Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A group of Utah voters, led by Ian Daniel Phillips, sought to initiate state legislation that would impose an age limit on Utah candidates for federal office. The Lieutenant Governor of Utah rejected the group's initiative application, concluding that the proposed law was "patently unconstitutional" under U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, a Supreme Court case that forbids states from enacting laws imposing qualifications on candidates for federal congressional office. The group then sued the Lieutenant Governor, seeking a declaration that the initiative is not patently unconstitutional and could become law if enacted.The district court dismissed the group's complaint, ruling that the proposed initiative is "squarely foreclosed by" Thornton, a decision that the court had no authority to overrule. The group appealed, maintaining that Thornton should be overruled because its prohibition on state-created qualifications for federal officeholders violates the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, they acknowledged that the Supreme Court of the State of Utah lacks authority to overturn Thornton and asked the court to affirm the district court’s decision, thereby paving the way for them to petition the United States Supreme Court for review.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the group had appellate standing, despite their concession that they cannot prevail at this stage of the appeal. The court also agreed with the district court that the proposed law is patently unconstitutional under Thornton. Therefore, the group did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. View "Phillips v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The case involves Greater Birmingham Ministries, a multi-faith, multi-racial organization that promotes voter registration efforts in Alabama, and the Secretary of State for the State of Alabama. The organization requested electronic production of several voter lists, including records of individual felons disqualified from voting by Alabama, invoking the public disclosure provision of the National Voter Registration Act. The organization argued that the records should be produced electronically and at no cost. The Secretary of State agreed to provide an electronic version of the first list of voter records at a cost of one cent per name but refused to provide any records related to felony disqualifications, asserting that the request exceeded the scope of the Act.The district court ruled that the National Voter Registration Act entitled Greater Birmingham Ministries to both sets of records and that electronic disclosure was required in the specific circumstances of this case. The court also ruled that the Act entitled the Secretary to charge a “reasonable fee,” connected “to the actual costs he incurs in producing responsive voter records.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order. The court held that the voter records that Greater Birmingham Ministries requested are covered by the National Voter Registration Act’s public disclosure provision. However, the court ruled that the Act does not require the Secretary to turn those records over in an electronic format. Therefore, the district court’s injunction ordering the Secretary to produce the records electronically was improper. The same is true for its direction that the parties reach agreement on a reasonable fee. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of civil rights organizations, voters, and an election official who sought to challenge recent amendments to Texas's election code, alleging that these amendments violated the United States Constitution and several federal statutes. The defendant was the District Attorney for Harris County, sued in her official capacity. The district court denied the District Attorney's motion to dismiss, holding that she was not immune from the plaintiffs' constitutional claims and that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims against her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the district court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional claims as barred by sovereign immunity. The court did not reach the issue of standing. The court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.The court's decision was based on the principle of sovereign immunity, which generally protects state officials from being sued in their official capacities. However, there is an exception to this rule, known as the Ex parte Young exception, which allows federal courts to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state statutes. The court found that the District Attorney did not have a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the challenged laws to fall within this exception. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Attorney was immune from the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. View "Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lodging tax increase proposal in McCurtain County, Oklahoma, intended to fund a new county hospital. The Board of County Commissioners for McCurtain County approved the proposal to be submitted to the voters. However, the Board did not publish the proposal in a county newspaper for four weeks before the election as required by Title 19 O.S. 2021 §383. Instead, the Board and the Hospital engaged in a three-month campaign to inform voters of the measure through various means such as radio advertisements, billboards, newspaper articles, town hall meetings, and social media posts. After the measure was approved by the voters, a lodging renter and property owner filed a lawsuit seeking to have the election declared null and void due to the lack of newspaper publication. The Hospital sought to have the election upheld.The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and Hospital, and against the lodging renter and property owner. The renter and owner appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that because the county commissioners neglected to follow the statutory publication requirements, the voter-approved lodging tax increase is invalid. The court emphasized that the Legislature has mandated what constitutes adequate notice by publication and anything less than strict compliance requires the court to invalidate the election. The court also encouraged the legislature to consider revisiting and possibly updating publication requirements to be more compatible with today's methods of communication. The decision of the lower court was reversed. View "Cathey v. Board of County Commissioners for McCurtain County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the petitioner, Ryan Binkley, who sought to have his name included on the Republican Party of Minnesota's ballot for the 2024 presidential nomination primary. However, the Chair of the Republican Party of Minnesota did not include Binkley as a candidate when notifying the Minnesota Secretary of State, Steve Simon, of the candidates for its ballot. Consequently, Binkley and his campaign committee filed a petition with the court, arguing that the procedures established by Minnesota Statutes section 207A.13, subdivision 2(a), which allow a major political party to determine the candidates that will appear on its ballot for the presidential nomination primary, violate the Electors Clause of the United States Constitution.The case was brought before the Minnesota Supreme Court after the petitioners' claim was denied in the lower court. The petitioners argued that the Electors Clause prohibits state-based favoritism on ballots through the exclusion of qualified candidates. The Secretary of State, however, contended that the presidential nomination primary is not subject to the Electors Clause because Minnesota does not use the presidential nomination primary to appoint presidential electors.The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the Secretary of State, ruling that the presidential nomination primary is not part of the process that Minnesota uses to appoint presidential electors. Therefore, the statutes that govern the presidential nomination primary do not fall within the scope of the Electors Clause. The court concluded that the petitioners' claim that section 207A.13, subdivision 2(a) violates the Electors Clause fails as a matter of law. The petition was thus denied. View "J. Binkley for President 2024 vs. Simon" on Justia Law

