Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff, who was twenty-seven years old at the time, was excluded from the presidential primary ballot under California law, she filed suit under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Twentieth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The court concluded that the case was not moot because it was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The court concluded that age requirements, like residency requirements and term limits, are neutral candidacy qualifications which the State had the right to impose; any burden on plaintiff's speech and association rights were minimal; and the burden was justified by California's asserted interest in protecting the integrity of the election process and avoiding voter confusion. The court rejected plaintiff's Equal Protection claim; because including ineligible candidates on the ballot could easily cause voter confusion, treating ineligible candidates differently from eligible ones was rationally related to the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the election process; and the Secretary did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by excluding from the ballot candidates who are indisputably ineligible to serve, while listing those with a colorable claim of eligibility. Even if the Twentieth Amendment gave rise to a private right of action, nothing in the Twentieth Amendment states or implies that Congress has the exclusive authority to exclude a candidate with a known ineligibility from the presidential ballot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Lindsay v. Bowen" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party of Ohio (LPO) sought to enjoin Ohio Secretary of State Husted from enforcing Ohio Rev. Code 3501.38(E)(1) and to restore its candidates to the May 2014 primary ballot. The Code requires that, to appear on the primary ballot and qualify for the general election, candidates must file petitions with (for statewide office) signatures of at least 500 qualified electors who are members of the same political party as the candidate. A petition consists of separate papers, each with signatures of electors of only one county; only one circulator can circulate each paper. Signatures must be in ink and include the location of the signer’s residence, as it appears on registration records. The circulator must note the number of signatures on each paper, and sign a statement that the circulator witnessed every signature and that, to the best of the circulator’s knowledge, each signature was that of a qualified voter and of the person whose signature it purports to be. The circulator must also identify the circulator’s name, address of permanent residence, and the name and address of the person employing the circulator to circulate the petition, if any. LPO previously successfully challenged an Ohio residency requirement for circulators. Hatchett collected signatures for LPO candidates and was paid about $2300. Hatchett, an independent contractor, believed it was unnecessary to fill in the employee information box, having circulated about 10,000 petition papers without completing that box. In response to a protest, papers submitted by Hatchett were invalidated. This was the first time enforcement of the employer disclosure requirement resulted in the disqualification of a statewide candidate. Absent a protest, practice had been not to check petitions for that disclosure. Because of the disqualification, LPO will likely lose its recognition as an Ohio political party. The district court rejected due process and First Amendment challenges to the statute. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Libertarian Party of OH v. Husted" on Justia Law

Candidates for Chicago mayor, city treasurer, or city clerk must submit signatures from 12,500 “legal voters of the city” to have their name printed on the ballot, 65 ILCS 20/21-28(b). This number is just under 1% of the 1.3 million registered Chicago voters. As a proportion of active voters, the number is higher. Candidates are advised to allow some margin for error, in case of challenges. They have 90 days in which to gather signatures. Voters may not sign more than one nominating petition for the same office in a single election cycle. Chicago’s most recent general election took place in February 2011; 20 candidates submitted petitions to run for mayor, including four of the plaintiffs. Only Walls gathered enough signatures to appear on the ballot. The plaintiffs challenged the 12,500-signature requirement. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. While an interlocutory appeal was pending Rahm Emanuel was elected mayor. Walls came in sixth. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to also challenge the 90-day limitation and the rule that a voter cannot sign more than one candidate’s petition in any election cycle. The district court concluded that their claims had been “soundly rejected by extensive Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent” and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Stone v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Libertarian Party sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the Equal Access to the Ballot Act was in effect. If the Court determined the Act was effective, the Party requested that the South Carolina State Election Commission be ordered to conduct a Libertarian Party primary on June 10, 2014, and place a referendum question on the primary ballot for approval of the use of the convention method of nominating candidates by petitioner in 2016. The Supreme Court granted the petition for original jurisdiction and declared the Act was in effect. However. The Court denied the Party's request to require the Commission to conduct a primary and place a referendum question on the primary ballot. View "SC Libertarian Party v. SC Election Commission" on Justia Law

