Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In early 2022, while Washington Governor Jay Inslee’s COVID-19 related mask mandate remained binding throughout the state, three of five Richland School District board (RSDB) members voted to make face coverings optional in Richland schools. This vote conflicted directly with the then effective statewide masking requirement. Two months later, a group of Richland voters filed petitions to recall those three RSDB members. The petitioners alleged that the three RSDB members violated the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), chapter 42.30 RCW, and knowingly violated state law in different ways when they voted to lift the mask mandate from the Richland schools. The trial court agreed that many of the counts containing those allegations were factually and legally sufficient to be placed on the ballot for the voters to decide. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with most of the trial court’s decisions. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopses 1, 3, and 5: petitioners sufficiently alleged that the RSDB members knowingly violated both the OPMA and the statewide mask mandate. But the Court reversed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopsis 4: the aspirational, nonbinding, RSDB “Code of Ethics” could not form the legal basis for a recall charge. View "In re Recall of Bird, et al." on Justia Law

independent-expenditure political action committees (super PACs) do not give money directly to candidates, party committees, or ballot-initiative movements. They spend money themselves to advocate for or against candidates, parties, or initiatives. The Fund wants to operate as an Indiana independent-expenditure PAC but fears that the state’s Election Code does not allow it to accept unlimited donations from corporations, in violation of the First Amendment. Indiana’s election officials say they do not believe their laws could be enforced that way.Indiana’s campaign finance laws allow corporations to make contributions "to aid in the election or defeat of a candidate or the success or defeat of a political party or a public question.” Section 4 imposes limits on direct corporate contributions to candidates and party committees but imposes no cap on contributions to committees unaffiliated with a political party, such as PACs. Section 5 ensures that corporations cannot use PACs as a loophole to avoid contribution caps by requiring corporations to designate their contributions to PACs “for disbursement to a specific candidate or committee listed under section 4.” Section 5 does not address how or whether a corporation could earmark a contribution for a PAC's independent expenditure for or against a candidate or party.The Seventh Circuit certified to the Indiana Supreme Court Does the Indiana Election Code—in particular, sections 3-9-2-3 to -6—prohibit or otherwise limit corporate contributions to PACs or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures? View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law

Greater Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”), an Alabamian non-profit organization dedicated to aiding low-income individuals, and several Alabamian felons (collectively “Appellants”) appealed the district court’s summary judgment denying their Equal Protection Clause challenge to Amendment 579 of the Alabama state constitution, their Ex Post Facto Clause, challenge to Amendment 579’s disenfranchisement provisions, and their National Voting Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), challenge to the format of Alabama’s mail voting registration form.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that (1) Amendment 579 successfully dissipated any taint from the racially discriminatory motives behind the 1901 Alabama constitution; (2) Amendment 579 does not impose punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (3) Alabama’s mail voting registration form complies with the NVRA. The court wrote that it rejects Appellants’ invitation to review the extent the Alabama legislature debated the “moral turpitude” language of Amendment 579. Further, the court explained that Section 20508(b)(2)(A) is a notice statute enacted for the convenience of voting registrants. Alabama’s mail-in voting form has provided sufficient notice by informing registrants that persons convicted of disqualifying felonies are not eligible to vote and providing an easily accessible link whereby voters convicted of felonies can determine their voter eligibility. Accordingly, Alabama has complied with the requirements of Section 20508(b)(2)(A). View "Treva Thompson, et al. v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court ruling that one of two proposed amendments to the City of Houston's charter approved by voters restricted the effectiveness of the other ballot measure, holding that on amendment included a "primary clause" that was void because it conflicted with state law.One of the amendments at the issue was submitted at the behest of the City Council, and the other was initiated by local citizens. The election ordinance included a "primacy clause" providing that the Council's proposition would prevail over the citizen-initiated proposition if voters approved the Council’s proposition by more votes than the citizens’ proposed amendment. The voters approved both amendments. The City brought suit, arguing that the second amendment did not become effective upon its adoption due to the primacy clause. Relying on the primacy clause, the trial court granted summary judgment for the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the primacy conflicts with state law requiring that a city must adopt a charter amendment upon its approval by a majority vote; and (2) therefore, the City may not rely on the primacy clause to avoid complying with the citizen-initiated proposition. View "Hotze v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth decertified certain voting equipment that Fulton County acquired from Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. (“Dominion”) in 2019 and used in the 2020 general election. The Secretary decertified the voting equipment after learning that, following the 2020 election, Fulton County had allowed Wake Technology Services, Inc. (“Wake TSI”), to perform a probing inspection of that equipment as well as the software and data contained therein. The Secretary maintained that Wake TSI’s inspection had compromised the integrity of the equipment. Fulton County and the other named Petitioner-Appellees petitioned in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the Secretary’s decertification authority generally and as applied in this case. During the pleading stage, the Secretary learned that Fulton County intended to allow another entity, Envoy Sage, LLC, to inspect the allegedly compromised equipment. The Secretary sought a protective order from the Commonwealth Court barring that inspection and any other third-party inspection during the litigation. The court denied relief. The Secretary appealed that ruling to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which entered a temporary order on January 27, 2022, to prevent the inspection and to preserve the status quo during the Court's review of the Secretary’s appeal. Months later—and with no public consideration, official proceedings, or notice to the courts or other parties to this litigation—the County allowed yet another party, Speckin Forensics, LLC to inspect the voting equipment and electronic evidence at issue in this litigation. Upon learning of this alleged violation of the temporary order, the Secretary filed an “Application for an Order Holding [the County] in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions.” The Supreme Court found Fulton County willfully violated the Supreme Court's order. The Court found Fulton County and its various attorneys engaged in a "sustained, deliberate pattern of dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious conduct and have acted in bad faith throughout these sanction proceedings." Taken as a whole, that behavior prompted the Court to sanction both the County and the County Attorney. View "County of Fulton, et al. v. Sec. of Com." on Justia Law

