Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Before the 2008 presidential election, federal agents were investigating then-Governor Blagojevich and obtained warrants authorizing the interception of his phone calls. When Barack Obama, then a Senator from Illinois, won the election, Blagojevich was to appoint his replacement. Interceptions revealed that Blagojevich viewed the opportunity to appoint a new Senator as a bonanza. After two trials, Blagojevich was convicted of 18 crimes, including attempted extortion from campaign contributors, corrupt solicitation of funds, wire fraud, and lying to federal investigators. The district court sentenced Blagojevich to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated convictions on five counts, concerning Blagojevich’s proposal to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate in exchange for an appointment to the Cabinet, and remanded. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but concluded the instructions permitted the jury to convict even if it found that his only request of Obama was for a Cabinet position. A proposal to trade one public act for another, logrolling, is unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment. The instructions do not ensure that the jury found that Blagojevich offered to trade the appointment for a private salary. Because the court affirmed on most counts and concluded that the sentencing range lies above 168 months, Blagojevich is not entitled to release pending further proceedings. View "United States v. Blagojevich" on Justia Law

During the 2000 presidential election, Dewald established and operated political action committees (PACs): “Friends for a Democratic White House” and “Swing States for a GOP White House.” He sent fundraising letters to political donors found on Federal Election Commission donor lists. The PACs collected about $750,000 in contributions, but Dewald remitted less than 20 percent of that amount to the political parties or to outside PACs. He funneled most the money to his for-profit corporation, which provided “consulting and administrative services” to the PACs. Dewald was convicted, under Michigan law, for obtaining money under false pretenses, common-law fraud, and larceny by conversion and ultimately sentenced to between 23 and 120 months. Rejecting Dewald’s preemption claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 USC 453 has a narrow preemptive effect. Dewald unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief. Dewald later obtained federal habeas corpus relief 28 U.S.C. 2254, on grounds that FECA preempted state law and that the Michigan court’s determination was objectively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit reversed. There is no clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, holding that FECA precludes a state from prosecuting fraud in the context of a federal election. Even if federal preemption provides “clearly established federal law” in general, the state decision did not unreasonably apply those general principles to this case. View "Dewald v. Wriggelsworth" on Justia Law

Beavers was a Chicago alderman from 1983-2006, when he began serving as a Cook County Commissioner. He was the chairman of each of his three campaign committees and the only authorized signor for each committee’s bank account. Beavers’ federal tax returns underreported his 2005 income, misstated expenditures in semi-annual disclosure reports (D-2s), did not disclose use of campaign funds to increase his pension annuity, misrepresented loans between the committees and Beavers, did not report monthly stipends that Beavers took as a Commissioner, and did not disclose that Beavers wrote himself checks totaling $226,300 from committee accounts to finance gambling trips, without documenting the purpose of the expenditures or any repayment. After federal agents approached Beavers in connection with a grand jury investigation, Beavers filed amended tax returns and attempted to repay the committees. Beavers was convicted of three counts of violating 26 U.S.C. 7206(1), which prohibits willfully making a material false statement on a tax return, and with one count of violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which prohibits corruptly obstructing the IRS in its administration of the tax laws. Beavers was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and was ordered to pay about $31,000 in restitution and a $10,000 fine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Beavers" on Justia Law

Eight defendants who held positions with Clay County, Kentucky, were charged with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), based on participation in a vote-buying scheme in three election cycles, 2002 to 2007. Candidates pooled money to pay “vote haulers” to deliver voters for a particular slate of candidates. To ensure that they voted for the correct slate, co-conspiring election officers and poll workers reviewed the ballots. When the proper slate was confirmed, the voter got a token or marking and was paid in a location away from the polls. Conspirators retained lists to avoid double payments and to keep track of whose votes could be bought in future elections and used absentee voting and voter-assistance forms to implement the scheme. When electronic voting machines were introduced, conspiring poll workers misinformed voters that they did not need to click “cast ballot” after selecting candidates; poll workers would enter the voting booth after the voter exited and change the electronic ballot to reflect the slate before casting the ballot. The Clay County Board of Elections was alleged to be the racketeering enterprise in the conspiracy. They were convicted after a seven week trial. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on cumulative errors in evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

