Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered the district court's permanent injunction enjoining Senate Bill 14 and 5, which concerned the state's former photo voter ID law. SB 14 generally required voters to present one of five forms of government-issued identification in order to vote at the polls. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that SB 14 had an unlawful disparate impact on African American and Hispanic voters in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. However, the en banc court reversed and remanded. The district court then entered an interim remedy whereby in-person voters who lacked an SB 14 ID could cast a regular ballot upon completing a Declaration of Reasonable Impediment and presenting a specified form of identification. SB 5 was subsequently enacted as a legislative remedy to cure and replace SB 14. The district court subsequently entered a remedial order permanently enjoining SB 14 as well as SB 5, vacating the interim remedy, and reinstating the pre-SB 14 law that lacked any photo voter ID requirement. This court then granted the State's emergency motion and stayed the district court's orders until the final disposition of the appeal. The court held that the appeal was not moot and the district court's overreach in its remedial injunction and proceedings was an abuse of discretion meriting reversal. The court held that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court had no legal or factual basis to invalidate SB 5, and its contemplation of Section 3(c) of the VRA relief also failed. View "Veasey v. Abbott" on Justia Law

The Secretary of State Jon Hosted did not abuse his discretion when he determined that Heidi R. Carroll had the requisite seventy-two months of legal-practice experience to qualify for a seat on the common-pleas-court bench.In these consolidated expedited election cases Relators sought writs of mandamus and/or prohibition to prevent Carroll from appearing on the May 8, 2018 ballot as a candidate for the Republican Party nomination for Medina County Common Pleas Court judge, Domestic Relations Division. Relators argued that Husted employed the incorrect legal framework in deciding that Carroll satisfied the seventy-two month requirement. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Secretary Husted did not abuse his discretion by placing Carroll’s name on the May 2018 ballot as a judicial candidate. View "State ex rel. Emhoff v. Medina County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus requested by Relators seeking to compel Respondents, the Mahoning County Board of Elections and its members (collectively, the Board), to place a proposed amendment to the Youngstown city charter on the May 2018 ballot.The Board voted not to place the proposed amendment on the ballot, finding that the proposed amendment “contained provisions that are beyond the scope of the City of Youngstown’s power” to enact. The Supreme Court held that Relators were entitled to a writ of mandamus because the Board offered no clear support for its conclusion that Relators’ current proposal was beyond the scope of the City’s legislative power. Therefore, Relators had a clear legal right to have their proposal placed on the ballot, and the Board had a clear legal duty to provide that relief. View "State ex rel. Khumprakob v. Mahoning County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled Representative Doug Lamborn could not appear on the primary ballot in his district because of a problem with his ballot petitions. The Court ruled a petition circulator working for Lamborn’s campaign did not live in the state at the time, rendering the signatures he gathered invalid and moving Lamborn below the threshold for ballot access in his district. The Supreme Court concluded the district erred when it focused on the challenged circulator’s subjective intent to move back to Colorado, rather than the test set forth in section 1-2-102, C.R.S. (2017) when determining the circulator’s residency. In applying the correct test to the essentially undisputed facts here, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held the Colorado Secretary of State could not certify Representative Lamborn to the 2018 primary ballot for Colorado’s Fifth Congressional District. View "Kuhn v. Williams" on Justia Law

