Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Ja’nekia Barton sought to disqualify Jennifer Adams-Williams as a candidate for county prosecutor in Bolivar County, Mississippi, for failing to meet the two-year residency requirement set forth by Mississippi Code Section 23-15-300 (Supp. 2022). The Bolivar County Circuit Court denied Barton’s petition, finding that Adams-Williams was clearly a resident of Bolivar County and had been for the required two-year residency period. Finding that the trial court applied the proper legal standard in its analysis and did not manifestly err in its factual findings, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Barton v. Adams-Williams" on Justia Law

In this action arising from an initiative petition proposing a constitutional amendment entitled "The Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety" the Supreme Court held that Relators, registered Ohio voters, were not entitled to a writ of mandamus.The Ohio Ballot Board and its members determined that the initiative petition proposed a single constitutional amendment to the Ohio Constitution that would protect an individual's "right to make and carry out one's own reproductive decisions." Relators commenced this action ordering the Board to issue a determination that the petition contained more than one amendment. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the ballot board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in determining that petition at issue contained a single constitutional amendment. View "State ex rel. DeBlase v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dan Hynes appealed two superior court orders granting in part the motion to dismiss filed by defendants the New Hampshire Democratic Party (NHDP) and Raymond Buckley, and granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff was a New Hampshire attorney. In 2009, plaintiff was convicted of theft by extortion, which was later annulled. As a result of the conviction, plaintiff was temporarily suspended from the practice of law, but not disbarred. In 2018, plaintiff was “the Republican nominee for New Hampshire State Senate District 9.” During the course of plaintiff’s campaign, defendants “contracted with Bridge Communications to prepare mail pieces for certain state senate candidates,” including plaintiff’s opponent for the state senate seat. With the aid of an NHDP staffer, Bridge prepared a political message that was distributed by mail which mentioned plaintiff's extortion conviction, but also held that he was disbarred. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendants based on the content of the mailer, claiming that the statements there constituted: (1) defamation per se; (2) defamation per quod; (3) libel; (4) invasion of privacy — false light; and (5) violation of RSA 651:5 (2016). Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the statements were “true or substantially true” and were not made “with knowledge of [their] falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth.” Defendants further argued that RSA 651:5 did not create a private right of action and that plaintiff failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in part, dismissing the defamation and libel claims as they related to the statement that plaintiff had been convicted of theft by extortion, and dismissed counts four and five, determining that plaintiff failed to state a claim for false light, and that RSA 651:5 did not create a civil cause of action. It did not, however, dismiss the defamation and libel claims as they related to the statement over plaintiff's disbarrment, finding that whether the statement was substantially true was a question for the jury. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The flyer did not refer to plaintiff's annulled conviction, nor did it accurately convey he was not disbarred from the practice of law. The Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issues resolved by summary judgment. View "Hynes v. New Hampshire Democratic Party, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Minnesota Rule 8210.2450, subparts 2 and 3 (the rule) does not conflict with Minn. Stat. 203B.121 (the statute) and that the challenged rule was therefore invalid, holding that subpart 3 of the rule conflicted with subdivision 2(b)(3) of the statute.Appellants brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a prospective declaration that the administrative rule, which governed the acceptance of absentee ballots, was invalid because the rule subparts conflicted with the statute by infringing on discretion the legislature gave to ballot board members. The court of appeals determined that there was no conflict between the rule and the statute. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Minn. R. 8210.2450, sub. 3, which authorized any ballot board member to review signatures in the event of an identification number mismatch, was invalid to the extent that the rule conflicted with Minn. Stat. 203B.121, subd.2(b)(3), which required that election judges conduct that review; and (2) the other challenged parts of the rule did not conflict with the statute. View "Minn. Voters Alliance v. Office of Minn. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that an unconstitutional provision in a proposed charter amendment was not severable, holding that the provision was not severable from the remainder of the proposed charter amendment.On August 8, 2022, the Bloomington City Council voted to reject the entirety of a proposed charter amendment based on its conclusion that the last of the proposed amendment's four sections, section 4.08, was manifestly unconstitutional. Appellants filed a petition seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to sever section 4.08 and submit the remaining valid provisions to voters. The district court denied the petition, concluding that it would be improper to sever section 4.08 from the remainder of the proposed charter amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 4.08 could not properly be severed from the proposed city-charter amendment. View "Kranz v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law

