Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, which summarily affirmed the decision of the circuit court affirming the results of a referendum recount conducted pursuant to Wis. Stat. 9.01, holding that Wis. Stat. 7.54 does not apply when an appeal of the result of a recount by the board of canvassers is before an appellate court.On review, Petitioners - James Sewell and George Myers - argued that the Racine Unified School District Board of Canvassers mistakenly calculated the recount's vote totals and that Sewell had an absolute right under section 7.54 to have the ballots opened and reviewed in circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the Board of Canvassers' recount, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while section 7.54 appears to provide an occasion to utilize its provisions in regard to a contested election, it did not apply in this case. View "Sewell v. Racine Unified School District Board of Canvassers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three Arizona voters and three organizations, including the Democratic National Committee, brought this action against the Arizona Secretary of State alleging that the Ballot Order Statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it gives candidates the benefit of appearing first on the ballot, not on the basis of some politically neutral ordering (such as alphabetically or by lot), but on the basis of political affiliation.The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis that plaintiffs lack standing and that the complaint presented a nonjusticiable political question. The circuit court panel held that the district court erred in dismissing the suit on these grounds. The panel held that: (1) the DNC satisfied the injury in fact requirement on the basis of its competitive standing; (2) the challenged law was traceable to the Secretary; and (3) having shown that an injunction against the Secretary would significantly increase the likelihood of relief, plaintiffs met their burden as to redressability. The court reasoned that adjudicating a challenge to a ballot order statute did not present the sort of intractable issues that arise in partisan gerrymandering cases. Further, the court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the district court’s dismissal could be affirmed on the alternative ground that she was not the proper defendant under Article III or the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs had stated a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "BRIAN MECINAS V. KATIE HOBBS" on Justia Law

The 2020 census revealed that Wisconsin’s State Assembly and Senate districts were no longer equally apportioned. The Governor vetoed new maps passed by the legislature. The Wisconsin Supreme Court invited proposed maps and selected the Governor's proposed maps; the Assembly map created seven majority-black districts—one more than the current map. The court stated there were “good reasons” to think that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301 “may” require the additional majority-black district.The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Under the Equal Protection Clause, districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest, such as compliance with the VRA. Preconditions to demonstrating a VRA violation require showings that the minority group is sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district, the minority group is politically cohesive, and a majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate. If the preconditions are established, a court considers the totality of circumstances.The Governor’s main explanation for the seventh majority-black district was that there is now a sufficiently large and compact population of black residents to fill it. Strict scrutiny requires more. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis of the preconditions improperly relied on generalizations and “made virtually no effort” to parse data at the district level or respond to criticisms of expert analysis. The court improperly reduced the totality-of-circumstances analysis to a single factor–proportionality--and failed to address whether a race-neutral alternative that did not add another majority-black district would deny black voters equal political opportunity. View "Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Ray Brubaker to compel the Lawrence County Board of Elections to place a local liquor option on the primary-election ballot, holding that Brubaker failed to establish that he was entitled to the writ.Brubaker filed with the Board paperwork requesting a liquor option on the May 3, 2022 primary election ballot for the Hanging Rock precinct allowing Sunday liquor sales. The Board rejected the liquor-option petition because Brubaker did not submit a Form No. 5-N. Brubaker subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus against the Board. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law. View "State ex rel. Brubaker v. Lawrence County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and the United States filed suit against the State of Texas, as well as state and local officials, seeking to enjoin enforcement of some or all of the new provisions in Senate Bill 1, which amended various provisions of the Texas Election Code pertaining to voter registration, voting by mail, poll watchers, and more.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Committees' motion to intervene as defendants, concluding that the Committees have a right to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court determined that the Committees made a timely application to intervene by right; they claim interests relating to SB 1 which is the subject of this consolidated suit; their absence from the suit may practically impede their ability to protect their interests; and the existing parties might not adequately represent those interests. Accordingly, the court remanded to allow the Committees to intervene by right in this suit. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris County Republican Party" on Justia Law

