Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, impose base limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee, and aggregate limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees, 2 U.S.C. 441a. In the 2011–2012 election cycle, McCutcheon contributed to 16 federal candidates, complying with all base limits. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to additional candidates and political committees and that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future. McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee challenged the aggregate limits under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, with five justices concluding that those limits are invalid. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the “closely drawn” test applies, the analysis depends on the fit between stated governmental objectives and the means selected to achieve the objectives. The aggregate limits fail even under the “closely drawn” test. Contributing to a candidate is an exercise of the right to participate in the electoral process through political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is not a “modest restraint.” To require a person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes penalizes that individual for “robustly exercis[ing]” his First Amendment rights. The proper focus is on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The justices noted the line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence and that the Court must “err on the side of protecting political speech.” Given regulations already in effect, fear that an individual might make massive unearmarked contributions to entities likely to support particular candidate is speculative. Experience suggests that most contributions are retained and spent by their recipients; the government provided no reason to believe that candidates or committees would dramatically shift their priorities if aggregate limits were lifted. Multiple alternatives could serve the interest in preventing circumvention without “unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights, such as targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and committees, tighter earmarking rules, and disclosure. View "McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

The major political parties in Marion County, Indiana followed a tradition of “slating” candidates that have the financial and organizational backing of party leadership in the primaries. Indiana enacted an “anti-slating” statute, prohibiting distribution of a list endorsing multiple political candidates during a primary election unless all such candidates have given written consent, Ind. Code 3-14-1-2(a). More than 10 years ago, that law was challenged as violating the First Amendment, resulting in a federal injunction against its future enforcement and a consent decree in which all parties stipulated and the court declared that the law was facially unconstitutional. The Marion County Election Board was a defendant, but nonetheless enforced the statute against a candidate running for state representative in the 2012 primary. That candidate sought an injunction. The district court dismissed the case under the “Younger” abstention doctrine, citing a still-ongoing Election Board investigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Election Board’s investigation is too preliminary a proceeding to warrant Younger abstention, at least in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs. Even if Younger abstention were theoretically available, the previous final federal judgment against the Election Board would amount to an extraordinary circumstance making Younger abstention inappropriate. View "Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd." on Justia Law

Snyder was involved in a fistfight with another town council member. He was convicted of battery. The court imposed a sentence of six months suspended and six months of home detention, but later determined that Snyder had violated probation. Snyder served the remainder of his sentence at the county jail. While Snyder was incarcerated, the County Voter Registration Board informed him that his voter registration had been cancelled under Ind. Code 3-7-46. Snyder knew that Indiana law permits him to reregister to vote at any time following release from jail. Snyder refused to re-register. He was turned away from voting in a special election. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg; the Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971; and the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. On certification, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Indiana Constitution authorized temporary disenfranchisement of any incarcerated convict. The district court dismissed the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds; held that a county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts done under state or federal law; and held that claims to enjoin de-registration or require reinstatement were not justiciable. Despite all parties arguing to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit found the case moot. Snyder waived any challenge to dismissal of the state defendants and failed to state a Monell claim against the county defendants. View "Snyder v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs raised an as-applied challenge to North Carolina's May 17 petition-filing deadline for the formation of new political parties. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' Rule 50(d) motion where discovery was not necessary to determine the constitutionality of the deadline. Balancing the character and magnitude of the burdens imposed against the extent to which the regulations advanced the state's interests, the court found that North Carolina's choice of May 17 as the operative deadline outweighed the modest burden imposed on plaintiffs. Therefore, the court held that the May 17 petition-filing deadline was constitutional as applied to plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pisano v. Strach" on Justia Law

