Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Based on activity related to former Kentucky Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes’ campaign for the U.S. Senate seat held by Mitch McConnell in 2014, Emmons and Lundergan (Grimes’s father) were convicted for knowingly and willfully making unlawful corporate contributions aggregating $25,000 or more, Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), 30118, and 18 U.S.C. 2; conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371; willfully causing the submission of materially false statements, 18 U.S.C 1001(a)(2) and 2; and the falsification of records or documents, 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the ban on corporate contributions as applied to intrafamilial contributions from a closely-held, family-run corporation. Such contributions present a risk of quid pro quo corruption. The district court adequately distinguished between independent expenditures and contributions in the jury instructions. The district court properly admitted evidence of Lundergan’s uncharged acts in connection with Grimes’ campaigns for Kentucky Secretary of State as res gestae evidence and under 404(b). The government presented sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that Emmons had the requisite intent to cause unlawful corporate contributions and the Grimes campaign to submit false campaign-finance reports. View "United States v. Emmons" on Justia Law

Attorney Smukler ran political campaigns for 30 years and developed expertise with Federal Election Commission law. In 2012, U.S. Representative Brady ran for reelection in Pennsylvania’s First Congressional District in Philadelphia. Brady's challenger, Moore, struggled to raise money and personally loaned his campaign about $150,000. Brady agreed to give Moore $90,000 to drop out of the race. To steer the money to Moore, Smukler devised a plan that involved a bogus corporation, “dummy invoices,” and funneling cash through a political consulting firm. In the 2014 Democratic Primary for the Thirteenth Congressional District of Pennsylvania, Smukler dipped into the general election reserve on behalf of former U.S. Representative Margolies, then used friends and family as strawmen to evade federal election laws.Smukler was convicted on nine counts of election law violations. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, plus fines and assessments. The Third Circuit vacated the convictions on two counts but otherwise affirmed. The court upheld the jury instructions defining the term “willfully,” except with respect to counts that charged Smukler with violating 18 U.S.C. 2 and 1001(a)(1) by causing the false statements of others within the Brady and Margolies campaigns. A proper charge for willfulness in cases brought under those sections in the federal election law context requires the prosecution to prove that defendant knew of the statutory obligations, that he attempted to frustrate those obligations, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. View "United States v. Smukler" on Justia Law