The question presented for the Court of Appeal in this case was whether California could lawfully require anyone who seeks to vote in a presidential primary for a candidate of a particular political party to associate with that party as a condition of receiving a ballot with that candidate’s name on it. Plaintiffs contended that the answer was no, making Elections Code section 13102 unconstitutional. Defendants California Secretary of State and the State of California disputed this conclusion, asserting that the United States Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative on multiple occasions. Defendants pointed out, that when plaintiffs discuss a “right” to cast an expressive ballot simply for the sake of doing so, rather than to affect the outcome of an election, they have ceased talking about voting. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that elections have some “generalized expressive function.” California Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiffs’ inventive theories therefore did not supply a constitutional basis for evading binding legal precedent that foreclosed their arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. View "Boydston v. Padilla" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the motion filed by the Summit County Republican Party Executive Committee seeking an award of more than $69,000 in attorney fees that it allegedly incurred in this election dispute, holding that the Committee's arguments in support of the award were unavailing.In 2021, the Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling Secretary of State Frank LaRose to reappoint Bryan C. Williams to the Summit County Board of Elections. The Committee subsequently sought attorney fees, suggesting that the Court's decision granting a writ of mandamus established that LaRose acted in bad faith in rejecting the Committee's recommendation to reappoint Williams. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Court's prior holding did not, in itself, support the Committee's recommendation to reappoint Williams, and the Committee's remaining arguments were unpersuasive. View "State ex rel. Summit County Republican Party Executive Committee v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that Wayne Jortner, Richard Bennett, John Clark, and Nicole Grohoski (collectively, Jortner) met his burden to demonstrate that a ballot question for citizen-initiated legislation was not "understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for the first time" and that it would mislead a reasonable voter under Me. Rev. Stat. 21-A, 905(2).Jortner brought this action seeking judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision upon the final wording of the ballot question for the citizens' initiative proposing legislation entitled "An Act To Create the Pine Tree Power Company, a Nonprofit, Customer-owned Utility." At issue was whether Pine Tree Power Company should be described as "consumer-owned" rather than "quasi-governmental." The superior court entered judgment for Jortner. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Secretary of State's use of the term "quasi-governmental" did not comply with her responsibilities to ensure that the description of the subject matter was understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for the first time. View "Jortner v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tommy Hanes, David Calderwood, and Focus on America appealed a circuit court judgment dismissing their claims against John Merrill, in his official capacity as the Alabama Secretary of State, and Bill English, Wes Allen, Clay Crenshaw, Jeff Elrod, and Will Barfoot, in their official capacities as members of the Alabama Electronic Voting Committee ("the committee"). In May 2022, plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relating to the general use of electronic-voting machines in the November 2022 general statewide election and in all future elections. Plaintiffs primarily sought to enjoin the usage of electronic-voting machines to count ballots. They specifically sought an order requiring that the 2022 election be conducted by paper ballot, with three individuals as independent counters who would manually count each ballot in full view of multiple cameras that could record and broadcast the counting proceedings, among other measures. Plaintiffs claimed the use of electronic voting machines was so insecure, both inherently and because of the alleged failures defendants in certifying the machines, that it infringed upon their constitutional right to vote, or, in the case of Focus on America, the right to vote of those persons it represented. Defendants moved to dismiss, citing Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. They argued plaintiffs lacked standing, that the claims were moot, that State or Sovereign immunity under Art. I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution barred the claims, that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and that the court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to § 17-16-44, Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court found that the jurisdiction-stripping statute barred the plaintiffs' action, that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs' claims. Finding plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims, thus depriving the circuit court of jurisdiction over their complaint, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. View "Hanes et al. v. Merrill, et al." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals remanded this case to the circuit court for entry of a declaratory judgment that Jacob Bennett was qualified to serve as a member of the Harford County Council while simultaneously being employed as a teacher by the Harford County Board of Education, holding that Bennett was entitled to relief.Harford County brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Bennett was not qualified to serve on the Harford County Council. Bennett filed a counterclaim seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus. The circuit court ruled that Bennett was precluded from serving on the Harford County Council. The Court of Appeals granted relief and ordered that Bennett was not precluded from serving as a member of the Harford County Council. View "Bennett v. Harford County" on Justia Law