Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Molly Teichman, as a citizen and qualified voter, filed a petition for permanent writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent the secretary of state from holding an election based on either the original or revised Senate plan and map submitted by the nonpartisan senate reapportionment commission. The Supreme Court sustained the petition and directed that a writ of prohibition issue to the secretary of state, holding (1) the commission had no authority to revise the reapportionment process on its own volition even if a majority of the members of the commission recognized a constitutional infirmity in the plan and map that had been unanimously signed and filed; (2) the original plan and map violated a clear and express constitutional limitation regarding the splitting of counties and was, therefore, invalid; and (3) Mo. Const. art. III, 7 compelled the legislative process to be redone in accordance with its terms. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Teichman v. Carnahan" on Justia Law

Six state citizens and qualified voters residing in various areas of the state brought an action against the attorney general and secretary of state. A second group of citizens and qualified voters filed an action against the secretary of state, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Both sets of plaintiffs alleged that a redistricting map and configuration of certain districts were not valid under Mo. Const. art. III, 45. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The circuit court granted both motions and dismissed both cases. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments, holding that the pleadings raised issues of fact concerning whether various districts were "composed of contiguous terrority as compact...as may be" under Mo. Const. art. III, 45, and therefore, the motions to dismiss could not be sustained because the facts alleged met the elements of a recognized cause of action. Remanded. View "Pearson v. Koster" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jann Carson, David Fidanque, Roey Thorpe and Cynthia Pappas sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot initiative petition 22 (2012), arguing that the title did not satisfy the requirements of state law. "Initiative Petition 22" would amend the Oregon Constitution to create a new provision to "recognize personal 'right to life' (undefined) that begins at fertilization [and] prohibits all abortions [and] certain contraceptives." Petitioners contended that the ballot title was deficient in a number of respects pertaining to the caption, the "yes" and "no" vote result statements and the summary. The Supreme Court found that reference to the "full legal rights of a person" in the "no" vote result statement was too vague to substantially comply with state law. Furthermore, "the use of the phrase in the summary pose[d] the same problems and for that reason, the summary must be referred to the Attorney General to more accurately describe the current state of the law." The Court found that there appeared to be no dispute that adoption of the measure would have the effect of prohibiting certain fertility treatments. The Court therefore referred the ballot measure back to the Attorney General for further modification. View "Carson v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston, Texas. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court held that no equitable relief was appropriate either because the relief was moot or because the court determined when examining the claims for damages that no constitutional violation occurred that would support such relief. The court also held that plaintiff lacked an interest protected by procedural due process and affirmed the district court's dismissal of that cause; plaintiff's interpretation of Anderson v. Celebrezze was not applicable; plaintiff's claims were rooted in procedural due process and his substantive due process claim failed; the dismissal of the equal protection claim was reversed and remanded where further proceedings were needed to determine whether plaintiff in fact submitted a proper application and, if he did, whether the Harris County Democratic Party Chairman purposefully discriminated or simply made an error or mistake of judgment; and the challenged election statute was constitutional. View "Wilson v. Birnberg, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Waters filed a petition to be a candidate for the Warren County Republican Party Central Committee for the 15th Precinct of Lebanon at the March 6, 2012 Republican primary election. Respondent Warren County Board of Elections voted to not certify Waters's candidacy. Waters then filed an expedited-election action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board and its members to certify his candidacy. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Waters was barred from candidacy in the March 6, 2012 Republican primary election because he voted in a primary election as a member of a different political party within the preceding two calendar years. View "State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth" on Justia Law

In 2010, Oklahoma voters approved a state constitutional amendment that would prevent state courts from considering or using Sharia law. Members of the state election board asked the Tenth Circuit to review whether a federal district court abused its discretion when it granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the Board from certifying the result. Plaintiff Muneer Awad sued the Election Board to prevent the certification of ballot title "SQ 755" from the November 2, 2010 election. Plaintiff is an American citizen residing in Oklahoma, and is the executive director of the Oklahoma Chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations. Plaintiff alleged that SQ 755 violated his rights under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. He objected to the amendment's singling out his religion for negative treatment. The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 9, 2010. On November 22, 2010, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing and granted a preliminary injunction one week later. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Board argued that Plaintiff's claims were not justiciable, and even if Plaintiff's Establishment or Free Exercise claims were justiciable, each failed to meet preliminary injunction requirements. Upon careful consideration of the district court record and the constitutional questions posed by the parties' briefs, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff's claims were justiciable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction based on those claims. View "Awad v. Ziriax, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Western Tradition Partnership (WTP), Champion Painting, and Montana Shooting Sports Foundation (MSSF), sued the Montana Attorney General and the Commissioner of Political Practices, seeking a declaration that Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(1) violated their freedom of speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on behalf of or opposing candidates for public office. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional, granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, enjoined enforcement of the statute, and denied the motion of Champion and MSSF for an award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants after applying the principles enunciated in Citizens United v. F.E.C., holding that Montana has a compelling interest to impose the challenged rationally-tailored statutory restrictions. View "Western Tradition P'ship v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Iowa Right to Life Committee (IRTL) filed a complaint in the U.S. district court, alleging, inter alia, that Iowa's campaign finance laws unconstitutionally imposed political committee status on corporations whose major purpose was something other than nominating or electing candidates. The district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court. At issue before the Court was whether a corporation must form a political committee under Iowa law if it wants to spend more than $750 advocating the election or defeat of Iowa candidates. The Court answered that a corporation like IRTL may engage in express advocacy without forming a political committee because a corporation making independent expenditures aggregating over $750 in a calendar year becomes an "independent expenditure committee" within the meaning of Iowa Code 68A.404 but not a "political committee" within the meaning of Iowa Code 68A.102(18) or a "permanent organization" within the meaning of Iowa Code 68A.402(9). View "Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a continuing political committee, alleged that three provisions of Washington election law violated the First Amendment as applied to ballot measure committees. The court held that Washington's disclosure requirements, Washington Revised Code, 42.17.090, and Washington Administrative Code 390-16-034, which required these committees to disclose the name and address of contributors giving more than $25, and additionally to disclose the employer and occupation of contributors giving more than $100, survived exacting scrutiny because they were substantially related to the important governmental interest in informing the electorate. The court held that Washington Revised Code 42.17.105(8), which prohibited a political committee from accepting from any one person contributions exceeding $5,000 within 21 days of a general election, was not closely drawn to achieve the state's important interest in informing the electorate. Therefore, section 42.17.105(8) was therefore unconstitutional as applied to ballot measure committees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Family Pac v. McKenna, et al." on Justia Law

The ordinance prohibits posting signs on utility poles, streetlights, sign posts, and trees in a public right-of-way. At the time their actions were brought, plaintiffs were both candidates for political office in an area of the city that contains "a classic urban landscape of row house neighborhoods, where most homes have no front yard." They claimed that, given their limited funds, they would have ordinarily relied heavily on signs posted on street poles to spread their political messages. Several political candidates received numerous tickets. The district court ruled in favor of the city. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the ordinance violated the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs conceded that the ordinance is content-neutral. It is narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests and leaves open ample alternatives for communication. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law