Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Derrick Shepherd filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and for Injunctive Relief. He filed a notice of candidacy qualifying form with the Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court’s office in which he certified that he would be a candidate for the office of State Representative for District 87 of the Louisiana House of Representatives in the primary election to be held on October 24, 2015. Shepherd's petition alleged that the District Attorney for the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District, filed a petition objecting to Shepherd's candidacy because Shepherd pled guilty to a felony in a United States District Court in 2008, and it had been less than fifteen years since he completed his sentence, circumstances which disqualified Shepherd from seeking office pursuant to La. Const. art. I, section 10(B). At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the district court rendered judgment in Shepherd’s favor, declaring Article I, section 10(B) of the Constitution null and void for failure to comply with the requirements of Article XIII, section 1 of the Constitution for promulgation of amendments to the Constitution. After reviewing the record, the legislative instruments, and the constitutional provision at issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the constitutionally mandated requirements for amending the constitution were not followed in this case. View "Shepherd v. Schedler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the FEC’s rule requiring corporations and labor organizations to disclose only those donations “made for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications.” At issue in this appeal is whether the rule survives Step Two of the Chevron framework and State Farm's arbitrary and capricious test, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. The court held that the FEC’s purpose requirement satisfies both Chevron Step Two and State Farm review has the benefit both of being a correct application of black letter administrative law and of forestalling to some other time an answer to the important constitutional questions bubbling beneath the surface of this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC" on Justia Law

In 2013 Ohio enacted Rev. Code 3503.06(C)(1)(a): “Except for a nominating petition for presidential electors, no person shall be entitled to circulate any petition unless the person is a resident of this state.” Non-profit organizations wrote to Secretary of State Husted, asking whether he planned to “reject[] petitions where the circulator is domiciled in a state other than Ohio[.]” “While a court may ultimately find this law unconstitutional,” Husted responded, “that determination is a decision for the judicial branch, not the Secretary of State… this office and county boards of election will implement this law like any other until such time as the legislature acts to make a statutory change or a court directs otherwise.” One of the non-profit groups hired a firm to gather signatures for an initiative petition, paying a higher-than-usual fee to ensure that the firm hired in-state signature gatherers. The organizations then sought a declaration that the residency requirement was unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, and damages against Husted “as compensation for extra petition circulation charges.” The court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction and denied Husted’s qualified-immunity motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the qualified-immunity ruling; the Secretary had no clearly established duty to decline enforcement of the properly enacted and presumptively constitutional statute. View "Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted" on Justia Law

There was only one judge on the Tenth Judicial District Court which had jurisdiction over the counties of Quay, DeBaca, and Harding. In 2008, Albert J. Mitchell, Jr. won a contested election for Tenth Judicial District judge against Judge Donald Schutte. Pursuant to 19 Article VI, Section 33 of the New Mexico Constitution, Judge Mitchell ran for retention in the 2014 general election. Prior to the retention election, the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission evaluated Judge Mitchell and recommended that voters retain him in the general election. Despite the Commission’s recommendation, Judge Mitchell was not retained, failing to garner at least fifty-seven percent of the votes. A district court judges nominating committee was convened to solicit and evaluate applicants to fill Judge Mitchell’s impending vacancy. Before the nominating committee could meet, Petitioner Pamela Clark unsuccessfully tried to prevent to nominating committee from considering Judge Mitchell's application by petitioning the New Mexico Supreme Court. The nominating committee ultimately submitted the names of both applicants to the governor for consideration. Governor Susana Martinez appointed Judge Mitchell to the vacancy. This case called upon the New Mexico Supreme Court to interpret the 1988 amendments to the New Mexico Constitution governing judicial selection. The question before the Court was whether Article VI, Section 33 prohibited a district judge who lost a nonpartisan retention election from being appointed to fill the resulting vacancy created by that judge’s nonretention. The Court held that the New Mexico Constitution did not prohibit a judicial nominating commission from considering and nominating, or the governor from appointing, an otherwise qualified judicial applicant to fill a vacant judicial office based on the judicial applicant’s nonretention in the immediately preceding election. "We recognize that our holding may seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, our holding is governed by our Constitution’s provisions governing judicial succession, not retention." View "Clark v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Following the 2010 decennial census, the General Assembly enacted redistricting plans for the North Carolina Senate and House of Representatives and for the North Carolina districts for the United States House of Representatives. Plaintiffs, registered voters, filed a complaint seeking to have the redistricting plans declared invalid on both constitutional and statutory grounds. The three-judge panel reviewing the redistricting plans upheld the plans. The Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court vacated this Court’s opinion and remanded for further consideration in light of its recent decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. The Supreme Court reconsidered this case in light of Alabama and affirmed the three-judge panel’s judgment, holding that the General Assembly’s enacted plans do not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and satisfy state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements. Moreover, the three-judge panel’s decision fully complies with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alabama. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

