Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Governor of Minnesota issued a writ of special election on December 27, 2024, to fill a vacancy in the office of State Representative for District 40B in Ramsey County. The writ scheduled the special election for January 28, 2025. The Minnesota Voters Alliance, two voters from House District 40B, and the Republican Party of Minnesota challenged the writ, arguing it was issued prematurely.The Ramsey County District Court had previously ruled on December 20, 2024, in an election contest brought by Paul Wikstrom against Curtis Johnson, the elected representative for House District 40B. The court found that Johnson did not meet the residency requirement to serve as the district's representative. No appeal was filed against this decision. Johnson subsequently sent a letter to the Governor on December 27, 2024, stating he would not accept his seat and resigned effective immediately.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the writ of special election was issued prematurely. The court held that Minnesota Statutes section 204D.19, subdivision 4, which governs the timing of special elections following a successful election contest, required the writ to be issued 22 days after the start of the legislative session unless the house passed a resolution regarding the court's determination. The court found that Johnson's letter did not create a vacancy that allowed for the writ's issuance on December 27, 2024, as he was not an incumbent and could not resign from an office he did not hold.The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the petition, quashed the writ of special election, and ordered the cancellation of the special election scheduled for January 28, 2025. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Walz" on Justia Law

Robin M. McNabb, a former Municipal Court Judge for Lenoir City, filed an election contest against Gregory H. Harrison, who won the election for the same position in 2022. McNabb argued that Harrison was ineligible to serve because he had not resided within the Lenoir City corporate limits for the year preceding the election, as required by Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution.The Chancery Court for Loudon County found that the term "district" in Article VI, Section 4 referred to the modern-day judicial district. Since Harrison resided in the Ninth Judicial District, the court ruled him eligible to serve. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but modified the judgment, stating that "district" referred to Loudon County, not the Ninth Judicial District, because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. It held that Article VI, Section 4 requires a candidate for a municipal judgeship to be a resident of the same municipality to which they will be assigned. Therefore, Harrison needed to reside in Lenoir City for one year prior to the election. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "McNabb v. Harrison" on Justia Law

In Washington State, most voters cast their votes by mail, and each voter must swear under oath that they are eligible to cast that ballot. Election workers must verify that the signature on the voter’s sworn ballot declaration matches the signature on file. If the signature cannot be verified, the ballot may be challenged, and if the voter does not cure their ballot in time, their vote will not be counted. The plaintiffs argue that this signature verification process results in some lawfully cast ballots not being counted, thus violating the due process, privileges and immunities, and freedom of elections clauses of the state constitution.The trial court denied all parties' summary judgment motions and adopted the Anderson-Burdick framework to determine the level of scrutiny for the case. The court concluded that additional factual development was required and reserved ruling on whether signature verification was severable from the rest of the statutory scheme. The defendants moved to certify the trial court’s order for immediate review, which the plaintiffs did not oppose. The court certified two questions for review: the appropriate standard of judicial review for the plaintiffs’ facial challenges and whether any party is entitled to summary judgment under that standard.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that signature verification, when coupled with the increasingly expansive cure system, does not facially violate the state constitution. The court held that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment, reversing in part, affirming in part, and remanding for entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court emphasized that the right to vote is fundamental and that the signature verification process, as part of a robust system of checks, provides both security and ease of voting. View "Vet Voice Foundation v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

In 2023, the Board of County Commissioners of Weld County approved a new map for electing county commissioners without complying with Colorado's redistricting statutes, arguing that as a home rule county, it was exempt from these requirements. Weld County residents, along with the League of Women Voters of Greeley and the Latino Coalition of Weld County, sued the Board, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the use of the new map.The Weld County District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting summary judgment and enjoining the Board from using the new map. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, the redistricting statutes applied to Weld County, and the Board had violated these statutes. The Board appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and the plaintiffs petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for certiorari review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the redistricting statutes provide a private right of action and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court further held that home rule counties must comply with the redistricting statutes, as these statutes impose mandatory functions rather than structural requirements. The court reversed the district court's allowance for the Board to use the 2015 map and ordered the Board to draw and approve a new map in compliance with the redistricting statutes in time for the 2026 county commissioner election. View "League of Women Voters of Greeley v. The Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of the Cnty. of Weld" on Justia Law

Kenneth Brown filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) alleging that the in-person absentee voting procedures in Racine during the August 2022 primary election violated the law. Brown observed voting at City Hall and a local mall and believed the procedures were unlawful. WEC found no probable cause of a violation and declined to take action. Brown then appealed WEC’s decision to the Racine County Circuit Court.The circuit court determined that Brown had standing to bring the action, as the alleged invalid voting procedures impacted his right to vote. The court partially ruled in Brown’s favor, concluding that the Racine City Clerk’s choice of alternate voting sites violated statutory requirements and that the use of a mobile election unit was unlawful. WEC sought to appeal this decision, and the case was brought before the Wisconsin Supreme Court via a bypass petition.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed whether Brown had standing to seek judicial review of WEC’s decision. The court interpreted Wisconsin Statute § 5.06(8), which allows for appeals from WEC’s decisions, and determined that to be “aggrieved” by a decision, an individual must suffer an injury to a legally recognized interest. The court found that Brown did not demonstrate any personal injury resulting from WEC’s decision, as he did not allege that the decision made it more difficult for him to vote or affected him personally.The court held that Brown was not “aggrieved” within the meaning of the statute and therefore did not have standing to seek judicial review. Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Brown’s complaint. View "Brown v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

