Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a registered voter in Auburn, New Hampshire, filed a complaint against the Governor, the Secretary of State, the State of New Hampshire, and officials from the Town of Auburn. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief regarding New Hampshire election laws, specifically challenging the use of electronic voting machines and other election-related statutes. The plaintiff alleged that he was denied the right to vote by hand on March 9, 2022, and claimed that various statutes were unconstitutional.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court did not address the issue of standing, despite the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing. The plaintiff appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiff had standing to bring his claims in Counts I and II, which related to his alleged denial of the right to vote by hand and the constitutionality of statutes allowing electronic voting machines. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of these counts to the extent they were based on the plaintiff's interpretation of Part II, Article 32 of the State Constitution. However, the court found that the plaintiff had standing to pursue his equal protection claim in Count II and remanded for further proceedings on that issue.For Counts III through VI, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing as these claims raised generalized grievances rather than concrete, personal injuries. The court vacated the trial court's ruling on these counts and remanded with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision. View "Richard v. Governor" on Justia Law

Three Libertarian Party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives were disqualified from the 2024 general election ballot by the State Objection Panel for failing to comply with Iowa's statutory nomination requirements. The candidates, Nicholas Gluba, Charles Aldrich, and Marco Battaglia, were nominated at a party convention after no Libertarian candidates filed for the primary election. However, the party did not follow the required process for selecting delegates to the convention, which included holding precinct caucuses and county conventions on separate days and notifying county auditors of the delegates.The Iowa District Court for Polk County upheld the Panel's decision, finding that the Libertarian Party did not comply with Iowa Code section 43.94, which mandates that county convention delegates' terms begin the day after their election at precinct caucuses. The court ruled that strict compliance with this law was necessary, and the party's failure to follow the process invalidated the nominations. The court also rejected arguments that the objectors lacked standing and that the Panel's decision violated the candidates' First Amendment rights.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the statutory requirements for nominating candidates by convention must be strictly followed and that the Libertarian Party's failure to comply with these requirements justified the disqualification of the candidates. The court also found that the objectors had standing to challenge the nominations and that the Panel's decision did not violate the candidates' First Amendment rights. The court emphasized that the election laws are designed to ensure a fair and orderly process for candidate nominations. View "Gluba v. State Objection Panel" on Justia Law

A grassroots organization, Dallas HERO, collected over 169,000 signatures to place three proposed amendments to the City of Dallas charter on the ballot. The city council, however, proposed three additional amendments that would effectively nullify the citizen-initiated amendments by including primacy provisions. The city council's propositions were designated as Propositions K, M, and N, while the citizen-initiated propositions were designated as Propositions S, T, and U. The council passed an ordinance to include all these propositions in a special election scheduled for November 5, 2024.Relators sought emergency mandamus relief from the Fifth Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas, arguing that the council-initiated propositions were misleading and would confuse voters. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied the petition, stating that relators failed to comply with procedural rules and did not demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief. The relators then brought their case to the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the ballot language for the council-initiated propositions K, M, and N was misleading because it did not acknowledge the contradictions with the citizen-initiated propositions S, T, and U. The court found that the ballot language would confuse and mislead voters by omitting the effect of the primacy provisions, which are central to the council-initiated propositions. The court directed the city council to remove Propositions K, M, and N from the ballot to avoid redundancy and confusion, ensuring that the election process remains clear and comprehensible for voters. The court denied relief on the issue of amending the agreed-upon ballot language for Propositions S, T, and U, as relators were estopped from challenging it. View "IN RE DALLAS HERO" on Justia Law

In 2018, Robbie Gail Charette, a Republican candidate for Judge of the County Court-at-Law in Washington County, Texas, was indicted on four misdemeanor charges related to campaign law violations. These charges included misrepresenting the source of a campaign communication, falsely claiming to hold a public office, failing to file a personal financial statement on time, and not maintaining proper records of political expenditures. A special prosecutor pursued these charges without a prior referral from the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC).The trial court denied Charette's pretrial habeas application, which argued that the prosecution was unauthorized without prior TEC proceedings. The court found no legislative language granting the TEC exclusive authority to enforce the violations and ruled that district attorneys could independently investigate and prosecute election-related crimes. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld this decision, stating that the district court had jurisdiction over the misdemeanors and that any alleged deprivation of civil due process rights by the TEC did not affect this jurisdiction.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the TEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses listed in Chapter 571 of the Texas Government Code. The court held that the TEC must make an initial determination on alleged violations before any criminal charges can be brought. Since no TEC proceedings occurred in Charette's case, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the dismissal of the indictments against Charette. View "EX PARTE CHARETTE" on Justia Law