This opinion was intended to bring finality to litigation concerning the state’s congressional redistricting that has spanned nearly four years in state courts. This case was before the Supreme Court for approval of a final congressional districting plan in accordance with the Court’s previous opinion in Apportionment VII and the Fair Districts Amendment. The Court approved in full the trial court’s “Order Recommending Adoption of a Remedial Map,” and directed that the plan approved here shall be used in the 2016 congressional elections and thereafter until the next decennial redistricting. In so doing, the Court rejected the Legislature’s contention that this decision moves the “goalposts” on the Legislature in its redrawing of the districts and dismissed the contention that the courts adopted a plan drawn by “Democratic operatives.” View "League of Women Voters v. Detzner" on Justia Law

In November 2009, County of Alameda voters approved Measures I and J levying special parcel taxes by the Albany Unified School District. Plaintiff-appellant Golden Gate Hill Development Company, Inc. was the owner of a parcel of real property in the City of Albany subject to the tax. In February 2014, appellant filed suit against the County and District seeking a refund of taxes paid under the Measures. Golden Gage Hill alleged the tax rates in the Measures were improper because different rates are imposed on residential and nonresidential properties, as well as nonresidential properties of different sizes. The complaint referenced a recent decision in this district, “Borikas v. Alameda Unified School Dist.” (214 Cal.App.4th 135 (2013)), which declared invalid a different parcel tax with similar rate classifications. Respondents moved to dismiss, contending the complaint failed to state a claim because, under Code of Civil Procedure section 860, et seq. (“the validation statutes”), appellant was required to present its claims in a “reverse validation action” within 60 days of passage of the Measures. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Because appellant has not shown there was a basis for its refund claim independent of the alleged invalidity of the Measures, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden Gate Hill Development Co. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Gerald Geier, an accountant, was the treasurer of Stop Now!, a Missouri political action committee (PAC). Geier was required to register the PAC with the Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC). Stop Now! became inactive after 2003, and the PAC’s bank account closed in 2006. When Stop Now! failed to file disclosure reports for the first three quarters of 2011, the MEC opened an investigation. The MEC subsequently filed a complaint against Geier and Stop Now!, alleging that they violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 13.046.1, 130.021.4(1) and 130.021.7 by failing to timely file disclosure reports and failing to notify the MEC of the closure of the PAC’s bank account. After a hearing, the MEC found probable cause that Geier and Stop Now! knowingly violated the applicable statutes. Geier sought judicial review, challenging, inter alia, the constitutional validity of the reporting statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the MEC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the reporting statutes are constitutional as applied; (2) Geier’s challenges to the facial validity of the reporting statutes are not ripe; (3) section 105.961.3, the statute that requires the MEC’s hearings be closed to the public, does not violate the First or Sixth Amendments; and (4) the MEC had authority to investigate Geier. View "Geier v. Missouri Ethics Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five Tucson voters and a non-profit corporation called PIA, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Tucson’s hybrid system for electing members of its city council. The Supreme Court has held that the primary and general elections are a “single instrumentality for choice of officers.” Because the primary and general elections are two parts of a “unitary” process, a citizen’s right to vote in the general election may be meaningless unless he is also permitted to vote in the primary. Because the constituency of the representative to be elected remains static throughout the election process, the geographical unit must also remain static throughout that process. In this case, such mismatches between voters at different stages of a single election cycle are not constitutionally permissible. The court concluded that the practical effect of the Tucson system is to give some of a representative’s constituents - those in his home ward - a vote of disproportionate weight. The court held that every otherwise eligible voter who will be a constituent of the winner of the general election must have an equal opportunity to participate in each election cycle through which that candidate is selected. Because all Tucsonans have an equal interest in determining who the nominees will be, the city may not exclude out-of-ward voters from the primaries. Thus, the court rejected the city's final argument that the hybrid system is a reasonable “residency restriction” on the right to vote. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the city. View "Public Integrity Alliance v. City of Tucson" on Justia Law

In 2015, Red Clay Consolidated School District (Red Clay) sought approval from voters to increase certain school-related property taxes. The referendum passed. Plaintiffs were residents of Red Clay who opposed the tax increase but did not vote because they were unable to access the polls. Plaintiffs brought this complaint asserting that Red Clay deprived them of their right to vote without due process of law and denied them equal protection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Red Clay violated Del. Const. art. I, 3, which states that all elections shall be free and equal. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that Red Clay raised impediments to voting by elderly and disabled residents, who Red Clay believed would oppose the tax increase. Red Clay filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Chancery denied Red Clay’s motion, concluding that Plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to move beyond the pleading stage. View "Young v. Red Clay Consolidated Sch. Dist." on Justia Law