Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Florida voters elect judges. The Florida Supreme Court adopted Canon 7C(1) of its Code of Judicial Conduct, stating that judicial candidates “shall not personally solicit campaign funds . . . but may establish committees of responsible persons” to raise money for election campaigns. Yulee mailed and posted online a letter soliciting financial contributions to her campaign for judicial office. The Florida Bar disciplined her for violating a Bar Rule requiring candidates to comply with Canon 7C(1). The Florida Supreme Court upheld the sanction against a First Amendment challenge. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. Florida’s interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary is compelling.. Unlike the legislature or the executive, the judiciary “has no influence over either the sword or the purse,” so its authority largely depends on the public’s willingness to respect its decisions. Canon 7C(1) raises no fatal underinclusivity concerns. The solicitation ban aims squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary: it is not riddled with exceptions. Allowing a candidate to use a committee and to write thank you notes reflect Florida’s effort to respect the First Amendment interests of candidates and contributors. Canon 7C(1) is not overinclusive It allows judicial candidates to discuss any issue with any person at any time; to write letters, give speeches, and put up billboards; to contact potential supporters in person, on the phone, or online; and to promote their campaigns through the media. Though they cannot ask for money, they can direct their campaign committees to do so. Florida has reasonably determined that personal appeals for money by a judicial candidate inherently create an appearance of impropriety. Canon 7C(1) must be narrowly tailored, not “perfectly tailored” to address that concern. View "Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar" on Justia Law

Russell brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Kentucky Secretary of State, Attorney General, and other state and local officials, alleging that Kentucky Revised Statute 117.235(3), which creates a 300-foot no-political-speech buffer zone around polling locations on election day, violated Russell’s free-speech rights. Russell’s business property is 150 feet from a polling location, with a four-lane highway and guardrails between. Citing the statute, Sheriff’s deputies have removed political signs from his property on previous election days, and the statute’s language prohibits Russell from, on his own property, waving signs and offering campaign literature to passersby. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit granted a partial stay of that injunction, which was issued only days before the 2014 general election, and expedited an appeal. The court then affirmed, holding that it had jurisdiction over the case, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against any of the remaining defendants, and that the statute facially violates the First Amendment because Kentucky failed to carry its burden of showing why it required a no-political-speech zone vastly larger than the Supreme Court has previously upheld. View "Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature enacted a new law requiring voter registration forms to list the two largest parties, as well as provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-152(A)(5). The Arizona Green Party, the Arizona Libertarian Party, and three of their members (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action alleging that the new voter registration form violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because the form failed to “treat equally the four parties with Statewide continuing ballot access.” The district court granted summary judgment for the State. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that section 16-152(A)(5) is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. View "Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Two associations and two individuals brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging two requirements that the State of California and the City of Chula Vista, California, place on persons who wish to sponsor a local ballot measure: (1) the requirement that official proponents of local ballot initiatives be electors, thereby excluding non-natural persons such as corporations and associations; and (2) the requirement that official initiative proponents identify themselves on the face of the initiative petitions. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The en banc court of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the requirement that the official proponent of an initiative be an elector does not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association; but (2) the requirement that the name on the official proponent of an initiative be disclosed on the face of the initiative petitions satisfies exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment. View "Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs v. Norris" on Justia Law