In 2010, three individuals ran for the Colorado House of Representatives, House District 61: Kathleen Curry was a write-in candidate; Roger Wilson was the Democratic nominee, and Luke Korkowski was the Republican nominee. Under Colorado law, individual contributions to Ms. Curry were capped at $200, and individual contributions to each of her opponents were capped at $400. Contributors to Ms. Curry’s campaign sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the state officials. The Tenth Circuit reversed on the equal-protection claim; and in light of this, declined to address the summary-judgment ruling on the First Amendment claims. View "Riddle v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on a matter of state campaign finance regulations in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in "Citizens United v. FEC," (558 U.S. 310 (2010)). Before "Citizens United" in 2010, New Mexico had introduced a new state campaign finance law that imposed a host of contribution and other limitations on political parties, political action committees, and donors to such entities. As pertains to this case, the state limited the amount an individual may contribute to a political committee. Potential donors, political parties, and political committees mounted an as-applied challenge to the law in federal district court, contending several of its provisions violated the First Amendment. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of two provisions: (1) limits on contributions to political committees for use in federal campaigns, and (2) limits on contributions to political committees that are to be used for independent expenditures. New Mexico appealed the latter ruling, contending that the limit on contributions furthers the state’s compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in campaign spending. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court was correct that the challenged provision could not be reconciled with Citizens United and, as a result, did not err in entering a preliminary injunction. View "Republican Party of New Mexico, et al v. King, et al" on Justia Law

NYPPP filed suit against election officials and others to enjoin enforcement of New York State Election Law 14-114(8) and 14-126(2). Section 14-114(8) imposed a $150,000 aggregate annual limit on certain political contributions by any person in New York State. Section 14-126(2) made it a misdemeanor to fail to file required statements or to knowingly and willfully violate any other provision of the Election Law. NYPPP would be prevented from receiving more than $150,000 from any individual contributor in any calendar year. The court concluded that NYPPP had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; there were important public interests at stake which were weighed against the hardships suffered by NYPPP; and the hardships faced by NYPPP and its donors from the denial of relief was significant. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the preliminary injunction. View "New York Progress and Protection PAC v. Walsh, et al." on Justia Law

TFE filed suit against the Commission seeking an injunction and a declaration that the relevant portions of the Texas Election Code violated the First Amendment as applied to TFE. The district court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of Tex. Elec. Code 253.094(a) - which prohibits corporations from making an unauthorized political contribution - and 253.003(b) - where an individual may not knowingly accept a political contribution - against TFE and the Commission appealed the injunction. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction because TFE was likely to succeed on the merits and because the manifest equities weighed in favor of equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order granting the injunction. View "Texans for Free Enterprise v. Texas Ethics Commission, et al." on Justia Law

The petitioners in this case sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 9 (2014). They argued the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 9, if adopted by the voters, would amend provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Upon review of the ballot title, the Supreme Court concluded that the proposed ballot title did not contain a concise and impartial summary of not more than 125 words that summarized the proposed measure and its effects. Furthermore, the Court found that the proposed summary of the initiative did not disclose that employees who were not members of the union but who were members of the bargaining unit would receive representation without cost. Accordingly the title was referred back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Towers v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Since 2001, Callaghan has worked part-time at the South Portland Library. Edwards works for the Parks and Recreation Department about four hours per week. Both are subject to a personnel policy, which, following 2010-2011 amendments, provides that city employees may not seek or accept nomination or election to any South Portland elective office; use the influence of their employment for or against any candidate for city elective office; circulate petitions or campaign literature for any city elective office; solicit or receive subscriptions, contributions or political service from any person for or against any candidate for any city elective office; or use city property to assist or advocate for or against any candidate. Callaghan has served on the School Board since 2007. When Callaghan sought reelection in 2011, the City Clerk stated that the personnel policy amendments prevented placement of her name on the ballot. Edwards had served on the Board for 18 years. In 2010, Edwards expressed interest in filling a vacancy on the Board. After the City Clerk questioned whether Edwards could be appointed given his city employment, Edwards did not pursue the appointment. Edwards and Callaghan filed a complaint, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the policy was an unconstitutional restraint on political speech. The trial court entered partial summary judgment for the employees and an injunction barring enforcement of a prohibition on any city employee seeking election to or serving on the School Board or, on their own time, from circulating petitions or campaign literature and soliciting or receiving contributions or political service for or against candidates in School Board elections. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed as to the employees, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it invalidates the policy as to employees who were not parties. View "Callaghan v. City of South Portland" on Justia Law