Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Election Law
The Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
The Public Interest Legal Foundation (PILF) requested records from the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). PILF sought documents related to a "glitch" in the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation's system that allowed ineligible persons to register to vote. The Secretary denied the request, leading PILF to file a lawsuit claiming an informational injury due to the denial of access to the records.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania initially dismissed the suit for lack of statutory notice but found that PILF had standing based on an informational injury. After PILF provided the required notice and refiled the suit, the District Court granted and denied parts of both parties' summary judgment motions, ruling that PILF was entitled to some records but not others. The District Court did not reassess PILF's standing in light of the Supreme Court's decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that PILF lacked standing. The court held that PILF did not demonstrate a concrete harm or adverse effects from the denial of information, as required by TransUnion. The court emphasized that PILF's inability to study and analyze the records or produce educational materials did not constitute a concrete injury related to the NVRA's purpose of increasing voter participation. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court's orders and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it. View "The Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law
In re Nomination of Huff
Michael Huff filed nomination petitions to run as a Democratic candidate for two judicial offices in the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. Julian Domanico objected, arguing that Huff did not meet the constitutional residency requirement because he lived with his family in Montgomery County, not in the First Judicial District. Huff claimed his residence was a property in Philadelphia, where he had moved in May 2024, while his wife and children continued to live in Montgomery County.The Commonwealth Court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Huff's family resided in Montgomery County. The court applied Section 704(d) of the Pennsylvania Election Code, which presumes a married person's residence is where their family lives unless the couple is separated. Since Huff and his wife were not separated, the court concluded that Huff's domicile was in Montgomery County and ordered his name removed from the ballot.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires judges to reside in their respective districts for at least one year before election. The court emphasized that residency for constitutional eligibility is determined by domicile, which involves physical presence and intent to remain. The court found that Section 704 of the Election Code, which applies to voter registration, should not be used as a bright-line rule for determining a candidate's eligibility to run for office.The Supreme Court vacated the Commonwealth Court's decision, ruling that the lower court improperly relied solely on Section 704(d) without considering the totality of the circumstances to determine Huff's domicile. The case was remanded for reconsideration based on the traditional concept of domicile, which includes assessing physical presence and intent to remain. View "In re Nomination of Huff" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Election Law, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
ARIZONA FOR ABORTION ACCESS v MONTENEGRO
The case involves the Arizona Abortion Access Act Initiative I-05-2024, which appeared on the November 5, 2024, general election ballot. The Legislative Council prepared an analysis of the initiative, which included a description of existing state law prohibiting abortions after 15 weeks of gestation, except in medical emergencies. The analysis used the term "unborn human being" to describe the existing law, which the initiative's proponents argued was not impartial and requested the term "fetus" be used instead.The Superior Court in Maricopa County ruled in favor of the initiative's proponents, finding that the term "unborn human being" was emotionally and partisanly charged, and ordered the Council to replace it with a neutral term. The Council members appealed the decision, arguing that the analysis was impartial and complied with statutory requirements.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's ruling. The Court held that the analysis substantially complied with the statutory requirement for impartiality by accurately describing existing law using the precise terminology found in the statute. The Court emphasized that the term "unborn human being" is used in the existing law and that the analysis provided necessary background information to voters. The Court concluded that the analysis was impartial and did not advocate for or against the initiative. The request for attorney fees and costs by the initiative's proponents was denied. View "ARIZONA FOR ABORTION ACCESS v MONTENEGRO" on Justia Law
Cummings v. Kelly
Two plaintiffs, Beth Cummings and Dena Burnham Johnson, filed a petition to annul or void an election that provided additional funds for the Great Falls Public Library. They alleged discrepancies in the election process, including a mathematical error in the ballot and a lack of clear information provided to voters. The election, held in June 2023, resulted in the approval of a mill levy increase to support the library.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Montana dismissed the plaintiffs' petition under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a legally cognizable claim. The court found that the plaintiffs' allegations did not demonstrate a violation of their constitutional rights to suffrage or due process. The court also noted that the mathematical error on the ballot was minor and did not mislead voters to the extent that it would invalidate the election results. Additionally, the court determined that the plaintiffs' claims of election law violations were not applicable to the mill levy election.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs' right of suffrage was not violated, as they were not prevented from voting and were not misled by the ballot language. The court also concluded that the due process claim was unfounded, as the election process and materials provided sufficient information to voters. Furthermore, the court agreed with the lower court that the plaintiffs' claims under state election laws were not relevant to the mill levy election.The Supreme Court also upheld the lower court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion to amend their petition, finding that the proposed amendments would be futile and would cause substantial prejudice to the defendants. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' additional legal arguments did not present a valid controversy and that the defendants had already expended significant resources in the case. View "Cummings v. Kelly" on Justia Law
Fossella v Adams
