Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality and legality of Senate Bill 14 in 2011, which requires individuals to present one of several forms of photo identification in order to vote. The district court held that SB 14 was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose, has a racially discriminatory effect, is a poll tax, and unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote. The court vacated the district court’s judgment that SB 14 was passed with a racially discriminatory purpose and remanded for further consideration of plaintiffs’ discriminatory purpose claims, using the proper legal standards and evidence; vacated the district court’s holding that SB 14 is a poll tax under the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments and rendered judgment for the State on this issue; the court need not and did not address whether SB 14 unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; vacated the district court’s judgment on that issue and dismissed those claims; and affirmed the district court’s finding that SB 14 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301(a), through its discriminatory effects and remanded for consideration of the appropriate remedy. Finally, the court remanded with further instructions. View "Veasey v. Abbott" on Justia Law

The Commission imposed an $8,690 fine on the Combat Veterans and its treasurer, David Wiggs, in his official capacity, for failing to meet three required reporting deadlines under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. Combat Veterans filed suit against the Commission, contesting the fine and charging that the Commission’s procedural errors deprived it of the power to act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected all of Combat Veterans’ claims and granted judgment to the Commission. At issue, among other things, was whether the Commission’s voting procedures may contravene the Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(2). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the Commission’s use of its voting procedure was harmless even if it was in error. In this case, Combat Veterans has failed to show that the Commission’s use of its allegedly flawed voting procedure caused it any prejudice. The court rejected Combat Veterans' remaining challenges, agreeing with the district court's explanations. View "Combat Veterans for Congress v. FEC" on Justia Law

In October 2013, William “Bill” Stone moved from Ashland in Benton County to Holly Springs in Marshall County. He sought the Democratic Party nomination for the newly-created Senate District 10, a district which encompassed parts of Marshall County, including Stone’s home in Holly Springs, and parts of Tate County. In 2015, Steve Hale, a resident of Tate County who also sought the Democratic nomination for District 10, filed an objection to Stone’s candidacy with the State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee, arguing that Stone was ineligible to run for that office because he did not meet the two-year residency requirement enunciated in Article 4, Section 42, of the Mississippi Constitution. After a hearing, the Executive Committee rejected Hale’s objection and certified that Stone satisfied the qualifications for candidacy. Hale sought judicial review at the Circuit Court. That court held affirmed. Hale then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court, finding it was not manifest error in that the Circuit Court held Stone had proven that he had established his domicile in Marshall County and that he therefore was qualified to run for the office of senator for District 10. View "Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee" on Justia Law

Appellant Collette Brown, a resident of Concord Township, Delaware County, appealed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's dismissal of her petition to place on the November 2014 ballot, a referendum question seeking to change the Township's governmental status from second-class to first-class. Appellant's petition contained 994 signatures (8.5%) out of the Township’s 11,640 registered voters and claimed that as of the 2010 census, the Township had a population density of around 1,258 inhabitants per square mile (“IPSM”). As stated, both figures easily exceeded the statutory thresholds of 300 IPSM and 5% registered voter signatures, which Appellant believed operated as conjunctive preconditions. Seven named qualified electors (“Appellees”) filed objections and claimed the petition was substantively and procedurally defective under Pennsylvania law, which they argued was time-limited to the first municipal or general election occurring at least ninety days after the 2010 census. That same day, the Delaware County Bureau of Elections intervened and requested declaratory relief, claiming that in addition to not satisfying the statutory requirements, the petition should have been dismissed because a home rule study referendum question was already on the ballot (which voters later approved), and that if Appellant’s referendum question were successful, the subsequent change in Township government could violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to 53 P.S. section 55207, second- to first-class township referendum questions shall be submitted to voters at the first general or municipal election occurring at least ninety days after fulfilling both the population density ascertainment and petition signature filing requirements as set forth in the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re: Ballot Quest to Concord Twp" on Justia Law

