Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the secretary of state, filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Wyoming's term limit statute. Plaintiff contended that the statute was prevented from exercising his constitutional right to seek a third term as secretary of state. The State retorted that Plaintiff's complaint did not present a justiciable controversy and, in any event, the statute was constitutional. The Supreme Court accepted certification of the issues from the district court and held (1) Plaintiff's complaint satisfied the four elements necessary to establish a justiciable controversy; and (2) the statute limiting the term limit for statewide elected officials is unconstitutional with respect to the offices of secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, and superintendent of public instruction, and the qualifications for those offices provided by the Wyoming Constitution are exclusive. View "Maxfield v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the State could directly enforce Article I, section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution to prevent a candidate from taking public office without regard to the Election Code's lime limits on challenges to candidacy. Answering in the affirmative, the Court reversed the appellate court's ruling and reinstated the trial court's ruling. View "Louisiana v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suits challenging the constitutionality of recently enacted redistricting plans and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from conducting elections using the redistricting plans. Plaintiffs requested from Defendants a variety of communications concerning enactment of the redistricting plans. Defendants objected to the production of certain categories of documents based upon the attorney-client privilege, legislative privilege, or work-product doctrine. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production. A three-judge panel allowed the motion and also concluded that any documents prepared solely in connection with redistricting litigation remain confidential pursuant to the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the panel's conclusion of law that the General Assembly waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine for pre-enactment communications and documents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 120-133; but (2) affirmed the panel's conclusion that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply to relevant post-enactment communications and documents. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

CFIF and WVFL are 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4) organizations that engage in election-related speech. These organizations and an individual brought suit alleging that West Virginia's campaign finance statutes were constitutionally impermissible. At issue was whether West Virginia's campaign-finance reporting and disclaimer requirements could survive constitutional scrutiny, West Virginia Code section 3-8-1 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's decisions to (1) strike "newspaper, magazine or other periodical" from West Virginia's "electioneering communication" definition; (2) upheld the "electioneering communication" definition's exemption for grassroots lobbying; (3) declined to consider the merits of the CFIF's challenge to the bona fide news account exemption because the organization lacked standing; and (4) prohibited prosecutions for violations that occurred while the earlier injunctions were in effect. However, the court reversed the district court's decision with respect to (1) its conclusion that subsection (C) of the "expressly advocating" definition was unconstitutional; (2) its choice to uphold the "electioneering communication" definition's section 501(c)(3) exemption; and (3) its application of an "earmarked funds" limiting construction to the reporting requirement for electioneering communications. Because WVFL did not file a notice of appeal in this case, the court could not consider its challenge to the district court's finding that the statutory scheme's twenty-four- and forty-eight-hour reporting requirements were constitutional. Consequently, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Center for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, et al." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Chancellor correctly interpreted 15 Del. C. Sec. 3306, which allows political parties to replace candidates who become incapacitated. The Court held that under the statute, the term "incapacity" includes situations where a candidate would be practically incapable of fulfilling the duties of office in a minimally adequate way. In determining whether the standard was met, the Chancellor could consider events that occurred after the candidate withdrew. In this case, the Court concluded the withdrawing candidate was incapacitated and therefore affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment. View "Sussex County Dept. of Elections, et al. v. Sussex County Republican Committee, et al." on Justia Law

PG sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of 25 Pa. Stat. 3060(d), a portion of the Pennsylvania Election Code mandating that all persons, except election officers, clerks, machine inspectors, overseers, watchers, persons in the course of voting, persons lawfully giving assistance to voters, and peace and police officers, when permitted by the provisions of this act, must remain at least ten (10) feet distant from the polling place during the progress of the voting. PG claimed that the statute infringed on its First Amendment “right to access and gather news at polling places” and that selective enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. There is no protected First Amendment right of access to a polling place for news-gathering purposes and there was no evidence of “invidious intent” or intentional discrimination. View "PG Publ'g Co. v. Aichele" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in these consolidated cases concerned the actions of the title setting board (Title Board) in setting the titles and ballot titles and submission clauses (or titles) in two groups of initiatives. In case 12SA117, Petitioner Philip Hayes challenged the Title Board's title setting for Initiatives 2011-2012, Numbers 67, 68 and 69. Respondents David Ottke and John Slota were the designated representatives for those proposed initiatives. If adopted, the initiatives would alter how the General Assembly amended or repealed citizen-initiated statutes. In Case 12SA130, Petitioners Barbara Walker and Don Childears challenged the Title Board's title setting for Initiative 201-2012 Number 94 and 95. Respondents Earl Staelin and Robert Bows were the designated representatives. If adopted, Initiative 94 would have amended the Colorado constitution to allow political subdivisions to establish and operate banks; Initiative 95 would have allowed the State to open and operate its own bank. The common threshold question before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the Title Board had authority to act on motions for rehearing to address challenges to the titles previously set, where fewer than both of the designated representatives of the initiative's proponents appeared at the rehearing. Finding no statutory authority that conferred such authority to the Title Board, the Supreme Court reversed the actions of the Title Board and returned the measures to the Title Board for further proceedings. View "Hayes v. Ottke" on Justia Law

Minor political parties sought ballot access (Green Party of Tennessee and Constitution Party of Tennessee) and sued, alleging that requirements to qualify for the Tennessee ballot as a “recognized minor party” were overly restrictive and impermissibly burdened First Amendment rights and were unconstitutionally vague and constituted improper delegation of legislative authority; that provisions governing the order in which political parties are listed on the general-election ballot violate the Equal Protection Clause; and that prohibition on the use of the words “independent” and “nonpartisan” in minor-party names contravenes the First Amendment. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on all claims, enjoined enforcement, ordered that the plaintiffs be placed on the November 2012 ballot, and directed the state to conduct random drawing to determine the order in which each party would appear on the ballot. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay with respect to the random-public-drawing. In the meantime, the Tennessee General Assembly amended some, but not all, of the invalidated provisions, relaxing the requirements. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the district court erred on some claims, that some claims were moot, and that the trial court should initially determine the validity of the amendments. View "Green Party of TN v. Hargett" on Justia Law

This was an original action challenging the decennial apportionment of districts in the General Assembly. At issue was whether the 2011 apportionment plan adopted by the apportionment board (Respondents) complied with Ohio Const. art. XI, 7 and 11. The Supreme Court denied Relators' request for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that Relators failed to adduce sufficient, credible proof to rebut the presumed constitutionality accorded the 2011 apportionment plan by establishing that the plan was unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, Relators were not entitled to a declaration that the 2011 apportionment plan was unconstitutional or a prohibitory injunction to prevent elections from being conducted in accordance with that plan. View "Wilson v. Kasich" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory ruling that Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(1) violated their constitutional rights to free speech by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on behalf of or opposing candidates for public office. Plaintiffs argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC barred Montana from prohibiting independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech, and that Montana's century-old ban on independent corporate expenditures therefore was invalid. The district court granted ATP's motion for summary judgment on the merits of its constitutional claim, declared section 13-35-227(1) unconstitutional, and denied ATP's request for attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding (1) the statute was constitutional; and (2) Plaintiffs' cross-appeal on the attorneys' fee issue, therefore, was moot. The Court's decision thereafter was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Montana Supreme Court then returned to ATP's cross-appeal on the issue of attorneys' fees and affirmed the district court's order declining to award attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs, holding that equitable considerations did not require the district court to award fees against the State under either the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act or the private attorney general doctrine. View "W. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law