Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals holding that a proposed charter amendment was not manifestly unconstitutional but was an improper referendum, holding that the proposed amendment was not an improper exercise of the charter amendment power and was not manifestly unconstitutional.After the City of Bloomington changed from a system of open trash collection to a system of organized collection a group of residents attempted, through an amendment to the City Charter, to require that voters pre-approve a change in the method of trash collection. The City refused to put the proposed charter amendment on the ballot. In the original appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for decision on whether the proposed amendment would violate the Contract Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions and whether it was an attempt to exercise the voter referendum power through an improper means. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that the proposed amendment was an improper referendum but was not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the proposed charter amendment was not an improper referendum and did not violate the Contract Clauses. View "Jennissen v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law

Respondents-Proponents Andrew Moore, Janet Ann Largent, and Lynda Johnson filed Initiative Petition No. 420, State Question No. 804 (IP 420), with the Secretary of State of Oklahoma. The initiative measure proposed to submit to the voters the creation of a new constitutional article, Article V-A, which would create the Citizens' Independent Redistricting Commission (Commission). IP 420 would vest the power to redistrict the State's House of Representatives and Senatorial districts, as well as Federal Congressional Districts, in this newly created Commission. IP 420 would also repeal current constitutional provisions concerning state legislative apportionment. Notice of the filing was published on October 31, 2019; within 10 business days, Petitioners Rogers Gaddis and Eldon Merklin petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction to challenge the legal sufficiency of IP 420. They alleged the proposed amendment by article suffered from two fatal constitutional defects: (1) the single subject rule, and (2) the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In case number 118405, the Supreme Court determined IP was legally sufficient for submission to the people of Oklahoma. In case number 118406, however, the Court determined the gist statement of IP 420 did not fairly describe the proposed amendment, and ordered it struck from the ballot. View "In re: Initiative Petition 420, State Question No. 804" on Justia Law

The en banc court reversed the district court's judgment for defendants in an action brought by the DNC and others. The DNC challenged Arizona's policy of wholly discarding, rather than counting or partially counting, ballots cast in the wrong precinct. The DNC also challenged House Bill 2023, a 2016 statute criminalizing the collection and delivery of another person’s ballot.The en banc court held that Arizona’s policy of wholly discarding, rather than counting or partially counting, out-of-precinct ballots, and H.B. 2023's criminalization of the collection of another person's ballot, have a discriminatory impact on American Indian, Hispanic, and African American voters in Arizona, in violation of the “results test” of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The en banc court further held that H.B. 2023's criminalization of the collection of another person's ballot was enacted with discriminatory intent, in violation of the "intent test" of Section 2 of the VRA and of the Fifteenth Amendment. The en banc court did not reach the DNC's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. View "The Democratic National Committee v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of Ark. Code Sec. 7-6-203(b)(1), which provides that candidates can only accept contributions within two years of an election. Plaintiff, who wished to donate to candidates running for state office in Arkansas's 2022 election, alleged that this blackout period violates her First Amendment rights.The court held that plaintiff alleged Article III standing because the allegations in her complaint and affidavit established that she intended to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and that there was a credible threat of prosecution if she donated to a candidate. The court also held that the district court correctly determined that, at this early stage of the litigation, plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits, because Arkansas failed to show how the blackout period advances its anti-corruption interest. View "Jones v. Jegley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, credentialed election monitors in Chicago during the 2016 Illinois primary election and a citizen who voted in the election, alleged that during the statutorily mandated post-election audit of electronic voting machines, they witnessed rampant fraud and irregularities by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners’ employees conducting the audit. The Illinois Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/1-1, provides for electronic voting, with a permanent paper record. After an election, the Board randomly tests five percent of the electronic voting equipment in service during that election by manually counting the votes marked on the permanent paper record for comparison to the electronically-generated results. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which they alleged that the post-election audit fraud violated their right to vote. Illinois law expressly precludes the findings of the post-election audit from changing or altering the election results; no matter how improper the Board employees’ conduct was during the audit, it could not have affected the Plaintiffs’ right to vote. Plaintiffs did not plead a plausible claim that the Board violated their right to freely associate or right to petition the government View "Shipley v. Chicago Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the county's 2011 redistricting plan for electing county commissioners, alleging a violation of their rights under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by providing only one Anglo-majority district.Determining that plaintiffs had standing, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiffs failed to meet the threshold conditions in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986), and in finding that plaintiffs failed to make a claim for voter dilution. In this case, the district court concluded that plaintiffs did not prove that Anglos, a minority in Dallas County, have the potential to elect their preferred candidate, a Republican, in a second commissioner district. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the district court applied the wrong standard, and that they need only provide an alternative map with two Anglo-majority districts. The court explained that an alternative map containing an additional majority-minority district does not necessarily establish an increased opportunity for the Anglo-preferred candidate. Furthermore, there was no case in which the ability to create an influence district was considered sufficient to establish a section 2 vote dilution claim.The court also held that plaintiffs failed to plead a racial gerrymandering claim, because the complaint did not allege a Shaw claim. Rather, the complaint only once alleged that race predominated, and it made this allegation five pages before stating the claim for relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's refusal to entertain a claim of racial gerrymandering and its denial of the vote dilution claim after trial. View "Harding v. County of Dallas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court declaring the affidavit requirement of Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.427.2(1) and 115.427.3 unconstitutional and enjoining the State from requiring individuals who vote under the non-photo identification option provided in section 115.427.2(1) to execute the affidavit or in enjoining it from disseminating materials indicating photo identification is required to vote, holding that the circuit court did not err.Respondents filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Missouri secretary of state, alleging that section 115.427 unconstitutionally burdens individuals' right to vote. The circuit court entered a judgment finding section 115.427 constitutional except for subsections 2(1) and 3, the affidavit requirement, and enjoined the State from requiring individuals who vote under this option to execute the affidavit required under subsections 2(1) and 3. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the affidavit requirement of sections 115.427.2(1) and 115.427.3 is misleading and contradictory, and therefore, the affidavit requirement is unconstitutional; and (2) the circuit court did not err in enjoining the affidavit requirement. View "Priorities USA v. State" on Justia Law