A trial court found that the Legislature’s 2012 congressional redistricting plan was drawn in violation of the Florida Constitutional’s prohibition on partisan intent because Florida’s twenty-seven congressional districts were apportioned in such a way as to favor the Republican Party and incumbent lawmakers. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Legislature’s enacted map was tainted by unconstitutional intent; but (2) reversed the trial court’s order upholding the Legislature’s remedial redistricting plan, as the court failed to give proper legal effect to its determination that the Fair Districts Amendment was violated. Remanded to the trial court with directions that it require the Legislature to redraw certain congressional districts pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this opinion. View "League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individual government contractors, challenged 52 U.S.C. 30119(a)(1) as violating their First Amendment and equal protection rights. 52 U.S.C. 30119(a)(1) barred individuals and firms from making federal campaign contributions while they negotiate or perform federal contracts. The court rejected plaintiffs' challenge because the concerns that spurred the original bar remain as important today as when the statute was enacted, and because the statute is closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. The court stated that there is no dispute regarding the legitimacy or importance of the interests that support the contractor contribution ban. The ban is not only supported by the compelling interest in protecting against quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, it is also supported by the obviously important interest in protecting merit-based public administration commonly at issue in cases involving limits on partisan activities by government employees. Further, the statute employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms, and does not deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws View "Wagner v. Federal Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Tennessee previously recognized only statewide political parties as automatically entitled to have their candidates identified on the ballot by their party affiliation. In 2011, the state created a new designation, “recognized minor party,” for any group that successfully filed a petition conforming to requirements established by the coordinator of elections, bearing, at minimum the signatures of registered voters equal to at least 2.5% of the total number of votes cast for gubernatorial candidates in the most recent election of governor, Tenn. Code 2-1-104(a)(24). In 2012, Tennessee again amended its statutes, requiring recognized minor parties to satisfy specific requirements to maintain their status as a recognized minor party beyond the current election year. Two minor parties filed suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for plaintiffs’ on an equal-protection challenge to the ballot-retention statute, and on a First Amendment challenge to a loyalty oath requirement. The court concluded that the entirety of the statute is not invalid and vacated summary judgment on plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges to a section that simply requires a party’s rules of operation to be filed with the Tennessee Secretary of State and is unrelated to the loyalty oath requirement. View "Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, Plaintiff challenged the sufficiency and fairness of the ballot title for a proposal modifying the right to bear arms in the state constitution. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a post-election challenge to ballot titles can be brought under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 115. The Supreme Court held (1) a challenge to a ballot title may be brought either before an election under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 116 or after an election under chapter 115 if the issue has not been previously litigated and determined; and (2) because the ballot title’s description of the declarations added was sufficient and fair, Plaintiffs did not show an election irregularity under chapter 115. View "Dotson v. Kander" on Justia Law

Under Arizona’s Constitution, voters may, by ballot initiative, adopt laws and constitutional amendments and may approve or disapprove measures passed by the legislature. Proposition 106 (2000), an initiative aimed preventing gerrymandering, amended Arizona’s Constitution, removing redistricting authority from the legislature and vesting it in an independent commission. After the 2010 census, the commission adopted redistricting maps for congressional and state legislative districts. The Arizona Legislature challenged the map for congressional districts, arguing violation of the Elections Clause of the U. S. Constitution, which provides:The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. The district court held that the Arizona Legislature had standing to sue, but rejected its complaint on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. 2a(c) permit the use of a commission to adopt congressional districts. Redistricting is a legislative function to be performed in accordance with state prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include referendum and the Governor’s veto. It is characteristic of the federal system that states retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes free from incursion by the federal government. The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative process in which the people’s legislative power is coextensive with the state legislature’s authority, but the invention of the initiative was consistent with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental power. Banning use of initiative to direct a state’s method of apportioning congressional districts would cast doubt on other time, place, and manner regulations governing federal elections that states have adopted by initiative without involvement by “the Legislature.” View "Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n" on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk filed an action in district court under section 24-72-204(6)(a) seeking an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure of the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, however, the General Assembly enacted section 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014), providing that voted ballots are subject to CORA and describing the process by which records custodians must make them available. The Clerk then produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect, and the parties agreed that the only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that where an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure under section 24-72-204(6)(a), a prevailing records request or is entitled to costs and attorney fees in accordance with section 24-72-204(5). "Under section 24-72-204(5), a prevailing records requestor is entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court finds that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. Here, the district court's order reflects that the Clerk's denial of Marks' request was proper. Consequently, Marks is not entitled to attorney fees in this case." The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding to the contrary. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law