The Committee filed suit seeking a declaration that certain portions of a Montana statute making it a criminal offense for any political party to "endorse, contribute to, or make an expenditure to support or oppose a judicial candidate" in a nonpartisan judicial election, Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-231, were unconstitutional and requesting an injunction against its enforcement. The court concluded that, to the extent appellants challenged the permanent injunction against enforcement of section 13-35-231's ban on endorsements and expenditures, the court was bound to follow its published decision finding those provisions unconstitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's entry of a permanent injunction as it pertains to those portions of the statute. However, the district court mistakenly entered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of section 13-35-231 in its entirety. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to revise the permanent injunction so that it enjoined only the statute's ban on endorsements and expenditures, and not the statute's ban on contributions. View "Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Fox, et al." on Justia Law

Tiffany Alston, a former member of the Maryland House of Delegates, was removed as a delegate after she was convicted and sentenced for misconduct in office. Before Alston fulfilled the conditions of her sentence, the assistant attorney general declared her removed from her House seat by operation of law. Gregory Hall was nominated to fill Alston's seat. While Hall's nomination was before the Governor, the Governor requested that the Democratic Central Committee of Prince George's County (Central Committee) withdraw the nomination. Hall filed a complaint seeking to prevent the withdrawal of his nomination. Alston filed, as an intervener and third-party plaintiff in the same case, a separate complaint seeking a declaration that she had been merely suspended, rather than removed, from her House seat because her conviction and sentence had been converted into probation before judgment. The circuit court ruled (1) Alston had been removed by operation of law on the date she was sentenced for her misconduct in office conviction; and (2) the Central Committee had the power to rescind Hall's nomination at any time before the Governor made the appointment. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the circuit court's judgment. View "Hall v. Prince George's County Democratic Cent. Comm." on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint seeking an injunction to require Arkansas Secretary of State Mark Martin to place Appellant's name as a candidate for President of the United States on the 2012 Democratic primary ballot and to register all convicted felons to vote in that primary election. The circuit court granted Martin's motion to dismiss the complaint. Appellant appealed and filed a motion seeking permission to file a supplemental brief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot and declared the motion moot, holding (1) because the election for which Appellant wanted his name placed on the ballot had already occurred, and the time for registering to vote in that election had passed, the appealed question was moot; and (2) neither exception to the mootness doctrine applied here. View "Judd v. Martin" on Justia Law

Under the “Hyde Amendment,” a district court in criminal cases may award to a prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation expenses, if the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds special circumstances, 18 U.S.C. 3006A. The district court denied such an award in a case involving four counts of conspiring and attempting to commit extortion, 18 U.S.C. 951(a) & 2 (Hobbs Act), and two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to promote and facilitate bribery, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3) & 2 (Travel Act). The government alleged that Manzo, a candidate for mayor of Jersey City, sought cash payments from Dwek, an informant posing as a developer, and that, in exchange, Manzo indicated he would help Dwek with matters involving Jersey City government. The district court dismissed each Hobbs Act count because Manzo was not a public official at the time of the conduct. The Third Circuit affirmed. The court later held that receipt of something of value by an unsuccessful candidate in exchange for a promise of future official conduct does not constitute bribery under the New Jersey bribery statute and dismissed all remaining charges. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of fees. View "United States v. Manzo" on Justia Law

Governor Strickland appointed Terry to fill a vacancy on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Terry sought reelection to retain the seat and enlisted the help of County Auditor Russo, a presence in Cleveland politics. The FBI was investigating Russo and had tapped his phones. Russo had a phone conversation with an attorney about foreclosure cases on Terry’s docket and promised to make sure Terry did what he was “supposed to do.” Later, by phone, Russo told Terry to deny motions for summary judgment. Terry said he would and did so. Russo ultimately pled guilty to 21political corruption counts and received a 262-month prison sentence. Terry was convicted of conspiring with Russo to commit mail fraud and honest services fraud; and honest services fraud by accepting things of value from Russo and others in exchange for favorable official action, 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2).. The district court sentenced him to 63 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, quoting once-Speaker of the California General Assembly, Jesse Unruh, “If you can’t eat [lobbyists’] food, drink their booze, . . . take their money and then vote against them, you’ve got no business being [in politics],” View "United States v. Terry" on Justia Law

Lessadolla Sowers was convicted in the Tunica County Circuit Court of ten counts of voter fraud as a habitual offender. Mississippi Bureau of Investigations officers determined that a significant number of absentee ballots had been mailed to a post office box held in Sowers's name. She was sentenced to five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections for each count, with each sentence ordered to run concurrently with the others. Sowers appealed, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to sustain the jury's verdicts of guilt on the ten counts of voter fraud and her habitual-offender status. Finding otherwise, the Supreme Court affirmed Sowers's convictions and sentence. View "Sowers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law