to establish a fundamental right to abortion until fetal viability or when necessary to protect the life or health of the pregnant patient, without state interference. The relators argued that the initiative violated the single subject rule of the Nebraska Constitution and contained confusing language.In the lower courts, the relators presented their objections to the Nebraska Secretary of State, who decided to certify the initiative for the ballot. The relators then filed petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to remove the initiative from the ballot. The Nebraska Supreme Court granted leave to file the actions and issued alternative writs of mandamus, ordering the Secretary of State to show cause why the initiative should not be removed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the initiative did not violate the single subject rule. The court found that the initiative's provisions were naturally and necessarily related to the general subject of creating a constitutional right to abortion. The court also rejected the argument that the initiative's language was confusing and misleading. Consequently, the court denied the writs of mandamus and dissolved the alternative writs by operation of law. View "State ex rel. Brooks v. Evnen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a registered voter in Auburn, New Hampshire, filed a complaint against the Governor, the Secretary of State, the State of New Hampshire, and officials from the Town of Auburn. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief regarding New Hampshire election laws, specifically challenging the use of electronic voting machines and other election-related statutes. The plaintiff alleged that he was denied the right to vote by hand on March 9, 2022, and claimed that various statutes were unconstitutional.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court did not address the issue of standing, despite the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing. The plaintiff appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiff had standing to bring his claims in Counts I and II, which related to his alleged denial of the right to vote by hand and the constitutionality of statutes allowing electronic voting machines. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of these counts to the extent they were based on the plaintiff's interpretation of Part II, Article 32 of the State Constitution. However, the court found that the plaintiff had standing to pursue his equal protection claim in Count II and remanded for further proceedings on that issue.For Counts III through VI, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing as these claims raised generalized grievances rather than concrete, personal injuries. The court vacated the trial court's ruling on these counts and remanded with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision. View "Richard v. Governor" on Justia Law

Three Libertarian Party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives were disqualified from the 2024 general election ballot by the State Objection Panel for failing to comply with Iowa's statutory nomination requirements. The candidates, Nicholas Gluba, Charles Aldrich, and Marco Battaglia, were nominated at a party convention after no Libertarian candidates filed for the primary election. However, the party did not follow the required process for selecting delegates to the convention, which included holding precinct caucuses and county conventions on separate days and notifying county auditors of the delegates.The Iowa District Court for Polk County upheld the Panel's decision, finding that the Libertarian Party did not comply with Iowa Code section 43.94, which mandates that county convention delegates' terms begin the day after their election at precinct caucuses. The court ruled that strict compliance with this law was necessary, and the party's failure to follow the process invalidated the nominations. The court also rejected arguments that the objectors lacked standing and that the Panel's decision violated the candidates' First Amendment rights.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the statutory requirements for nominating candidates by convention must be strictly followed and that the Libertarian Party's failure to comply with these requirements justified the disqualification of the candidates. The court also found that the objectors had standing to challenge the nominations and that the Panel's decision did not violate the candidates' First Amendment rights. The court emphasized that the election laws are designed to ensure a fair and orderly process for candidate nominations. View "Gluba v. State Objection Panel" on Justia Law

Independent candidates and minor political parties in Texas challenged several provisions of the Texas Election Code, arguing that these provisions, when combined, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing severe and unequal burdens on non-wealthy Independents and Minor Parties. The provisions in question include requirements for obtaining ballot access through primary elections, party nominations, or nominating petitions, as well as restrictions on petitioning methods and timelines.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found that the requirement for candidates to submit hardcopy signatures for ballot access petitions was unconstitutional, reasoning that it imposed an unequal burden on the plaintiffs compared to Major Parties, which could use electronic methods. The court enjoined the enforcement of the paper-petitioning process but stayed its injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the Anderson-Burdick framework to evaluate the constitutionality of the ballot-access laws. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the challenged provisions imposed severe burdens on them. The court upheld the numerical signature requirement, the costs associated with obtaining signatures, the time constraints on petitioning, and the restrictive petitioning procedures as justified by legitimate state interests. The court also upheld the filing fee or petition requirement for Minor Party candidates and rejected the claim that the provisions imposed more severe restrictions on presidential Independents.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the paper-petitioning requirement was unconstitutional, noting that all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, must obtain petition signatures through hardcopy methods. The court affirmed the constitutionality of the challenged provisions and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Miller v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including the National Republican Senatorial Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, Senator J.D. Vance, and former Representative Steve Chabot, challenged the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on coordinated campaign expenditures. They argued that these limits, which restrict political parties from spending money on campaign advertising with input from the candidate, violate the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Federal Election Commission from enforcing these limits, claiming that the restrictions increase costs, create redundancies, and hinder effective communication and spending.