Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered an appeal by Mark Meadows, former White House chief of staff under President Donald Trump, who sought to move his state criminal prosecution to federal court. The state of Georgia had indicted Meadows for crimes related to alleged interference in the 2020 presidential election. Meadows argued that because these actions were taken in his official capacity, they should be heard in federal court according to the federal-officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). The district court denied this request because Meadows' charged conduct was not performed under the color of his federal office. The court of appeals affirmed this decision. It ruled that the federal-officer removal statute does not apply to former federal officers and even if it did, the alleged actions leading to this criminal action were not related to Meadows’ official duties. The court concluded that the former chief of staff’s role does not include influencing state officials with allegations of election fraud or altering valid election results in favor of a particular candidate, regardless of the chief of staff's role with respect to state election administration. Therefore, Meadows was not entitled to invoke the federal-officer removal statute. View "The State of Georgia v. Meadows" on Justia Law

A non-profit organization, Vote.org, sued several county election officials in Texas, alleging that a state law requiring an original signature on a voter registration form violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The law frustrated Vote.org's use of its smartphone app, which only allowed for digital signatures. The district court ruled in favor of Vote.org, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision. The appellate court concluded that Vote.org had standing to sue, both in its own right and on behalf of third parties. The court found that the requirement for an original signature on a voter registration form did not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that Texas's requirement of an original signature was a material condition of voter registration and served legitimate state interests in ensuring the reliability of the registration process and reducing fraud. The court also found that the burden imposed by the requirement was only slight and did not unduly burden the right to vote. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the defendants. View "Vote.Org v. Paxton" on Justia Law

In the state of Kansas, a number of non-profit groups, including the League of Women Voters of Kansas and the Kansas Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, challenged a law which made it a felony to engage in conduct that gives the appearance of being an election official or that would cause another person to believe a person is an election official. The non-profits argued that the law was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague, as it could criminalize their voter education and registration activities. They also claimed that the law violated their rights to free speech and association. The district court denied their request for a temporary injunction and the Court of Appeals dismissed the non-profits' claims for lack of standing, arguing that they were not at risk of prosecution under the statute. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed these decisions, finding that the non-profits did have standing to challenge the law. The Court held that when a law criminalizes speech and does not clearly demonstrate that only constitutionally unprotected speech is being criminalized, the law is unclear enough to confer pre-enforcement standing on a plaintiff challenging the law. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab" on Justia Law

In a case concerning the constitutionality of the Kentucky General Assembly's legislative and congressional reapportionment plans, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court's decision that the plans were constitutional. The appellants, which included the Kentucky Democratic Party and several individual voters, challenged the plans, alleging that they were the result of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, violated the Kentucky Constitution's guarantees of free and equal elections, equal protection, and freedom of speech and assembly, and violated Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution, which sets forth requirements for the reapportionment process. The court held that the apportionment plans did not involve an unconstitutional level of partisan gerrymandering and did not violate the state constitution's guarantees of free and equal elections, equal protection, freedom of speech and assembly, or Section 33's requirements for the reapportionment process. The court applied a substantially deferential standard in its review, given the political nature of the apportionment process. It found that the plans did not involve a clear, flagrant, and unwarranted deviation from constitutional limitations, nor did they threaten the state's democratic form of government. The court also found that the appellants had standing to bring their claims and that the claims were justiciable. View "GRAHAM V. ADAMS" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, the court heard an appeal from a quo warranto judgment which ordered the removal of Ed Sachs, Wendy Bucknum, and Greg Raths from their positions as members of the City of Mission Viejo City Council. The quo warranto judgment was based on the finding that their respective two-year terms of office, which they had been elected to in November 2018, had expired in December 2020. Despite this, Sachs, Bucknum, Raths, and Mission Viejo continued to hold office.The defendants argued that Elections Code section 14029, which authorizes broad remedies for violations of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001, did not permit the implementation of two-year terms of office for city councilmembers because Government Code section 57377 imposes an ironclad requirement of four-year terms. They contended that they must be deemed to have been elected in November 2018 as councilmembers to four-year terms of office and were entitled to stay in office past their two-year terms.However, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating that even if their interpretation of Elections Code section 14029 and section 57377 was correct, the result they propose – that they receive four-year terms of office – was not. In November 2018, Sachs, Bucknum, and Raths were elected for two-year terms, not four-year terms. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment for quo warranto, stating that they were unlawfully holding office. View "P. ex rel. Schlesinger v. Sachs" on Justia Law