Ranked-choice voting is the current statutory law of Maine for the primary elections scheduled for June 12, 2018.The superior court reported seven questions to the Supreme Judicial Court addressing the Secretary of State’s planned implementation of ranked-choice voting in Maine’s primary elections to be held on June 12, 2018. The Court answered Question 3 on its merits and held (1) the Court assumes without deciding that the Maine Senate has standing to seek a declaration regarding the legal status of ranked-choice voting in the June 2018 primary elections and to challenge in court the operational planning of the Secretary of State; (2) the answer to Question 3 is that ranked-choice voting is Maine’s statutory law for the June 2018 primary elections; (3) Questions 1 and 2 are not justiciable; and (4) the remaining questions are moot. View "Maine Senate v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relator’s motion for leave to amend his complaint and denied the writ of mandamus he sought to compel Respondents, the City of Columbus and the Franklin County Board of Elections, to remove a proposal to amend the Columbus city charter from the May 8, 2018 ballot.On March 9, 2018, Relator filed a formal protest against the proposed charter amendment, arguing that it was substantively unconstitutional and that the summary language was false and deceptive. Three days later, the office of Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted approved the final ballot language. The board of elections then informed Relator it would not hold a hearing on his protest. Relator then filed this complaint against the city and the board of elections seeking a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court (1) denied the writ, holding that the language of the proposed Columbus charter conveyed enough information for voters to know what they were being asked to vote on; and (2) denied as moot the motion for leave to amend the complaint to name Husted as a respondent. View "State ex rel. Schuck v. Columbus" on Justia Law

The Mayor of Chicago appoints the city’s Board of Education, 105 ILCS 5/34-3. Until 1995, the Mayor needed the consent of the City Council; now the Mayor acts independently. Plaintiffs claimed that the system violated the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301 (section 2). School boards elsewhere in Illinois are elected; plaintiffs say that failure to elect the school board in Chicago has a disproportionate effect on minority voters. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Section 2(a) covers any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard” that results in an abridgment of the right to vote; it does not guarantee that any given public office be filled by election rather than appointment, a civil service system, or some other means. Whether having an appointed board is “good government” or good for pupils is irrelevant to the Act. While more minority citizens live in Chicago than in other Illinois cities and do not vote for school board members, neither does anyone else. Every member of the electorate is treated identically, which is what section 2 requires. View "Quinn v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied writs of mandamus sought by Relators to compel respondent members of the Columbus City Council to approve an ordinance placing a proposed city-charter amendment on the May 8, 2018 ballot and to compel respondent Franklin County Board of Elections to place the proposed amendment on the ballot. The Court held (1) Relators’ petition was insufficient because it did not comply with the plain and unambiguous language of the one-proposal rule in Columbus Charter 42-2(d), and therefore, the Columbus City Council had no clear legal duty to place Relators’ petition for charter amendment on the ballot; and (2) the Franklin County Board of Elections had no clear legal duty to place Relators’ petition for charter amendment on the ballot because the city council had not passed an ordinance approving the placement of the amendment on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Beard v. Hardin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Jonathan Heavey and Adam Hudak certifying their names to the May 8, 2018 ballot as candidates for the Democratic Party’s nominees for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively, holding that Heavey and Hudak failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a legal right to have their names placed on the May 8 ballot.Because the county boards of elections verified the validity of only 854 signatures in Heavey and Hudak’s part-petitions, Secretary of State Jon Husted did not certify Heavey and Husted as candidates for the May 8 ballot. In their present action, Heavey and Hudak alleged that Husted and the boards disregarded applicable law by rejecting at least 146 valid signatures. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Heavey and Hudak did not present clear and convincing evidence that they were at least 146 erroneously-rejected signatures. View "State ex rel. Heavey v. Husted" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Jonathan Heavey and Adam Hudak certifying their names to the May 8, 2018 ballot as candidates for the Democratic Party’s nominees for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively, holding that Heavey and Hudak failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a legal right to have their names placed on the May 8 ballot.Because the county boards of elections verified the validity of only 854 signatures in Heavey and Hudak’s part-petitions, Secretary of State Jon Husted did not certify Heavey and Husted as candidates for the May 8 ballot. In their present action, Heavey and Hudak alleged that Husted and the boards disregarded applicable law by rejecting at least 146 valid signatures. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Heavey and Hudak did not present clear and convincing evidence that they were at least 146 erroneously-rejected signatures. View "State ex rel. Heavey v. Husted" on Justia Law