In the March 2020 primary election, McHenry Township voters rejected a proposition to dissolve the township. Months later, the township’s board of trustees adopted a resolution to place a nearly identical proposition on the November 2020 general election ballot. The McHenry County Clerk refused to place the proposition on the ballot, notifying the township that the proposition violated the statutory prohibition against “the same proposition” appearing on the ballot more than once within 23 months, 10 ILCS 5/28-7.The circuit court dismissed a mandamus petition. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that, regardless of whether the proposition was prohibited from appearing on the November 2020 ballot, the clerk lacked the statutory authority to make that determination and was obligated to perform the ministerial act of placing the proposition on the ballot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the township is no longer pursuing dissolution.Section 28-5 provides that a county clerk is authorized to give notice that the public question may not be placed on the ballot only when the question is prohibited by “the limitations of section 28-1.” The prohibition against placing the same proposition on the ballot more than once in 23 months is set forth in section 28- 7, not section 28-1. The court did not consider whether the proposition actually violated section 28-7. View "McHenry Township v. County of McHenry" on Justia Law

Sigcho-Lopez, the alderman for Chicago’s 25th Ward, filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Elections, alleging that his predecessor’s (Solis) campaign committee unlawfully paid Solis's personal legal fees from campaign funds. The Board dismissed Sigcho-Lopez’s complaint. On administrative review, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Legal fees incurred to pay for a public official’s criminal defense against investigations or charges of public corruption do not amount to a per se prohibited personal debt under the plain language and spirit of Election Code section 9-8.10(a)(3); whether legal defense fees amount to a personal debt that does not defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Solis was not indicted but worked with federal investigators using his official capacity to expose public corruption. Considering the evidence before the Board, its conclusion that Solis’s legal fees amounted to a proper expenditure not prohibited as “satisfaction or repayment” of personal debt but incurred “to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” was not clearly erroneous. View "Sigcho-Lopez v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

About seven weeks after the 2020 presidential election, Republican state legislators, individual voters, and organizations representing voters from Wisconsin, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—all states carried by Joseph R. Biden Jr.—sued to prevent Congress from certifying their states’ electoral results. The district court denied their motion to enjoin the counting of electoral votes, and, after the Senate certified Biden as the winner, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their case. In a post-dismissal order cataloging the suit’s “numerous shortcomings,” the district court referred plaintiffs’ counsel, Kaardal, to the Committee on Grievances for possible discipline. “When any counsel seeks to target processes at the heart of our democracy,” the district court reasoned, “the Committee may well conclude that they are required to act with far more diligence and good faith than existed here.”The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court’s referral is not a final order. Rather than fixing Kaardal’s rights and liabilities, the challenged order merely initiated disciplinary proceedings. View "Wisconsin Voters Alliance v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Terpsehore Maras, who circulated petitions to appear on the May 2022 Republican Party primary ballot as a candidate for secretary of state, holding that Maras was not entitled to mandamus relief.When the secretary of state's office forwarded Maras's part-petitions to various county boards of elections for signature verification most of the boards did not receive an accompanying declaration of candidacy. Many of the county boards, therefore, invalidated the entire part-petitions due to the absence of a declaration. Because the county boards did not validate sufficient petition signatures for Maras to qualify as a candidate on the ballot the secretary of state's office refused to certify her name as a candidate. The Supreme Court denied a writ sought by Maras to compel the Secretary of State to send her declaration of candidacy to the county boards for a new signature verification to be conducted, holding that Maras failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her part-petitions met the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 3513.09. View "State ex rel. Maras v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief in this mandamus action and directed the secretary of the city of West Lake Hills to accept Linda Anthony's application and place her on the ballot as a candidate for Mayor of the City of West Lake Hills, holding that Anthony was entitled to relief.Anthony, the current Mayor of West Lake Hills, submitted a 2022 ballot application that left blank the box for the applicant's occupation. The city secretary rejected the application because it did not provide all of the information required by Tex. Elec. Code 141.031, thus excluding Anthony from a place on the ballot as candidate for mayor. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding (1) Anthony's application was not defective for failing to list an occupation when she currently had no paid employment; and (2) therefore, the city secretary had no discretion to reject Anthony's application. View "In re Anthony" on Justia Law