Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A woman who immigrated from Vietnam to the United States and became active in the Vietnamese community in Sioux City, Iowa, organized a campaign in 2020 to assist Vietnamese Americans—many of whom had limited English proficiency and were unfamiliar with the U.S. election system—in registering to vote and casting absentee ballots. Her efforts were not solely for civic engagement; she hoped these voters would support her husband, who was a candidate in the election. She facilitated the process by providing forms, translating, and returning completed documents to the county auditor. However, she also engaged in fraudulent conduct by instructing family members to complete and submit voting documents for absent adult children, and in some cases, she filled out and signed the forms herself. In total, she submitted 26 documents with forged signatures. The county auditor became suspicious and contacted the FBI, leading to her arrest and indictment on 52 counts of voter fraud under two federal statutes.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa presided over her trial. The court used model jury instructions that did not require the jury to find that she knew her conduct was illegal or that the children did not consent to her actions, despite her request for such an instruction. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and her motion for judgment of acquittal was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the jury instructions accurately reflected the law and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court held that the instructions properly conveyed the required mental states—knowledge and willfulness—and did not need to require knowledge of the specific law violated. The court also found the evidence sufficient for conviction, including for counts involving equivocal testimony, based on the defendant’s pattern of conduct. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Several individuals were nominated by the Nevada Republican Party to serve as potential electors for the 2020 presidential election. After the Democratic candidates won the Nevada popular vote, these individuals challenged the results in state court, seeking to be declared the legitimate electors. Their challenge was denied by the district court, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Despite this, the individuals held a ceremony in Carson City, signed documents purporting to cast Nevada’s electoral votes for the Republican candidates, and mailed these documents to various officials, including the Chief Judge of the United States District Court in Las Vegas, Nevada.Based on these actions, the State charged the individuals with crimes under NRS 205.110 (uttering or offering forged instruments) and NRS 239.330 (offering a false or forged instrument to be filed in a public office). The indictment was filed in Clark County, where the federal courthouse is located. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the alleged offenses were complete upon mailing the documents from Douglas County, and thus venue was improper in Clark County. The Eighth Judicial District Court agreed, finding that the crimes were completed upon mailing and dismissed the indictment for improper venue.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the offenses charged were not complete upon mailing, but rather required the delivery and receipt of the documents at the intended location in Clark County. The court concluded that venue was proper in Clark County because the alleged crimes involved the delivery of false documents to a recipient in that county. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. DeGraffenreid" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Douglass Mackey, was convicted of conspiring to injure citizens in the exercise of their right to vote in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. The conviction was based on three memes he posted or reposted on Twitter shortly before the 2016 presidential election, which falsely suggested that supporters of then-candidate Hillary Clinton could vote by text message.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Donnelly, J.) oversaw the trial, where a jury found Mackey guilty. Mackey appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly agreed to join the charged conspiracy. The government presented evidence of Mackey's participation in several private Twitter message groups where members discussed strategies to influence the election, including the creation and distribution of misleading memes. However, Mackey was not a member of these groups during the critical period when the conspiracy was allegedly formed and discussed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence that Mackey knowingly agreed to join the conspiracy. The court noted that while Mackey posted the misleading memes, there was no direct evidence that he viewed or participated in the relevant discussions within the private message groups. The court emphasized that mere association with individuals involved in an unlawful undertaking is not enough to prove knowing involvement in a conspiracy.The Second Circuit concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support Mackey's conviction and reversed the judgment of the district court. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for Mackey. View "United States v. Mackey" on Justia Law

In 2018, Robbie Gail Charette, a Republican candidate for Judge of the County Court-at-Law in Washington County, Texas, was indicted on four misdemeanor charges related to campaign law violations. These charges included misrepresenting the source of a campaign communication, falsely claiming to hold a public office, failing to file a personal financial statement on time, and not maintaining proper records of political expenditures. A special prosecutor pursued these charges without a prior referral from the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC).The trial court denied Charette's pretrial habeas application, which argued that the prosecution was unauthorized without prior TEC proceedings. The court found no legislative language granting the TEC exclusive authority to enforce the violations and ruled that district attorneys could independently investigate and prosecute election-related crimes. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld this decision, stating that the district court had jurisdiction over the misdemeanors and that any alleged deprivation of civil due process rights by the TEC did not affect this jurisdiction.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the TEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses listed in Chapter 571 of the Texas Government Code. The court held that the TEC must make an initial determination on alleged violations before any criminal charges can be brought. Since no TEC proceedings occurred in Charette's case, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the dismissal of the indictments against Charette. View "EX PARTE CHARETTE" on Justia Law

The case involves a review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 54 (2024) (IP 54), which was challenged by the petitioners, Sandy Chung and Yvonne Garcia. IP 54, also known as the "Oregon Crimefighting Act," proposes significant changes to the pretrial release system for individuals charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors in Oregon. The Act also empowers local governments to pass ordinances to fight local crime and requires the state to pay for jail space for those charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors who need to be held until trial.The Attorney General prepared a draft ballot title for IP 54 and, after considering public comments, modified the draft and certified the final ballot title. The petitioners, who had submitted comments on the draft, challenged the certified ballot title, arguing that the summary did not comply with the requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2)(d).The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with the requirements. The court agreed with the petitioners that the summary was deficient. It found that the summary did not adequately convey the breadth of the changes that IP 54 would effectuate, particularly in relation to pretrial release decisions at arraignment. The court concluded that the summary must be modified to clarify that IP 54 would override existing law and to provide a more accurate description of the changes that IP 54 would make to the current law governing pretrial release at arraignment. The court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Chung v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