In 2012 Alabama redrew the boundaries of its 105 House and 35 Senate districts to minimize each district’s deviation from precisely equal population and avoid retrogression with respect to racial minorities’ “ability to elect their preferred candidates of choice” under the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10304(b), by maintaining roughly the same black population percentage in existing majority-minority districts. The district court rejected an equal protection claim of “racial gerrymander.” The Supreme Court vacated. Analysis of the racial gerrymandering claim as referring to the state “as a whole,” rather than district-by-district, was erroneous. Showing that race-based criteria did not significantly affect the drawing of some districts did not defeat a claim that such criteria predominantly affected the drawing of others. The objectors’ claimed that individual majority-minority districts were racially gerrymandered, and those districts must be reconsidered. There was “strong, perhaps overwhelming, evidence that race did predominate as a factor” with respect to one district. An equal population goal is not a “traditional” factor in determining whether race “predominates,” but is taken as a given. The district court and the Alabama legislature relied upon a mechanically numerical view as to what counts as forbidden retrogression and asked how to maintain the present minority percentages in majority-minority districts. The Act does not require maintenance of a particular numerical minority percentage. It requires the jurisdiction to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice. View "Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Leading up to the 2012 state Senate elections in Texas, Texas failed to gain preclearance of its recently enacted Senate redistricting plan as required under then-existing law. Because Texas’s new plan had not been precleared, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit and successfully blocked the plan for the 2012 elections. A three-judge district court panel in San Antonio enjoined Texas’s plan and ordered an interim plan in its place. But after the election, the Supreme Court held that the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula, which automatically subjected Texas to the preclearance requirement, was unconstitutional. Regardless, after the Court’s decision, Texas repealed the contested redistricting plan and adopted the court-imposed plan in its place, thus mooting Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The district court then awarded Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs. Texas appealed the award of costs. Because the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erroneously characterized Plaintiffs as prevailing parties, the Fifth Circuit reversed. View "Davis v. Abbott" on Justia Law

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

In 2010, the House of Representatives passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), by a vote of 219 to 212, following significant debate over whether PPACA included taxpayer funding for abortion. Driehaus, a Representative from Ohio and an anti-abortion Democrat, was an outspoken advocate of the “no taxpayer funding for abortion in the PPACA” movement, insisting that he would not vote for PPACA without inclusion of the Stupak-Pitts Amendment, expressly forbidding use of taxpayer funds “to pay for any abortion or to cover any part of the costs of any health plan that includes coverage of abortion” except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the life of the mother. Driehaus voted for the PPACA without the Amendment. President Obama later issued Executive Order 13535: “to … ensure that [f]ederal funds are not used for abortion services … consistent with a longstanding [f]ederal statutory restriction … the Hyde Amendment.” Debate continues as to whether PPACA includes federal funding for abortion. SBA, an anti-abortion public-advocacy organization, publicly criticized Driehaus, among other congressmen, for his vote. Driehaus considered SBA’s statement untrue and filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, alleging violation of Ohio Revised Code 3517.21(B) (Unfair Political Campaign Activities). OEC found probable cause of a violation. SBA sued, claiming that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Driehaus counterclaimed defamation. Staying the other claims, pending agency action, the district court granted summary judgment, holding that associating a political candidate with a mainstream political position, even if false, cannot constitute defamation. The Sixth Circuit Affirmed. View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 8 (2016), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). IP 8 would alter the authority of metropolitan service districts in Oregon by eliminating the authority of a metropolitan service district to engage in various planning functions related to land use, urban growth, air and water quality, and transportation. The Attorney General did not dispute that the reference in the results statements to a “regional plan for managing urban growth” was too broad to apprise potential petition signers and voters of the effect of the elimination of districts' authority to engage in those planning functions; it necessitated assuming that they would readily understand all that was entailed in a regional plan under current state law. Moreover, it failed to cover the role of a metropolitan service district as the federally mandated metropolitan planning organization charged with carrying out federal air and water quality planning responsibilities. The Supreme Court therefore referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Schoenheit v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

In 2013, the General Assembly passed Act 1413 of 2013, which made numerous changes to the portions of the Arkansas Code pertaining to initiatives and referenda. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Mark Martin, in his official capacity as the Secretary of State, alleging that certain sections of the Act violated the Seventh Amendment of the state Constitution. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Secretary Martin from enforcing the Act. Dustin McDaniel, acting in his official capacity as Attorney General, intervened in the action. The circuit court concluded that certain provisions of Act 1413 violated the Constitution because the provisions would cause citizens to lose their ability to propose legislative measures and laws directly to the people. The court then permanently enjoined Secretary Martin from enforcing those portions of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some of the sections of the Act declared unconstitutional by the circuit court were, in fact, constitutional. View "McDaniel v. Spencer" on Justia Law