The case involves a review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 54 (2024) (IP 54), which was challenged by the petitioners, Sandy Chung and Yvonne Garcia. IP 54, also known as the "Oregon Crimefighting Act," proposes significant changes to the pretrial release system for individuals charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors in Oregon. The Act also empowers local governments to pass ordinances to fight local crime and requires the state to pay for jail space for those charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors who need to be held until trial.The Attorney General prepared a draft ballot title for IP 54 and, after considering public comments, modified the draft and certified the final ballot title. The petitioners, who had submitted comments on the draft, challenged the certified ballot title, arguing that the summary did not comply with the requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2)(d).The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with the requirements. The court agreed with the petitioners that the summary was deficient. It found that the summary did not adequately convey the breadth of the changes that IP 54 would effectuate, particularly in relation to pretrial release decisions at arraignment. The court concluded that the summary must be modified to clarify that IP 54 would override existing law and to provide a more accurate description of the changes that IP 54 would make to the current law governing pretrial release at arraignment. The court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Chung v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed a case involving the League of Women Voters of Kansas and other organizations against the Kansas Secretary of State and the Kansas Attorney General. The plaintiffs challenged three new Kansas election laws, alleging that they violated various provisions of the Kansas Constitution. The laws in question prohibited the false representation of an election official, prohibited election officials from counting advance ballots that did not have a signature or had a signature that an election official determined did not match the signature on file, and prohibited any person from collecting and returning more than 10 advance ballots for other voters.The case was initially heard in the Shawnee County District Court, which denied the plaintiffs' request for a temporary injunction against the false representation statute. The court also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the claims against the signature verification requirement and the ballot collection restriction. The plaintiffs appealed these decisions, and the cases were consolidated.The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of their claim that the false representation statute was constitutionally infirm. Therefore, the district court erred in denying their request for a temporary injunction. The court also held that the signature verification requirement was a valid effort by the Legislature to provide "proper proofs" of the right to be a qualified elector. However, the court remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the statute and its implementing regulations complied with the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim that the ballot collection restriction was constitutionally infirm, because the restriction was not a new qualification on the right to be an elector, and because the proscribed activity—the delivery of ballots—was not political speech or expressive conduct. View "League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab" on Justia Law

The case involves Conrad Reynolds, Arkansas Voter Integrity Initiative, Inc., and Restore Election Integrity Arkansas (collectively referred to as the petitioners) who filed an original action against John Thurston, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, and the State Board of Election Commissioners (collectively referred to as the respondents). The petitioners submitted two proposed measures to amend the Arkansas Constitution to the Attorney General for approval. One measure would have required elections to be conducted with paper ballots, and the other would have changed absentee-voting procedures. The Attorney General rejected both measures, citing various reasons such as conflicting provisions, unclear language, and redundancy. The petitioners resubmitted the measures to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the State Board of Election Commissioners for certification, but the Secretary and the Board refused to examine the sufficiency of the ballot titles and popular names.The petitioners then filed this original-action complaint, asking the court to independently certify the legal sufficiency of the measures’ ballot titles and popular names and order them placed on the November 2024 ballot. They also asked the court to declare Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-9-107 and section 7-9-126(e) unconstitutional, arguing that these sections violate Article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution.The Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed the complaint, ruling that it only has original jurisdiction over the sufficiency of petitions after the Secretary of State has made a sufficiency determination. The court found that the petitioners' request for a declaration that the statutes are unconstitutional falls outside its original jurisdiction. The court also noted that the petitioners could have filed a declaratory-judgment action in the circuit court to determine the constitutionality of the statutes. View "Reynolds v. Thurston" on Justia Law

A group of Ohio voters sought to amend the Ohio Constitution through a ballot initiative. To do so, they had to submit their proposed amendment, a summary of the amendment, and one thousand supporting signatures to the Ohio Attorney General, who then had to certify that the summary was a fair and truthful statement of the proposed amendment. The Attorney General, David Yost, declined to certify the plaintiffs' summary on at least six occasions. After the most recent denial, the plaintiffs sought review from the Supreme Court of Ohio, which declined to grant expedited review. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint in federal district court, alleging that the Attorney General's enforcement of the certification requirement violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by creating an unconstitutional obstacle to their ballot access and their ability to advocate for their proposed amendment. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims and were not barred by sovereign immunity. The court also determined that the certification requirement imposed a severe burden on the plaintiffs' core political speech, and that the state had not shown that the requirement was narrowly tailored to its interests. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim. The court also found that the remaining factors for granting a preliminary injunction weighed in the plaintiffs' favor. The court therefore granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief, enjoining the Attorney General from enforcing the certification requirement against the plaintiffs. View "Brown v. Yost" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed a case involving the redrawing of congressional districts in South Carolina following the 2020 Census. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and a voter from District 1 challenged the new map, alleging that it resulted in racial gerrymanders in certain districts and diluted the electoral power of the state's black voters. The District Court held that the state drew District 1 with a 17% black voting-age population target in mind, violating the Equal Protection Clause and unlawfully diluting the black vote.The Supreme Court disagreed with the District Court's findings. The Court found that the District Court erred in its conclusion that race predominated in the design of District 1. The Court noted that the challengers did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations. The Court also criticized the District Court for not drawing an adverse inference from the challengers' failure to submit an alternative map that would have allowed the state to achieve its districting goals while maintaining a higher black voting-age population in District 1.The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court concluded that the same findings of fact and reasoning that guided the court's racial-gerrymandering analysis also guided the analysis of the challengers' independent vote-dilution claim, and that conclusion also could not stand. The Court found that the District Court erred in conflating the two claims. View "Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP" on Justia Law