On December 9, 2021, the New York City Council passed a bill amending the New York City Charter to allow lawful permanent residents to vote in municipal elections. The bill became effective on January 9, 2022, as Local Law 11, after both outgoing Mayor Bill de Blasio and incoming Mayor Eric Adams neither signed nor vetoed it. Local Law 11 permitted certain noncitizens to vote in elections for New York City offices such as Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller, Borough President, and City Council Member.Plaintiffs, including current and former elected officials and New York City registered voters, filed a lawsuit against the New York City Council, Mayor Eric Adams, and the New York City Board of Elections. They sought to declare Local Law 11 null and void, arguing it violated the New York State Constitution, the New York State Election Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on all grounds, declaring Local Law 11 unconstitutional and enjoining its implementation. The Appellate Division modified the judgment regarding the Election Law claim but otherwise affirmed the decision, with one justice dissenting. The City Council and intervenors appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals held that Article II, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution restricts voting to citizens, thus invalidating Local Law 11. The court found that the Constitution's language and historical context clearly limit the right to vote to U.S. citizens. The court rejected arguments that Article IX of the Constitution, which grants home rule powers to local governments, overrides this restriction. Consequently, the Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division's order and, as modified, affirmed the decision, maintaining the invalidation of Local Law 11. View "Fossella v Adams" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Shamro v. Delaware County Board of Elections
Chris Shamro sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Delaware County Board of Elections to place a zoning referendum on the May 6, 2025 primary-election ballot. The referendum concerned a zoning amendment for a property in Brown Township owned by Henmick Brewery, L.L.C. The board of elections decertified the referendum from the ballot, finding that the petition did not contain the correct name of the zoning amendment, had a misleading summary, and was accompanied by a misleading map.The board of elections held a protest hearing and voted to sustain the protest and decertify the referendum. Shamro filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the board of elections abused its discretion. The board of elections and Henmick argued that the petition failed to comply with statutory requirements, including providing an accurate summary of the zoning amendment and modifications approved by the board of trustees.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions. The court concluded that the referendum petition’s summary was misleading because it did not include approved modifications to the zoning amendment. Therefore, the court denied the writ and Shamro’s request for attorney fees and expenses. View "State ex rel. Shamro v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Porteous v. Franklin County Board of Elections
Densil Porteous sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Franklin County Board of Elections to place his name on the May 5, 2025 primary-election ballot for Columbus City Council or to reconsider its decision at a public meeting. Porteous had submitted a nominating petition with approximately 332 signatures, but the board validated only 230, falling short of the required 250 signatures. Porteous requested reconsideration, claiming some signatures were wrongly invalidated and offered unsworn statements from signatories as proof.The board initially rejected Porteous's petition due to insufficient valid signatures. Porteous's subsequent requests for reconsideration were denied, and he was informed that the board's verification process was consistent with standards applied to all candidates. Porteous then sought a public hearing for reconsideration, which the board also denied.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that Porteous failed to demonstrate that the board abused its discretion or acted in clear disregard of the law. The court noted that the board has broad discretion to verify signatures and is not required to accept unsworn statements as proof of authenticity. The court also found no statutory requirement for the board to hold an evidentiary hearing to contest invalidated signatures. Additionally, the court determined that Porteous did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the board treated him differently from similarly situated individuals. Consequently, the court denied the writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Porteous v. Franklin County Board of Elections" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Election Law, Supreme Court of Ohio
Nardi v. King
Christopher Nardi submitted an APRA request to the Indiana Election Division for documents related to Indiana’s voter-registration system. He requested three specific documents: the latest standard operating procedures, build notes, and the latest contract with third-party vendors. The Division denied the requests, citing security concerns, but directed Nardi to an online portal for the contract, which he accessed but failed to save. Nardi then filed a complaint with Indiana’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), which recommended partial disclosure. The Division refused, leading Nardi to file a lawsuit in Marion Superior Court.The Marion Superior Court conducted an in-camera review and ordered the Division to provide a redacted version of the contract but denied the other requests. Nardi petitioned for attorney’s fees, claiming he substantially prevailed. The trial court awarded him one-third of the requested fees, reasoning he prevailed on one of three requests. Both parties appealed. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the partial summary judgment but reversed the fee award, concluding Nardi did not substantially prevail.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case, holding that Nardi substantially prevailed by obtaining a wrongfully withheld public record. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this determination. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s mechanical reduction of attorney’s fees to one-third. The case was remanded for the trial court to recalculate the fees, considering the time spent on the successful claim and whether the time spent on unsuccessful claims was indivisible from the successful claim. The Indiana Supreme Court emphasized that APRA should be liberally construed to promote transparency and accountability in government. View "Nardi v. King" on Justia Law
Lake v. Gates
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law
Lake v. Gates
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's electronic voting system, arguing it should be replaced with a system using exclusively hand-counted paper ballots. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the use of computerized equipment in elections. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Lake v. Fontes. Subsequently, the district court granted the defendants' motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs' lead attorneys, Andrew J. Parker and Kurt Olsen, and their law firms, holding them liable for $122,200.00 in fees.The district court found that the lead attorneys made false, misleading, and unsupported factual assertions in their first amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, and did not conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry. Key false allegations included claims that Arizona does not use paper ballots and that its voting machines are not tested. The district court concluded that these misleading statements rendered the complaint factually insufficient and open to sanction. Additionally, the court found that the attorneys acted recklessly and in bad faith, particularly in the timing and nature of their motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the lead attorneys' actions were both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry. The court also upheld the finding of bad faith, noting that the attorneys' behavior and timing in bringing the motion for a preliminary injunction were reckless. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law