Don Davis, in his capacity as the Judge of Probate for Mobile County, appealed a Circuit Court's final judgment in favor of then Secretary of State Beth Chapman and the three members of the Mobile County Board of Registrars: Pat Tyrrell, Shirley Short, and Virginia Delchamps. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned a regulation promulgated by the Secretary in an effort to comply with certain federal election laws and an asserted conflict between that regulation and the residency requirement prescribed by three Alabama election statutes. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court: "Alabama statutory law continues to require, as it long has, that voters who have moved cast ballots at the polling place designated for their new address. Further, Ala. Admin 20 Code (Secretary of State), Reg. 820-2-2-.13(1), was not and is not required by NVRA or HAVA. Because Reg. 820-2-2-.13(1) expressly contradicts Alabama statutory law, it is void."View "Davis v. Bennett" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Election Rule 10.7.5, promulgated as a temporary or emergency rule on the evening of the November 5, 2013 election. Plaintiffs were registered electors of the Adams 12 Five Star School District who sued seeking judicial review of the Secretary of State's authority to promulgate the rule, and for an order to direct the Clerk and Recorder of Adams County to finish counting votes and to certify the vote tally for all candidates in the school district director election. The district court ruled that the Secretary acted in excess of his authority in promulgating the emergency rule, and ordered all defendants to complete and certify the vote count for all candidates in the Adams 12 director district 4 election. The Secretary petitioned the Supreme Court for review of whether the district court erred in holding "Rule 10.7.5 [was] contrary to and in conflict with existing election statutes." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rule 10.7.5 indeed "contravene[d] the election code by permitting a designated election official to usurp the courts' express authority to resolve . . . issues." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court only in holding that Rule 10.7.5 conflicted with existing election rules. View "Hanlen v. Gessler" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a combined petition challenging the legal sufficiency of Initiative No. 171 (I-171), a proposed ballot measure that would prohibit the state and its political subdivisions from using funds, resources, or personnel to administer or enforce the federal Affordable Care Act, among other things. Petitioners sought an order enjoining the Secretary of State from approving petitions for circulation to the electorate for signatures or otherwise submitting the measure for approval by the voters and further sought a declaration that I-171 was unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) the Attorney General correctly determined that I-171 was legally sufficient; and (2) the ballot statements for I-171 satisfy the requirements of law.View "Hoffman v. State" on Justia Law

A federal district judge issued an injunction that blocks the State of Wisconsin from conducting a judicially supervised criminal investigation into whether certain persons have violated the state’s campaign-finance laws. The court acted despite 28 U.S.C. 2283, the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” In 1972 the Supreme Court (Mitchum v. Foster) held that 42 U.S.C.1983 authorizes anti-suit injunctions if appropriate under principles of “equity, comity, and federalism.” The Seventh Circuit held that this case does not present a situation in which state proceedings may be displaced. The Anti-Injunction Act embodies a fundamental principle of federalism: state courts are free to conduct their own litigation, without ongoing supervision by federal judges, let alone threats by federal judges to hold state judges in contempt. The scope given to state litigation is especially great in the realm of criminal investigations and prosecutions. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss, leaving all further proceedings to the courts of Wisconsin. View "O'Keefe v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

On Sept. 18, 2013, Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question 767 was filed with Secretary of State. The Initiative Petition proposes amendments to the State Constitution with an ultimate primary purpose of constructing storm shelters for schools. Proponents also filed with the Secretary of State a proposed ballot title for their proposed Initiative. The Oklahoma Attorney General disagreed with Proponents' ballot title and then prepared and filed with the Secretary of State a new ballot title for the Initiative. The Proponents disagreed with the Attorney General's version and appealed to the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that: (1) a proponent of an initiative petition must file or submit a copy of the initiative petition and a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General when the proponent files the initiative petition and ballot title with the Secretary of State; (2) the Attorney General must file a response to a ballot title within five business days from the date the ballot title is filed; (3) the Attorney General's section 9(D) response to a ballot title is statutorily effective although the Attorney General's response was filed two days late; (4) a proponent of an initiative who challenges a ballot title prepared by the Attorney General has the burden to show that the Attorney General's ballot title is legally incorrect, or is not impartial, or fails to accurately reflect the effects of the proposed initiative; (5) the Attorney General's ballot title challenged in this proceeding was legally correct, impartial, and accurately reflected the effects of the proposed initiative; (6) when a ballot title appeal has been made, a proponent's ninety-day period of time to collect signatures commences when the ballot title appeal is final. View "In re: Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question No. 767" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Florida Secretary of State, arguing that Florida was violating the 90 Day Provision of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), by conducting a program to systematically remove suspected non-citizens from the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election. The 90 Day Provision requires states to "complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters." Concerned about people who are not citizens casting ballots in Florida elections, the Secretary engaged in two separate programs to identify and remove non-citizens from the Florida voter rolls. Determining that the issue was not moot even if the 2012 elections have passed, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the 90 Day Provision indicates that the Secretary's actions fall under the category of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters." Further, the statutory context and policy of the NVRA supported the court's conclusion that the plain meaning of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters" was intended by Congress to include programs like the Secretary's. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Arcia, et al. v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law