Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Arizona legislature amended Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-1441(I) to require the election of two at-large members to the governing board of community colleges located in very populous counties. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaration that section 15-1441(I) violates Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against special laws. The superior court concluded that the legislation did not violate the special law prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the test set forth in Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, section 15-1441(I) does not violate the special laws provision of article 4, part 2, section 19 of the Arizona Constitution. View "Gallardo v. State" on Justia Law

Ohio voters can cast a ballot in person on Election Day, or by using absent voter’s ballot procedures, Ohio Rev. Code 3509.01. One can vote by mail or early, in person, at a designated location if a request is timely received. Overseas uniformed military, those subject to disability or confinement, those in unforeseen hospitalization and those confined for a misdemeanor or awaiting trial can submit ballot applications up to 90 days before an election. Boards of elections send teams to obtain the ballots from confined voters. While teams visit nursing homes up to a month before the election, they wait until Election Day to visit the jails: persons jailed after 6:00 P.M. on the Friday before Election Day who are not released in time to vote on Election Day and who have not already voted are unable to vote. If a voter or the voter’s minor child is “confined in a hospital as a result of an accident or unforeseeable medical emergency” an absentee ballot application can be delivered to the board by 3:00 P.M. on Election Day and the ballot can be entrusted to a family member or to a team for delivery. No corresponding provision exists for persons in jail on Election Day. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Voting Rights Act, and the Seventeenth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit instructed the district court to dismiss. The organizational plaintiff did not establish concrete and particularized injury to itself or its members. Even if it could demonstrate Article III standing, it asserts the rights of third parties. Its relationship with the persons whom it seeks to help—unidentified, future late-jailed voters—does not resemble the close relationship of the lawyer-client or doctor-patient relationships recognized by the Supreme Court. View "Fair Elections OH v. Husted" on Justia Law

On June 24, 2014, Thad Cochran, a Republican nominee for United States Senator, won the Republican primary runoff. His opponent, Chris McDaniel, filed an election contest with the State Republican Executive Committee (SREC) on August 4, 2014 – forty-one days after the election. The SREC declined to consider McDaniel’s complaint, and McDaniel appealed. The trial judge found that McDaniel did not meet the twenty-day deadline to file his election contest and dismissed the case. On appeal, McDaniel argued that no deadline existed to contest a primary election. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court found that there indeed was a deadline, and McDaniel failed to file his election contest within twenty days. The dismissal was affirmed. View "McDaniel v. Cochran" on Justia Law

In May 2012, election officials in six Colorado counties had the theoretical ability to learn how individuals voted because the ballots were traceable. Citizen Center, a Colorado non-profit organization, sued the Secretary of State and the clerks for five of the six counties, contending that the use of traceable ballots violated members' federal constitutional rights involving: (1) voting, (2) free speech and association, (3) substantive due process, (4) equal protection, and (5) procedural due process. In addition, Citizen Center sued five of the clerks for violation of the Colorado Constitution. All defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing, and the clerks included an alternative argument for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed the complaint on standing grounds without reaching the merits of the clerks' argument under Rule 12(b)(6). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) the claims were partially moot because the Secretary of State adopted new regulations banning some of the challenged practices; (2) Citizen Center had standing on the "live" parts of the claims involving denial of equal protection and procedural due process, but its alleged injury in fact was too speculative for standing on the right-to-vote, free-speech-and-association and substantive-due-process claims; and (3) the first amended complaint failed to state a valid claim against the clerks for denial of equal protection or procedural due process. These conclusions resulted in a termination of all claims except the federal claims against the Secretary of State for denial of equal protection and procedural due process. View "Citizen Center v. Gessler" on Justia Law

In September 2010, the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office received information regarding polling telephone calls made to New Hampshire residents that were described as containing negative content about United States congressional candidate Ann McLane Kuster. The AG investigated, and concluded that the Bass Victory Committee (he authorized campaign committee of former United States Congressman Charles F. Bass) had engaged in “push-polling” as defined in RSA 664:2, XVII (2008) (amended 2014) without complying with the disclosure requirements set forth in RSA 664:16-a. The Attorney General appealed a superior court order that dismissed his petition for civil penalties against the Committee. The AG argued that the trial court erroneously determined that the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) preempted RSA 664:16-a. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire Attorney General v. Bass Victory Committee " on Justia Law