In 2016, Jesse Benton, a political operative, received funds from Roman Vasilenko, a foreign national, and contributed those funds to a fundraiser supporting then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump. Benton was subsequently convicted of six felonies related to the unlawful contribution and related campaign finance filings. Benton appealed his conviction on several grounds, including challenges to the government’s decision to prosecute campaign finance crimes under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the admissibility of an earlier pardoned conviction, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury charge.The District Court denied Benton's motion to dismiss the charges, ruling that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could be applied to false campaign finance filings. The court also allowed the admission of Benton's earlier pardoned conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its use at sentencing. After a three-day jury trial, Benton was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration and twenty-four months' supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the government had discretion to prosecute under either the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The court also found no error in the district court's admission of Benton's pardoned conviction under Rule 404(b) and declined to review Benton's challenge to the use of the pardoned conviction at sentencing. Finally, the court rejected Benton's challenges to the jury instructions, finding that any error was invited by Benton himself. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered an appeal by Mark Meadows, former White House chief of staff under President Donald Trump, who sought to move his state criminal prosecution to federal court. The state of Georgia had indicted Meadows for crimes related to alleged interference in the 2020 presidential election. Meadows argued that because these actions were taken in his official capacity, they should be heard in federal court according to the federal-officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). The district court denied this request because Meadows' charged conduct was not performed under the color of his federal office. The court of appeals affirmed this decision. It ruled that the federal-officer removal statute does not apply to former federal officers and even if it did, the alleged actions leading to this criminal action were not related to Meadows’ official duties. The court concluded that the former chief of staff’s role does not include influencing state officials with allegations of election fraud or altering valid election results in favor of a particular candidate, regardless of the chief of staff's role with respect to state election administration. Therefore, Meadows was not entitled to invoke the federal-officer removal statute. View "The State of Georgia v. Meadows" on Justia Law

In a case involving former U.S. President Donald J. Trump, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has partially upheld and partially vacated a lower court's order restricting Trump's public statements about the trial. The case stems from Trump being indicted for conspiring to overturn the 2020 presidential election through unlawful means and for obstructing the election’s certification. Trump had posted numerous statements on social media attacking potential witnesses in the case, the judge, and the prosecution team. The lower court issued an order restraining the parties and their counsel from making public statements that "target" the parties, counsel and their staffs, court personnel, and "any reasonably foreseeable witness or the substance of their testimony." On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the order insofar as it prohibited all parties and their counsel from making public statements about known or reasonably foreseeable witnesses concerning their potential participation in the investigation or in the criminal proceeding. The court also upheld the order to the extent it prohibited parties and their counsel from making public statements about counsel in the case other than the Special Counsel, members of the court’s staff and counsel’s staffs, or the family members of any counsel or staff member, if those statements were made with the intent to materially interfere with the trial or with the knowledge that such interference was highly likely to result. However, the court vacated the order to the extent it covered speech beyond these categories. The court found that the order was justified by a sufficiently serious risk of prejudice to an ongoing judicial proceeding, that no less restrictive alternatives would adequately address that risk, and that the order was narrowly tailored to ensure the fair administration of justice while also respecting Trump's First Amendment rights. View "USA v. Donald Trump" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's summary judgment to the three named state official defendants in this complaint seeking a temporary injunction related to the August 6, 2020 election, holding that Plaintiff was required to comply with both Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-143(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. 40-29-202 before he could be re-enfranchised.Plaintiff, a Tennessee resident since 2018, was convicted in 1986 of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia. In 2020, the governor of Virginia granted Plaintiff clemency, thus reinstating his right to vote in Virginia. Later that year, Plaintiff attempted to register to vote in Grainger County, Tennessee but was denied. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise persons convicted of infamous crimes out of state when the governor or the appropriate authority of such other state restores that person's rights of citizenship. The chancery court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, to regain the right of suffrage in Tennessee, Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals must comply with both Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-143(3) and the additional requirements set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. 40-29-202. View "Falls v. Goins" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment against him following a jury trial where he was convicted of one count of conspiring to illegally donate  monies to a political campaign and one count of aiding and abetting over $25,000 of such donations. Defendant argued that the district court erred in giving the standard jury instruction on willfulness: that “a person acts ‘willfully’ when he acts with a ‘bad purpose’ to disobey or disregard the law. Further, Defendant challenged the district court’s refusal to 1) instruct the jury that for count one, a co-conspirator must knowingly and willfully join the conspiracy with the “intent of achieving [the alleged conspiracy’s] unlawful objectives, namely violation of the federal election laws;” and 2) to provide e a good faith defense charge.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant was aware of the specific provision of the law that he is charged with violating.” Further, the district court charged the jury that the government needed to prove  Defendant acted willfully, knowingly, and voluntarily. As the district court aptly noted, “to have found that Defendants acted willfully, the jury had to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that they intentionally did something that the law forbids, the opposite of good faith.” Where, as here, the district court correctly instructed the jury as to knowledge and willfulness and the defendant’s theory was thus “effectively presented elsewhere in the charge,” its refusal to provide a separate “good faith defense” instruction is not reversible error. View "United States v. Kukushkin" on Justia Law