Debbie Mayfield, a former member of the Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate, sought to run in a special election for Senate District 19 after the incumbent announced his resignation. Mayfield submitted the necessary paperwork to qualify for the ballot, but the Secretary of State and Director of the Division of Elections refused to place her on the ballot, citing a constitutional provision on term limits.The Circuit Court did not review the case. Mayfield directly petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for writs of mandamus and quo warranto, arguing that the Secretary misinterpreted his authority and failed to fulfill his statutory duty.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and granted Mayfield's petition for mandamus relief. The court held that Mayfield had a clear legal right to appear on the ballot, as she had met all statutory requirements for qualification. The court found that the Secretary's role in reviewing candidate qualifications is ministerial and does not include the authority to assess a candidate's constitutional eligibility. The court also rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the term-limits provision, concluding that Mayfield's break in service meant she had not served more than eight consecutive years in the Senate. The court ordered the Secretary to place Mayfield on the ballot by a specified deadline and denied the petition for quo warranto as moot. View "Mayfield v. Secretary, Florida Department of State" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles E. Wilson filed a lawsuit against the District of Columbia Board of Elections, Mayor Muriel E. Bowser, and the District of Columbia, challenging the proposed ballot Initiative 83, also known as the “Make All Votes Count Act of 2024.” Wilson objected to the initiative’s summary statement, short title, and legislative form, and raised several challenges to the Board’s determination that the initiative was a “proper subject” for an initiative. The initiative, which proposed ranked-choice voting and changes to primary election rules, was approved by voters on November 5, 2024.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Wilson’s complaint, ruling it was untimely because it was filed the day before the ten-day period described in D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(e)(1)(A) began. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the complaint was not filed within the specified timeframe.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the ten-day period described in Subsection (e)(1)(A) is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule. The court determined that the ten-day period is a deadline by which any suit must be filed, rather than a time window during which a suit must be brought. The court also held that the Superior Court had general equity jurisdiction to hear Wilson’s substantive challenges to the Board’s “proper subject” determination. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the Mayor and the District of Columbia, as they were not proper defendants in this case.The Court of Appeals vacated the Superior Court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings to address Wilson’s claims against the Board of Elections. View "Wilson v. Bowser" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a Maryland LLC and a Missouri nonprofit corporation, alleged that the Maryland State Board of Elections mismanaged state electoral operations in violation of state and federal laws during the 2020 and 2022 general elections. They claimed inaccuracies in voter registration records, excessive error rates in voting systems, improper certification of voting machines, use of uncertified machines, and failure to provide requested audit logs and configuration reports. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including the appointment of a Special Master to supervise changes before the November 2024 election.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs had not alleged injuries sufficiently concrete and particularized to support Article III standing. The court found that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements for organizational standing, as they failed to allege any injury to their organizational activities or to their members that was concrete and particularized. The court also held that the alleged violations of the Maryland Public Information Act did not constitute a redressable injury in fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked representational standing to assert claims on behalf of their individual members. The court found that the alleged vote dilution and the possibility that members' ballots were cast blank were generalized grievances that did not constitute concrete, particularized injuries. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that any of their members made the public records requests, thus failing to establish standing for the alleged violations of the Maryland Public Information Act. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of the motion for injunctive relief as moot. View "Maryland Election Integrity, LLC v. Maryland State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Election Integrity Project California, Inc. (EIPC) filed a lawsuit for declaratory relief against Mark A. Lunn, the Ventura County Clerk-Recorder, Registrar of Voters. EIPC claimed that their observers were denied adequate access to observe the processing and counting of vote-by-mail ballots as required under Election Code section 15105. They argued that Lunn restricted observers to areas where they could not properly monitor the election process. Lunn maintained that the designated observation areas were sufficient to prevent tampering while allowing observation.The trial court ruled in favor of Lunn, finding that the designated observation areas were adequate for observers to monitor the election process. The court concluded that Lunn's procedures complied with statutory requirements, allowing observers to effectively observe established vote counting procedures.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court addressed the issue of mootness, noting that the case involved matters of continuing public interest, such as the rights of election observers and election integrity, and thus warranted a decision despite the specific elections in question being past events. The court applied the substantial evidence standard of review, affirming that the trial court's judgment was supported by substantial evidence.The appellate court held that the trial court correctly construed the scope of section 15104, which requires that vote-by-mail ballot processing and counting be open to the public and that observers be allowed sufficiently close access to monitor the process. The court found that the trial court's interpretation and application of the statute were correct, and that Lunn's procedures met the statutory requirements. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the respondent. View "Election Integrity Project California, Inc. v. Lunn" on Justia Law

A group of Baltimore City registered voters, led by Anthony J. Ambridge, filed a petition seeking judicial review of a proposed amendment to the Baltimore City Charter, known as "Question F," which was to appear on the 2024 general election ballot. The petitioners argued that the proposed charter amendment was not proper "charter material" and that the ballot language was not understandable. The Maryland State Board of Elections opposed the petition, arguing that the claims were barred by laches and that the judicial review mechanism used by the petitioners was inappropriate.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ruled in favor of the petitioners, determining that the claims were not barred by laches and could be raised under the judicial review mechanism. The court found that Question F violated Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution as it was not proper charter material and that the ballot language was not easily understandable by voters. The court ordered that the results of Question F should not be certified.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that EL § 9-209(a) is not a proper mechanism to challenge whether a proposed charter amendment is proper charter material or whether the ballot language meets the standards for understandability. The Court also held that the petitioners' claims were barred by laches due to the unreasonable delay in filing the petition, which caused prejudice to the State Board, the City, and the electorate. The Court further concluded that the ballot language conveyed, with minimum reasonable clarity, the actual scope and effect of the measure, allowing voters to make an informed choice. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the appellants. View "State Bd. of Elections v. Ambridge" on Justia Law