After the General Assembly passed Act 595 of 2013, Appellees, registered voters in Pulaski County, filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that sections of the Act that allegedly placed an additional qualification and impairment on Arkansas residents before they could exercise their right to vote violated the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court concluded that Act 595 was unconstitutional, enjoined and restrained Appellants, the Secretary of State and the Commissioners of the State Board of Election Commissioners, from enforcing any proof-of-identity provisions of the Act and from enforcing their rules promulgated as a result of the Act, and granted a preliminary injunction against Appellants from enforcing Act 595’s proof-of-identity requirements in favor of Appellants. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling that Act 595 was unconstitutional on its face, holding that the Act’s requiring proof of identity was unconstitutional on its face and imposed a requirement that fell outside the ambit of Ark. Const. art. III, 1. View "Martin v. Kohls" on Justia Law

Steven Glovsky sought to solicit signatures for his nomination to the second district seat on the Governor’s Council on the sidewalk immediately outside the entrance to a supermarket owned by Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. Despite believing he had a right under article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to solicit signatures on the property, Glovsky left the property after a store manager informed him Roche Bros. prohibited this activity. Glovsky filed suit, requesting relief under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act for a violation of his rights “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” The superior court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the portion of the judgment dismissing Glovsky’s request for declaratory relief under article 9 and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, holding (1) Glovsky adequately alleged a right to solicit nominating signatures outside the supermarket, but (2) Roche Bros. did not violate this right by threats, intimidation or coercion. Remanded for entry of a judgment dismissing the request for declaratory relief as moot. View "Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

Aspiring Ohio state court judges must run for office and must follow the Code of Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Code limits candidates’ campaign-related speech to help maintain an “independent, fair, and impartial judiciary,” free of “impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” After the Sixth Circuit struck parts of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, Ohio narrowed its Code. As amended, all judicial candidates—incumbents and challengers—are subject to restrictions on direct, personal monetary solicitation; bans on public political party speeches and endorsements of other candidates; and a prohibition on receiving campaign money earlier than 120-days before the primary. Platt, an attorney who wishes to run for Ohio judicial office, wanted to publicly endorse other candidates, directly solicit campaign funds in person, and to receive campaign contributions without the time limitations. Platt sued to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the rules as applied to non-sitting judicial candidates. The district court denied Platt’s request, holding that Platt failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claims and that the requested injunction would cause substantial harm to sitting judicial candidates who would still be subject to the restrictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Platt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Grievances & Discipline" on Justia Law

Since 2005 Indiana has required voters to present photographic identification at the polls. In 2008, the Supreme Court (Crawford decision) held that the statute is compatible with the Constitution. In 2011 Wisconsin enacted a similar statute, 2011 Wis. Act 23. A district court held that Act 23 is unconstitutional and enjoined its implementation. The Seventh Circuit stayed that injunction, but subsequently reversed, holding that the district court’s findings do not justify an outcome different from Crawford, in which the Justices concluded that prevention of voter impersonation on election day and preservation of public confidence in the integrity of elections justify a photo ID requirement, even though persons who do not already have government-issued photo IDs must spend time to acquire necessary documents (such as birth certificates) and stand in line at a public agency to get one. Wisconsin’s law differs from Indiana’s, but not in ways that matter under the analysis in Crawford. View "League of United Latin Am. Citizens of WI v. Deininger" on Justia Law

Doralee Chandler, a registered voter, filed an amended petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment, alleging that Judge Harrison G. Foster II was not a qualified or eligible candidate for circuit judge because he was not a “licensed attorney” for the constitutionally mandated six-year time period preceding the assumption of the office. The circuit court denied Chandler’s petition and granted Foster’s third-party complaint, determining (1) Foster was not “unlicensed” pursuant to Rule VII(C) of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar despite his failure to timely pay his licensing fee four of the six consecutive years prior to the time for taking office, if elected; (2) the suspension of Foster’s license to practice law due to Foster’s failure to timely renew his licensing fee violated his due process rights; and (3) Rule VII(C) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Foster was not “unlicensed” pursuant to Rule VII and in finding that he was qualified to seek the position of circuit judge; and (2) Rule VII(C) is unconstitutional in that it provides for an automatic suspension of a lawyer’s license without procedural due process.View "Chandler v. Martin" on Justia Law