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio certified the constitutional question to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The district court found that the plaintiffs raised a non-frivolous question and established a factual record before certifying the question. The district court asked whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in the Federal Election Campaign Act violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court held that the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II) remains binding and that the Act’s limits on coordinated party expenditures do not facially violate the First Amendment. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that changes in legal doctrine, statutory amendments, and factual developments since 2001 undermined Colorado II. The court also denied the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge, noting that it was too broad and would effectively nullify Colorado II. The court concluded that the limits on coordinated party expenditures do not violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications." View "National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Three Kentucky Republican Party county executive committees challenged the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance’s prohibition on expending funds to support a state constitutional amendment on the November general election ballot. The committees sought an advisory opinion from the Registry, which concluded that they could not use funds raised for party nominees to support a constitutional amendment and would need to form a political issues committee for such expenditures. The committees argued that this restriction violated their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied the committees' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the requirement to form a political issues committee imposed only a minimal burden on their First Amendment rights, justified by the governmental interest in transparency and disclosure. The court concluded that the Registry’s actions met the standards of strict scrutiny, exacting scrutiny, or rational basis review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and granted an injunction pending appeal. The court found that the executive committees were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim. It determined that the Registry’s prohibition on spending in support of a constitutional amendment burdened the committees' political speech. The court applied strict scrutiny, concluding that the Registry’s restriction was not narrowly tailored to the asserted interest in disclosure. The court noted that less restrictive alternatives, such as imposing disclosure requirements on executive committees, could achieve the same ends without restricting speech. The Registry was enjoined from enforcing its advisory opinion against the committees, and expedited briefing was ordered for the appeal. View "Boone County Republican Party Executive Committee v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The relator, Justin Tjaden, sought a writ of mandamus to have his name placed on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot as an independent candidate for the office of state representative of Ohio House District 99. Tjaden's petition was found to be 124 valid signatures short of the required number. He argued that the boards of elections exceeded their authority by invalidating signatures as "not genuine" and violated his procedural due process and equal protection rights. Tjaden also contended that the statutory requirement for independent candidates to submit a petition with signatures amounting to at least one percent of registered voters who cast ballots for governor in the 2022 general election was unconstitutional.The Geauga County Board of Elections determined that Tjaden's petition contained 371 valid signatures, which was insufficient to qualify for the ballot. Tjaden attempted to challenge this decision in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas but was unsuccessful due to procedural issues. He then filed a complaint in the same court and a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court dismissed his first mandamus action based on the jurisdictional-priority rule but allowed him to file a second mandamus action after his common-pleas-court case was removed to federal court.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Tjaden's writ of mandamus. The court held that Tjaden did not have enough valid signatures to qualify for the ballot, even if all contested signatures were deemed valid. The court also found that Tjaden's procedural due process rights were not violated, as the mandamus action provided him with the necessary process. Additionally, the court declined to address Tjaden's equal protection claim, stating that even if the statute were declared unconstitutional, there would be no statutory requirement for an independent candidate to qualify for the ballot. Thus, the court denied the writ. View "State ex rel. Tjaden v. Geauga County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Democratic Party activist and former candidate for Plano City Council, was indicted for violating Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code. This statute prohibits knowingly representing in a campaign communication that the communication emanates from a source other than its true source, with the intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election. The appellant sent text messages that appeared to come from a Republican or conservative campaign, identifying Republicans in local nonpartisan races. In response, the appellant filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as it regulated core political speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.The trial court denied the appellant's application. On appeal, the Fifth Court of Appeals agreed with the appellant, finding that the statute was not narrowly tailored and did not survive strict scrutiny. The appellate court held that the statute's broad reach was problematic and ordered the trial court to dismiss the indictment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case upon the State's petition. The State argued that the statute was narrowly drafted and survived strict scrutiny. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. The court found that the statute was a content-based restriction on protected speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard. It was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of preventing dishonest conduct in elections. The court affirmed the Fifth Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the statute violated the First Amendment. View "EX PARTE STAFFORD" on Justia Law