Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A candidate seeking the Republican Party nomination for U.S. Representative from the Sixth Ohio Congressional District submitted a petition with signatures from several counties, including Stark and Carroll. The Stark County Board of Elections, after reviewing the signatures and receiving certified determinations from other relevant county boards, initially validated one additional signature beyond those accepted by the Carroll County Board, enabling the candidate to meet the minimum requirement for ballot access. A protest was filed arguing the board lacked authority to revisit other counties’ signature determinations and that not enough valid signatures existed. At a protest hearing, both parties presented evidence about specific disputed signatures.The Stark County Board of Elections held a hearing on the protest, as required by Ohio law. At this stage, the board considered evidence regarding the validity of disputed signatures, including some that had previously been declared invalid by the Carroll County Board. The board found three additional signatures valid (including two from Carroll County), bringing the total valid signatures above the threshold. The board accordingly denied the protest and certified the candidate for the primary ballot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court held that while the Stark County Board could not, during the initial precertification review, override other counties’ signature determinations, the board did have authority during a formal protest hearing to consider evidence and make its own determinations regarding the validity of any signatures, including those from other counties. The court found that the board did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in denying the protest and certifying the candidate. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the requested writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Spencer v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

An individual submitted a candidate filing form to appear on the ballot for Douglas County sheriff in the May 2026 primary election. Alongside his filing, he provided a letter from the director of the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center certifying that he possessed an “inactive” Nebraska law enforcement officer certificate. His certificate had been active from 1984 to 2009 but was inactive at the time of filing. The Douglas County Republican Party objected to his candidacy, arguing that Nebraska law required a candidate to hold an “active” certificate. The objection was supported by a memorandum and legislative materials suggesting legislative intent to require active certification.The Douglas County election commissioner reviewed the objection and determined that the candidate did not meet the requirements to run for sheriff, based on the inactive status of his law enforcement certificate. The candidate then filed an emergency application for special proceedings with the Nebraska Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the commissioner’s decision and compel his placement on the ballot. The Republican Party intervened, asserting that legislative history and statutory context supported the requirement of an active certificate.The Supreme Court of Nebraska heard the case as a special, summary proceeding under state election law. The court held that the relevant statute required only that a candidate “possess a law enforcement officer certificate,” and made no distinction between active and inactive status. The court found the statutory text to be unambiguous and declined to consider legislative history or administrative regulations. Accordingly, the court concluded that possession of an inactive certificate satisfied the statutory qualifications for candidacy. The judgment ordered that the candidate’s name appear on the ballot for the sheriff’s office. View "Martinez v. Jensen" on Justia Law

A candidate filed to run in the Democratic primary for city marshal in Okolona, Mississippi, listing an in-city address. His opponent contended that the candidate did not truly reside within the city limits for the two years required before the election. Evidence was presented suggesting the candidate held homestead exemptions outside the city and had not lived at the addresses he claimed. The candidate argued he met the residency requirement, providing some documentation and his own testimony. Additional testimony from a city official cast doubt on whether the candidate had actually lived at the in-city address before the qualifying deadline.The Okolona Democratic Executive Committee initially found the candidate qualified. The opponent then petitioned the Chickasaw County Circuit Court for review. A special judge presided and, after a hearing, found the candidate failed to prove two years’ residency in the city as required by law, giving weight to evidence of out-of-city homestead properties and the lack of credible proof of in-city residence. The judge disqualified the candidate from the primary ballot.The candidate appealed the disqualification order to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Meanwhile, both the primary and general elections took place, and the candidate was not on either ballot. The candidate also attempted a post-primary challenge, but did not pursue an appeal in time. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the candidate’s appeal under the preprimary-qualification statute was moot since the elections had already occurred and the statute provides no remedy after the fact. The Court also found that substantial evidence supported the judge’s finding that the candidate did not meet the two-year residency requirement. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Randle v. Ivy" on Justia Law