The New York Court of Appeals held that the New York State Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) failed to fulfill its constitutional duties for redistricting maps after the 2020 census. The court affirmed a lower court decision ordering the IRC to reconvene and deliver a second set of lawful redistricting maps.In 2014, New York voters amended the state constitution to mandate that the IRC, not the courts or the legislature, draw legislative districts. However, the IRC failed to deliver the required maps, resulting in a court-ordered redistricting plan for the 2022 elections.The court clarified that such court-directed plans are limited to the "extent" that the court is "required" to do so, and are not meant to last longer than necessary to remedy a violation of law. Therefore, the existing court-drawn districts are limited to the 2022 election.The court dismissed arguments that it was too late to compel the IRC to act, explaining that the court-ordered maps were not required to last a decade and that the IRC's constitutional obligation could be enforced at any time, unless barred by laches. The court also rejected arguments that the lawsuit was a collateral attack on an earlier decision, which dealt with a different issue.The ruling orders the IRC to submit a second set of redistricting maps and implementing legislation to the legislature as soon as possible, but no later than February 28, 2024. View "Matter of Hoffmann v New York State Ind. Redistricting Commn." on Justia Law

In this case, a group of New Hampshire voters challenged the constitutionality of the state's new boundaries for state senate and executive council districts. The plaintiffs claimed that the legislature violated the New Hampshire Constitution by drawing districts that unfairly benefitted one political party at the expense of another. They sought a declaration that the districts violated various parts of the state constitution and an injunction preventing the implementation of the new boundaries.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the issue of partisan gerrymandering raised a non-justiciable political question because the New Hampshire Constitution committed the task of redistricting to the legislature and did not provide any legal standard for the courts to review such decisions. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not claim that the redistricting plans violated any mandatory requirements of the state constitution.The court also rejected the argument that the constitution's guarantees of free speech, equal protection, and association were violated by the alleged gerrymandering. The court found that these constitutional provisions did not provide clear and manageable standards for adjudicating claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering.The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that the challenge to the constitutionality of the districts based on claims of excessive political gerrymandering presented non-justiciable political questions. View "Brown v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, who are voters in Travis County, Texas, filed a lawsuit against county officials alleging violations in the conduct of the November 2020 general election. Specifically, they claimed that the defendants used an uncertified electronic voting system for the election, thereby violating several state and federal laws. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief to prohibit electronic voting in Travis County, require paper ballots, and unseal various records related to the 2020 general election. The defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The district court agreed and dismissed the case without prejudice. The decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.In its decision, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which requires a plaintiff to establish that they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is likely caused by the defendant and would likely be redressed by judicial relief. The plaintiffs alleged two injuries: their votes were invalidated and not counted, and their personal information was unlawfully disclosed. The court found that neither injury was sufficient for Article III standing.However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court's dismissal of the case. Instead, it ruled that the proper course of action, when a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to a lack of standing, is to remand the case to state court rather than dismissing it. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to send it back to state court. View "Lutostanski v. Brown" on Justia Law

In this case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs were appealing the wording of a district court's declaratory judgment which held certain voter-registration provisions in the Houston City Charter unconstitutional. The plaintiffs were up against the City of Houston and two officials, Anna Russell and Pat J. Daniel, who were acting in their official capacities as City Secretaries.The court, however, found that there was no case or controversy as both parties had agreed from the start that the voter registration provisions were unconstitutional, and the city confirmed that it could not and would not enforce these provisions. The court cited precedent confirming that where there is no adversity between the parties on a constitutional question, there is no Article III case or controversy.Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the suit without prejudice, stating that such faux disputes do not belong in federal court. This dismissal allows for the possibility of the case being refiled in a competent jurisdiction in the future if necessary. View "Pool v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

In a case involving former U.S. President Donald J. Trump, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has partially upheld and partially vacated a lower court's order restricting Trump's public statements about the trial. The case stems from Trump being indicted for conspiring to overturn the 2020 presidential election through unlawful means and for obstructing the election’s certification. Trump had posted numerous statements on social media attacking potential witnesses in the case, the judge, and the prosecution team. The lower court issued an order restraining the parties and their counsel from making public statements that "target" the parties, counsel and their staffs, court personnel, and "any reasonably foreseeable witness or the substance of their testimony." On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the order insofar as it prohibited all parties and their counsel from making public statements about known or reasonably foreseeable witnesses concerning their potential participation in the investigation or in the criminal proceeding. The court also upheld the order to the extent it prohibited parties and their counsel from making public statements about counsel in the case other than the Special Counsel, members of the court’s staff and counsel’s staffs, or the family members of any counsel or staff member, if those statements were made with the intent to materially interfere with the trial or with the knowledge that such interference was highly likely to result. However, the court vacated the order to the extent it covered speech beyond these categories. The court found that the order was justified by a sufficiently serious risk of prejudice to an ongoing judicial proceeding, that no less restrictive alternatives would adequately address that risk, and that the order was narrowly tailored to ensure the fair administration of justice while also respecting Trump's First Amendment rights. View "USA v. Donald Trump" on Justia Law