Independent candidates and minor political parties in Texas challenged several provisions of the Texas Election Code, arguing that these provisions, when combined, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing severe and unequal burdens on non-wealthy Independents and Minor Parties. The provisions in question include requirements for obtaining ballot access through primary elections, party nominations, or nominating petitions, as well as restrictions on petitioning methods and timelines.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found that the requirement for candidates to submit hardcopy signatures for ballot access petitions was unconstitutional, reasoning that it imposed an unequal burden on the plaintiffs compared to Major Parties, which could use electronic methods. The court enjoined the enforcement of the paper-petitioning process but stayed its injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the Anderson-Burdick framework to evaluate the constitutionality of the ballot-access laws. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the challenged provisions imposed severe burdens on them. The court upheld the numerical signature requirement, the costs associated with obtaining signatures, the time constraints on petitioning, and the restrictive petitioning procedures as justified by legitimate state interests. The court also upheld the filing fee or petition requirement for Minor Party candidates and rejected the claim that the provisions imposed more severe restrictions on presidential Independents.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the paper-petitioning requirement was unconstitutional, noting that all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, must obtain petition signatures through hardcopy methods. The court affirmed the constitutionality of the challenged provisions and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Miller v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Shawn Valentine sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Lucas County Board of Elections to place a zoning referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The referendum concerned a zoning amendment approved by the Spencer Township Board of Trustees, which rezoned a portion of property owned by Jeff Davis Properties, L.L.C. Valentine and others circulated a petition for the referendum but included a map that outlined the area originally requested for rezoning, not the smaller area actually rezoned by the trustees.The Lucas County Board of Elections reviewed the petition and found it contained the required number of valid signatures. However, Jeff Davis Properties filed a protest, arguing that the map included with the petition was not appropriate. The Board of Elections held a hearing and sustained the protest, deciding that the map did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 519.12(H), which mandates that a referendum petition be accompanied by an appropriate map of the area affected by the zoning proposal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the map submitted with the petition was misleading because it did not accurately reflect the area affected by the zoning resolution. The court found no evidence that the map was approved by the board of township trustees as reflecting the zoning amendment. Consequently, the court held that the Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions when it sustained the protest and refused to place the referendum on the ballot. The writ of mandamus was denied, along with Valentine’s requests for costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Valentine v. Schoen" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including the National Republican Senatorial Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, Senator J.D. Vance, and former Representative Steve Chabot, challenged the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on coordinated campaign expenditures. They argued that these limits, which restrict political parties from spending money on campaign advertising with input from the candidate, violate the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Federal Election Commission from enforcing these limits, claiming that the restrictions increase costs, create redundancies, and hinder effective communication and spending.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio certified the constitutional question to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The district court found that the plaintiffs raised a non-frivolous question and established a factual record before certifying the question. The district court asked whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in the Federal Election Campaign Act violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court held that the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II) remains binding and that the Act’s limits on coordinated party expenditures do not facially violate the First Amendment. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that changes in legal doctrine, statutory amendments, and factual developments since 2001 undermined Colorado II. The court also denied the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge, noting that it was too broad and would effectively nullify Colorado II. The court concluded that the limits on coordinated party expenditures do not violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications." View "National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Three Kentucky Republican Party county executive committees challenged the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance’s prohibition on expending funds to support a state constitutional amendment on the November general election ballot. The committees sought an advisory opinion from the Registry, which concluded that they could not use funds raised for party nominees to support a constitutional amendment and would need to form a political issues committee for such expenditures. The committees argued that this restriction violated their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied the committees' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the requirement to form a political issues committee imposed only a minimal burden on their First Amendment rights, justified by the governmental interest in transparency and disclosure. The court concluded that the Registry’s actions met the standards of strict scrutiny, exacting scrutiny, or rational basis review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and granted an injunction pending appeal. The court found that the executive committees were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim. It determined that the Registry’s prohibition on spending in support of a constitutional amendment burdened the committees' political speech. The court applied strict scrutiny, concluding that the Registry’s restriction was not narrowly tailored to the asserted interest in disclosure. The court noted that less restrictive alternatives, such as imposing disclosure requirements on executive committees, could achieve the same ends without restricting speech. The Registry was enjoined from enforcing its advisory opinion against the committees, and expedited briefing was ordered for the appeal. View "Boone County Republican Party Executive Committee v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The relator, Justin Tjaden, sought a writ of mandamus to have his name placed on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot as an independent candidate for the office of state representative of Ohio House District 99. Tjaden's petition was found to be 124 valid signatures short of the required number. He argued that the boards of elections exceeded their authority by invalidating signatures as "not genuine" and violated his procedural due process and equal protection rights. Tjaden also contended that the statutory requirement for independent candidates to submit a petition with signatures amounting to at least one percent of registered voters who cast ballots for governor in the 2022 general election was unconstitutional.The Geauga County Board of Elections determined that Tjaden's petition contained 371 valid signatures, which was insufficient to qualify for the ballot. Tjaden attempted to challenge this decision in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas but was unsuccessful due to procedural issues. He then filed a complaint in the same court and a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court dismissed his first mandamus action based on the jurisdictional-priority rule but allowed him to file a second mandamus action after his common-pleas-court case was removed to federal court.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Tjaden's writ of mandamus. The court held that Tjaden did not have enough valid signatures to qualify for the ballot, even if all contested signatures were deemed valid. The court also found that Tjaden's procedural due process rights were not violated, as the mandamus action provided him with the necessary process. Additionally, the court declined to address Tjaden's equal protection claim, stating that even if the statute were declared unconstitutional, there would be no statutory requirement for an independent candidate to qualify for the ballot. Thus, the court denied the writ. View "State ex rel. Tjaden v. Geauga County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Democratic Party activist and former candidate for Plano City Council, was indicted for violating Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code. This statute prohibits knowingly representing in a campaign communication that the communication emanates from a source other than its true source, with the intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election. The appellant sent text messages that appeared to come from a Republican or conservative campaign, identifying Republicans in local nonpartisan races. In response, the appellant filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as it regulated core political speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.The trial court denied the appellant's application. On appeal, the Fifth Court of Appeals agreed with the appellant, finding that the statute was not narrowly tailored and did not survive strict scrutiny. The appellate court held that the statute's broad reach was problematic and ordered the trial court to dismiss the indictment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case upon the State's petition. The State argued that the statute was narrowly drafted and survived strict scrutiny. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. The court found that the statute was a content-based restriction on protected speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard. It was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of preventing dishonest conduct in elections. The court affirmed the Fifth Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the statute violated the First Amendment. View "EX PARTE STAFFORD" on Justia Law