A group of petitioners proposed a constitutional amendment, designated as Ballot Issue 8 (BI-8), which would add a new section to the Montana Constitution. This amendment would explicitly recognize a fundamental right to initiative and referendum and set forth procedural protections to ensure the timely, impartial, and unburdened exercise of those rights. BI-8 also contains limits on governmental interference, including a prohibition on the use of government resources to support or oppose ballot measures. The Attorney General determined that BI-8 was legally insufficient, arguing it violated the Montana Constitution’s separate-vote requirement by effecting multiple, unrelated constitutional changes. The Attorney General also appended a fiscal statement to BI-8, based on speculative litigation costs, despite the fiscal note indicating zero fiscal impact.The Montana Attorney General’s legal-sufficiency determination was challenged in the Supreme Court of the State of Montana under its original jurisdiction. The main arguments centered on whether BI-8 improperly combined multiple unrelated constitutional subjects and whether the Attorney General had statutory authority to append a fiscal statement when the fiscal note showed no fiscal impact.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that BI-8 constituted a single constitutional amendment because its provisions were closely related and collectively served to define and protect the right to initiative and referendum. The Court explained that procedural protections and government-resource limitations were integral components of the proposed right, not separate constitutional subjects. The Court further held that the Attorney General lacked authority to append a fiscal statement since the fiscal note did not indicate a fiscal impact. As a result, the Court reversed the Attorney General’s determination, struck the fiscal statement, and ordered the Attorney General to prepare ballot statements for submission to the Secretary of State. View "Kendrick v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

A candidate for town council in South Windsor challenged the town clerk’s decision regarding the application of newly approved charter revisions following the November 2025 municipal election. The charter revisions, approved by referendum on election day, reduced the maximum number of town council members from any one party from six to five. During the election, six Democratic candidates received more votes than any Republican candidate. The plaintiff, a Democrat, received the sixth highest total among his party’s candidates. After the election, the town clerk determined that the newly approved “bare majority” rule applied immediately, which resulted in a Republican candidate, who received fewer votes, being seated instead of the plaintiff.The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford, claiming he was aggrieved by the town clerk’s application of the charter revisions to the 2025 election results. He argued that this constituted a ruling of an election official under Connecticut General Statutes §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the town clerk’s actions did not constitute a “ruling of an election official” as required by the statutes, reasoning that the clerk was merely applying the law after votes were tallied.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed whether the town clerk’s decision constituted a ruling of an election official for purposes of expedited judicial review under the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court held that the town clerk’s decision to apply the new charter revisions in determining the outcome of the election was indeed a ruling of an election official. The court concluded that this action involved interpreting and applying legal requirements central to the election process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Amadasun v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

A nonprofit corporation focused on public policy issues published several materials criticizing ranked-choice voting in Alaska ahead of a 2020 statewide election that included a ballot proposition proposing to adopt ranked-choice voting and other election reforms. These materials included a press release announcing an educational campaign, a video posted on the nonprofit’s website and YouTube channel, a press release about a report on the effects of ranked-choice voting, and a blog post. The communications did not explicitly mention the ballot proposition by name but referred to ranked-choice voting and the upcoming election.A complaint was filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission (the Commission), alleging that the nonprofit failed to comply with Alaska’s campaign finance laws by not registering, not reporting expenditures, and not including “paid for by” disclosures on its communications. The nonprofit acknowledged spending approximately $643 on related activities. The Commission determined that the nonprofit’s communications qualified as regulated “express communications” because, in context, they could only be interpreted as exhortations to vote against the ballot proposition. The Commission found violations but waived any penalty.The nonprofit appealed to the Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, challenging the statutory interpretation, the application of the law, and the constitutionality of the statutes as vague and violative of the First Amendment. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s order, holding that the statutory standards were reasonably applied, were not unconstitutionally vague, and withstood First Amendment scrutiny under exacting review.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that the nonprofit’s communications triggered reporting and disclosure requirements. The court ruled that the statutes, as narrowed by agency interpretation, were not unconstitutionally vague and that the disclosure and reporting requirements were substantially related to the government’s interest in an informed electorate. The judgment was affirmed. View "Alaska Policy Forum v. Alaska Public Offices Commission" on Justia Law