Petitioner Raji Rab contended that by allowing Los Angeles County workers to scan vote by mail ballots into the Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP) system (the computer hardware and software system used to capture and count votes in Los Angeles County) beginning 10 days before the March 2020 primary election, Dean Logan, the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk violated California Elections Code section 15101 (b)’s, prohibition on accessing and releasing a vote count prior to 8 p.m. on the day of an election. Rab alleged respondents the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors and its members (with Logan, the County) and the California Secretary of State, failed in their oversight of Logan, and, therefore, failed to protect the election process and aided and abetted in Logan’s alleged misconduct. Rab brought a petition for writ of mandate, seeking a manual recount of ballots from the March 2020 primary election, and claiming this matter was one “of [the] greatest public interest.” The trial court denied his petition. Specifically, in denying the petition, the trial court wrote, “[t]he Court interprets ‘machine reading’ to include, and thus to permit, scanning ballots. To leave no room for confusion in the future, the Court reiterates: Elections Code section 15101(b) allows the County to start scanning ballots on the 10th business day before the election.” Rab appealed, arguing the trial court misinterpreted Elections Code section 15101(b). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Rab v. Weber" on Justia Law

On November 3, 2020, the voters of San Bernardino County passed Measure K, amending the county charter so as to: (1) limit a supervisor to a single four-year term; and (2) limit a supervisor’s compensation to $5,000 a month. At the same time, the voters also elected three new supervisors. The trial court ruled that the one-term limit was unconstitutional, but that the compensation limit was constitutional. The court ruled that because Measure K was not severable, it, too, had to be struck down. Finally, it ruled that Measure K did not apply to the new supervisors (although it acknowledged that the issue was moot, in light of its other rulings). Nadia Renner, proponent of Measure K, appealed.The San Bernardino County Board of Suprervisors (Board) cross-appealed, contending: (1) Supervisors’ compensation could not be set by initiative; (2) the compensation limit violated minimum wage laws; alternatively, if it effectively forced supervisors to work part-time, it impaired governmental functions; and (3) the compensation limit improperly acted as a referendum on San Bernardino County Code section 13.0614. After determining the trial court’s ruling was appealable, the Court of Appeal concluded the one-term limit was constitutional. Further, the Court held that the supervisors’ compensation could be set by initiative, and the Board did not show the limit violated minimum wage laws. The Board also did not show the limit conflicted with section 13.0614. “Even assuming that it does, the voters can amend or abrogate an ordinance not only by referendum, but also by initiative.” Because the Court held the one-term and compensation limits were valid, the Court did not reach the issue of whether Measure K was severable. The Court was split as to whether Measure K applied to new supervisors: the term limit applied, but the compensation limit did not. View "San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors v. Monell" on Justia Law

In this case involving the proposed redevelopment of the Redondo Beach waterfront, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous order awarding attorney's fees to Defendant. After the court initially awarded attorney's feed to Defendant, Plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court, which held that a Defendant is only entitled to attorney's fees if the plaintiff brought or maintained an action without foundation.Revisiting the issue, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous decision in light of the Supreme Court's holding. Plaintiffs' claims "marshaled a foundation for their suit" sufficient to avoid paying attorney's fees. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division concluding that the underlying challenge to Local Law No. 9-2014 was not time barred by either a four-month or a six-year statute of limitations, holding that there was no error.Local Law No. 9-2014 was adopted by the Town Board of the Town of Clarkstown in 2014 and purportedly set an eight-year term limit for all Clarkstown elected officials and required a supermajority vote of the Town Board to repeal. Appellees brought this action seeking a determination that the law was invalid because it was not subjected to a referendum of the Town's voters. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds. The appellate division declined to dismiss the actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed in each case, holding that, under the circumstances, the actions were not time barred. View "Hoehmann v. Town of Clarkstown" on Justia Law

Heritage Action for America appeals the denial of its post-judgment motion to intervene as of right, in Campaign Legal Center’s challenge to the Federal Election Commission’s failure to act on its administrative complaint. The district court found the motion was untimely because prior to judgment, it became clear Heritage Action’s interests would not be protected and delay in considering the complaint would prejudice Campaign Legal to the detriment of Congress’ enforcement scheme.   The DC Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention and dismissed the merits appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that Heritage Action had not yet received the Commission’s response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed 41 months after the administrative complaint, but the record supports the district court’s findings upon applying the test in Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, 142 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2022). Further, Heritage Action was not a party to the default judgment in Campaign Legal’s lawsuit against the Commission and would not be prevented from arguing that Section 30109(a)(8)(C)’s prerequisites have not been met. View "Campaign Legal Center v. FEC" on Justia Law