In April 2019, Monica Colbert and Juliet Sebold sought to have titles set for eight ballot initiatives. Each of the proposed initiatives was designed to create an “Expanded Learning Opportunities Program” for Colorado children, but each included a different funding mechanism. The Title Board held a hearing on the eight initiatives; it declined to set titles for two, Initiatives #74 and #75, after concluding that both proposed initiatives contained multiple subjects in violation of the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court was asked, in its original jurisdiction, whether a statement in section 1-40-107(1)(c), C.R.S. (2019), that “[t]he decision of the title board on any motion for rehearing shall be final, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, and no further motion for rehearing may be filed or considered by the title board” – meant what it said. The Court responded, “yes”: Section 1-40-107 contemplated only a single Title Board rehearing on a proposed initiative title. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Title Board declining to consider a motion for a second rehearing on Proposed Initiative 2019–2020 #74 and Proposed Initiative 2019–2020 #75. View "In re Ballot Title #74, & No." on Justia Law

The Executive Clemency Board appealed the district court's orders denying in part its motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoining Florida's former system for re-enfranchising convicted felons. Plaintiff and other convicted felons alleged that the former system facially violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted plaintiff's motion on three of four counts, and issued permanent injunctions prohibiting the Board from enforcing the then-current vote-restoration system, ending all vote-restoration processes.In 2016, Florida voters amended their state constitution as it concerns the re-enfranchisement of convicted felons. In 2019, Florida's legislature revised its statutory scheme for re-enfranchisement. Plaintiff claimed that he and the other convicted felons are eligible to seek restoration of their voting rights. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that this case is moot and vacated in part the district court's order on cross-motions for summary judgment dated February 1, 2018; vacated the district court's order directing entry of judgment dated March 27, 2018; and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Hand v. Desantis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court rendered this advisory opinion to address the issue of the validity of a citizen initiative petition circulated pursuant to Fla. Const. art. XI, 3, concluding that the proposed initiative should not be placed on the ballot.The initiative at issue was sponsored by Citizens for Energy Choices and titled "Right to Competitive Energy Market for Customers of Investor-Owned Utilities; Allowing Energy Choice." In opposing the initiative, the Attorney General argued that the ballot title and summary failed adequately to inform the voters of "the true meaning and ramifications of the proposed amendment." Specifically at issue was whether the ballot summary affirmatively misled voters to believe that the initiative grants a right to sell electricity. The Supreme Court concluded that the ballot summary was affirmatively misleading and thus did not comply with Fla. Stat. 101.161(1). View "Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Right to Competitive Energy Market for Customers of Investor-Owned Utilities; Allowing Energy Choice" on Justia Law