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives, District 92, was certified to appear on the Republican primary ballot. Another Arkansas citizen, who did not reside in District 92, sued to have the candidate declared ineligible based on a past guilty plea to a felony public trust crime. The plaintiff sought to prevent election officials from counting or certifying any votes cast for the candidate.The Pulaski County Circuit Court considered the statutory framework that allows any Arkansas citizen to bring an action to enforce eligibility requirements for public office if the responsible prosecuting attorney fails to act. The court found that the prosecuting attorney knew of the candidate’s prior conviction and failed to act, and that the plaintiff, as a citizen, had standing. The court ruled the candidate ineligible to run or hold office and ordered that votes for the candidate not be counted. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings that the plaintiff had standing, that the prosecuting attorney’s failure to act was sufficient, and that the candidate was ineligible under the plain language of Arkansas’s statutory disqualification provisions for those pleading guilty to public trust crimes, even if records were sealed. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings. On cross-appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statute mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses to a prevailing citizen plaintiff. Thus, it reversed the denial of fees and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The Supreme Court’s disposition was to affirm on the direct appeal and reverse and remand on the cross-appeal. View "Reed v. Yang" on Justia Law

The case concerns the non-reappointment of a local general registrar of elections in Lynchburg, Virginia. The plaintiff, previously appointed unanimously by a bipartisan electoral board, reapplied for her position after her term expired in 2023. By that time, the board’s partisan makeup had shifted to include two Republicans and one Democrat, reflecting state law. The board interviewed four candidates, including the plaintiff, but ultimately appointed a different candidate who was a registered Republican. The plaintiff, describing herself as an independent, alleged her non-reappointment was due to partisan bias rather than job performance.Following the board’s decision, the plaintiff sued the board and its two Republican members, alleging First Amendment violations tied to political animus. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed the claim against the board itself on sovereign immunity grounds, but allowed the suit against the individual members to proceed. After a jury trial, the verdict favored the defendants. The plaintiff then appealed, raising concerns about jury selection procedures and the exclusion of certain evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in managing voir dire, including its refusal to allow more pointed questioning about potential jurors’ political affiliations and beliefs. The Fourth Circuit also determined that the plaintiff had not preserved most evidentiary challenges for appellate review, as she failed to make sufficient proffers or obtain definitive rulings on excluded evidence. For the limited evidentiary exclusions properly preserved, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Gibbons v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives was challenged by his opponent, who argued that she was ineligible to run for office due to a prior disposition in a 2018 hot-check case. The challenger claimed that the opponent had been found guilty of violating the Arkansas Hot Check Law, which, under state constitutional and statutory provisions, would render her ineligible for election. The evidence included a district court docket showing a disposition labeled “GUILTY – BOND FORFEITURE,” as well as payment of fines, fees, and restitution related to the charge. The opponent did not contest the existence of the underlying case but denied that she had been convicted or found guilty.The case was first heard in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. After a hearing that included testimony from court and law enforcement personnel about the court’s procedures, and review of the district court records, the circuit court concluded that the bond forfeiture was not an admission of guilt. The court found that the opponent had neither entered a plea nor been found guilty by the court. The circuit court therefore held that she had not been convicted of an infamous crime or a public trust crime under Arkansas law, and denied the challenger’s petition for declaratory judgment and mandamus.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the record and the circuit court’s findings under a clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that a bond forfeiture, without a plea or factual finding of guilt, does not constitute a conviction or render a candidate ineligible under Article 5, Section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution or the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court rejected the challenger’s remaining arguments and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "DAY V. WARDLAW" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to election integrity, along with two individual members, filed administrative complaints with the Wisconsin Elections Commission, alleging that the Commissioners themselves had failed to properly enforce certain aspects of federal election law regarding voter-ID requirements and management of voter registration lists. The Commission, citing ethical concerns about adjudicating complaints against itself, declined to review the complaints on their merits but suggested alternative remedies, such as referral to a district attorney or appeal to a state court. Dissatisfied, the organization and its members filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, seeking to compel the Commission to address their complaints under federal law.The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that neither the organization nor its members had Article III standing because they failed to show a concrete injury. The plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint, but upon doing so, the district court again dismissed the action, finding that their alleged injuries were intangible and insufficient to establish standing under federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that alleged procedural violations of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) did not constitute a concrete injury in fact necessary for Article III standing, as there was no historic or common-law analog for suing the government merely for failing to follow statutory procedures. The court further determined that HAVA did not create a private right of action enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiffs’ claims of organizational or associational standing were inadequately supported. The Seventh Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Millis" on Justia Law