Mohamed Awad appealed a district court order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to a charge of knowingly voting when not qualified to do so. On appeal, Awad argued the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not adequately advised under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b) of the possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty, and because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court order. View "North Dakota v. Awad" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal addressed an issue of first impression involving declarations containing false information collected by defendant Dolores Lucero, to be used in court to support of her request for injunctive relief to halt a petition drive to recall her from her position as a city council member for the City of Shasta Lake (Shasta Lake). Defendant submitted the declarations to law enforcement, and an investigation against a person involved in the recall effort was initiated as a result. Defendant duped several people who had signed the recall petition into signing these declarations. A jury convicted defendant of violating Penal Code section 134. She was thereafter placed on probation for three years with various terms and conditions including that she serve 30 days in jail. Two years into her probation, defendant petitioned for early termination of probation and the court granted it. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) section 134 was inapplicable to the circumstances of this case and that Penal Code section 118 (perjury) was a more specific statute that covered her conduct; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; (3) the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error related to the instructions on the charged offense; (4) the testimony of one of the declarants, Charles Lukens, was coerced and that the trial court erred in excluding evidence offered to show that Lukens had a motive to conform his testimony to the prosecution’s theory of the case; and (5) certain probation conditions must be struck because they are unreasonable. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "California v. Lucero" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, petitioners sought review of the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 43 (2018), contending that various aspects did not comply with requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). IP 43 proposed a statutory enactment that, with exceptions including a limited registration scheme, would prohibit the unlawful possession or transfer of an “assault weapon” or a “large capacity magazine,” as those terms are defined in the proposed measure. After defining the weapons and magazines within its scope, IP 43 created a new crime, “unlawful possession or transfer of an assault weapon or large capacity magazine,” for any person who “manufactures, imports, possesses, purchases, sells or transfers any assault weapon or large capacity magazine,” with exceptions. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court referred the ballot title for IP 43 back to the Attorney General for modification of the caption, the “yes” and “no” result statements, and the summary. View "Beyer v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Valenti is a convicted felon and registered sex offender, with a 1993 California conviction for a “Lewd or Lascivious Act with [a] Child Under 14 Years.” Valenti claimed that Indiana violated his right to vote by refusing to let him enter a polling site located at a school (Ind. Code 35-42-4-14(b)). His neighborhood polling place is a school gymnasium. The state allows serious sex offenders to vote by absentee ballot, Ind. Code 3‐11‐10‐24(a)(12), at a county courthouse, or at a civic center. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the state defendants, noting that Valenti does not even have a constitutional right to vote: Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives states the “affirmative sanction” to exclude felons from the franchise. His right to vote is only statutory and the Indiana statute survives rational basis review. “Indiana’s position is an iron‐clad fortress in light of the rational basis test.” View "Valenti v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Edward Pinkney was charged with five felony counts of election forgery, and six misdemeanor counts of making a false statement in a certificate-of-recall petition, all for having submitted petitions with falsified dates in connection in an effort to recall the mayor of Benton Harbor, Michigan. After defendant was bound over to court for trial, he moved to quash the charges, arguing that MCL 168.937 was a penalty provision and not a substantive, chargeable offense. The court denied the motion. Defendant was convicted by jury on all five counts of election forgery but acquitted of all six counts of making a false statement in a certificate-of-recall petition. Defendant was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent prison terms of 30 to 120 months. The Court of Appeals upheld defendant’s convictions, holding that MCL 168.937 created the substantive offense of election-law forgery. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that MCL 168.937, by its plain language, was only a penalty provision; it did not set forth a substantive offense. As a result, defendant was not properly charged under that provision with the substantive offense of election-law forgery. Therefore, his convictions had to be vacated and the charges dismissed. View "Michigan v. Pinkney" on Justia Law

Two sets of petitioners challenged the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 28 (IP 28). IP 28, if adopted, would add an exception to the constitutional protections recognized in Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P2d 770 (1997). Petitioners challenged the caption, the “yes” and “no” result statements, and the summary. Finding revisions warranted for all elements to the ballot title, the Oregon Supreme Court referred the matter back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Markley/Lutz v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Curtis Francis and another man, Michael Dax, were collecting signatures near the Jamestown Civic Center, a designated polling place, on voting day. They were doing so in an effort to get an initiated measure regarding environmental concerns placed on the next ballot. While they were collecting signatures, it began to rain. They moved under a canopy covering an entrance to the polling place. They continued collecting signatures as individuals walked past them to vote. One voter told an election clerk about Francis and Dax's activities. The clerk informed the county auditor. The auditor, along with a plain-clothed security officer, went to speak with Francis and Dax. They informed the two it was illegal to collect signatures within 100 feet of a polling place. Dax began arguing with the auditor; Francis continued collecting signatures. A police officer was dispatched. The officer confiscated the signatures, but did not arrest Francis or Dax. After the incident, the officer forwarded a report to the county prosecutor. The prosecutor filed charges against Francis for collecting signatures within 100 feet of an open polling place. Francis appealed after conditionally pleading guilty to gathering signatures within 100 feet of a polling place. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the electioneering law he was charged under did not violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and was a reasonable restriction on the North Dakota Constitution's initiated ballot measure provision. The Court also concluded Francis has failed to show he was selectively prosecuted. View "North Dakota v. Francis" on Justia Law

Kelli Jo Griffin was convicted for the crime of delivery of a controlled substance. Griffin later registered to vote and cast a provision ballot in a municipal election. The county auditor concluded that Griffin was not eligible to vote due to her felony conviction and rejected her ballot. Griffin filed a petition asking the district court to declare that her felony conviction did not disqualify her from voting under the Iowa Constitution. The district court denied relief. At issue on appeal was whether the felony crime of delivery of a controlled substance is an “infamous crime” under the voter disqualification provision of the Iowa Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Constitution permits persons convicted of a felony to be disqualified from voting in Iowa until pardoned or otherwise restored to the rights of citizenship. View "Griffin v. Pate" on Justia Law